SOURCE: AFI
The AUKUS pact, announced in 2021 as a trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, was initially heralded as a major defense breakthrough. At the core of this pact was the promise of advanced nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) for Australia, giving the nation a formidable naval capability in the Indo-Pacific. However, recent admissions from the U.S. Congress suggest that Australia may not actually receive these submarines after all. Instead, the U.S. has proposed an alternative plan to station U.S.-crewed Virginia-class SSNs in Australia. This controversial move has sparked debates not only about the viability of AUKUS but also about Australia’s strategic autonomy and the future of its naval ambitions.
Given these developments, an intriguing question arises: Should India, a key player in the Indo-Pacific, step in and offer Australia a partnership in its SSN program as an alternative to the faltering AUKUS submarine deal?
When AUKUS was first announced, the deal was seen as a bold step to counter China’s growing naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. Under the pact, Australia was to acquire up to eight nuclear-powered submarines with cutting-edge technology from either the U.S. or the U.K., significantly enhancing its defense capabilities. However, the complexities of the deal, including production delays, the sheer cost, and Australia’s lack of experience in operating nuclear submarines, have severely hampered progress.
Now, the U.S. Congress has openly admitted that Australia may not receive these submarines, or at least not in the way originally envisioned. The latest proposal on the table involves building additional Virginia-class submarines, but instead of transferring three to five of them to Australia, these subs would be manned and operated by the U.S. Navy, merely stationed in Australian waters. This alternative, if implemented, would deprive Australia of its intended sovereign SSN capability, leaving it reliant on U.S. forces stationed on its territory. This proposition risks undermining Australia’s strategic autonomy while turning its naval ambitions into little more than a hosting arrangement for foreign military assets.
Amidst the uncertainty surrounding AUKUS, India finds itself in a unique position. As one of the few nations developing an indigenous nuclear submarine program, India could potentially offer Australia an alternative partnership. India has already made significant progress in the development of its SSN program, with the first indigenously-built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, entering service in 2016. The country is now focused on building a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to complement its growing naval power.
India and Australia have seen their defense relationship strengthen significantly in recent years, especially through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alongside the U.S. and Japan. Australia’s inclusion in naval exercises like the Malabar series, where India is a key participant, reflects the growing naval cooperation between the two nations. Offering Australia a partnership in India’s SSN program would be a natural extension of this relationship, and it could provide Australia with a viable alternative to AUKUS.
Advantages of an India-Australia SSN Collaboration
Technology Sharing and Indigenous Development: India’s ongoing development of indigenous nuclear technologies could be beneficial for Australia. By sharing technical know-how, the two countries could accelerate the development of Australia’s own submarine capabilities, reducing the reliance on external powers like the U.S. This would not only build Australian expertise but also establish a stronger foundation for long-term defense collaboration between the two nations.
Strategic Autonomy for Australia: Unlike the new U.S. proposal under AUKUS, where U.S.-crewed submarines would be stationed in Australia, an India-Australia partnership could allow Australia to retain control over its own submarines. India’s experience in operating and developing nuclear submarines, including its partnership with Russia on the INS Chakra, positions it as a capable partner for helping Australia establish its own SSN capabilities.
Cost and Flexibility: Building submarines through India’s SSN program could be more cost-effective than the expensive Virginia-class submarines that Australia was expected to purchase from the U.S. By partnering with India, Australia might have the opportunity to co-develop and co-produce SSNs that are tailored to its specific defense needs in the Indo-Pacific, offering flexibility that the AUKUS arrangement might not provide.
Strengthening the Indo-Pacific Security Framework: An India-Australia SSN partnership would strengthen the broader Indo-Pacific security framework. With China’s growing assertiveness in the region, both countries share a vested interest in ensuring free and open maritime routes. Australia’s acquisition of SSNs through an Indian partnership would enhance the naval power of both nations, further solidifying their role in maintaining regional security.
While an India-Australia SSN collaboration offers many potential benefits, there are challenges to consider. Developing and operating nuclear-powered submarines requires significant expertise and infrastructure, which Australia currently lacks. Partnering with India would require a long-term commitment to technology transfer, training, and infrastructure development on Australia’s part.
Additionally, Australia’s existing relationships with the U.S. and the U.K. could complicate a pivot toward India’s SSN program. A shift in defense procurement priorities could strain Australia’s ties with its traditional allies, though it’s worth noting that the U.S. has itself proposed an alternative that leaves Australia without its own submarines.