SOURCE: AFI
For over two decades, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been grappling with the urgent need to replenish its dwindling fighter squadron strength, a need that first became painfully evident during the 1999 Kargil War. The call to procure 126 new fighter jets, identified as critical to maintaining India’s air superiority, has since spiraled into a complex web of political delays, bureaucratic red tape, and shifting priorities.
Despite successive governments, from the Congress-led UPA to the BJP-led NDA, no administration has successfully navigated the complex defense procurement process to deliver a full fleet of modern fighter jets to the IAF. Today, as the IAF continues to grapple with depleting squadron strength, the blame for this 25-year debacle lies squarely at the feet of political indecision and a flawed procurement process.
The 1999 Kargil War underscored the urgent need for modern fighter jets. The IAF’s existing fleet, dominated by aging MiG-21s, faced significant limitations against high-altitude targets. In response, the government launched the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender in the early 2000s, aiming to acquire 126 fighter jets to rejuvenate the IAF’s fleet and restore its combat readiness. This procurement was critical for maintaining a squadron strength of 42 squadrons, essential for India’s two-front war capabilities.
But despite the urgency, the MMRCA tender soon found itself mired in prolonged evaluations, contentious negotiations, and political indecision. By the time a decision seemed within reach, years had passed, and the nation had endured successive government changes, each introducing new layers of scrutiny and delay.
During the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, the MMRCA program progressed at a glacial pace. After a grueling evaluation process, Dassault’s Rafale emerged as the preferred option in 2012. Yet, the procurement deal soon hit bureaucratic snags, with concerns over pricing, offsets, and manufacturing requirements within India. The Congress-led UPA government, notorious for its cautious and often overly scrutinized approach to defense procurement, let the negotiations drag on without any tangible results.
Internal disagreements, a lack of political will, and a series of corruption scandals only exacerbated the delays. The procurement process, already complex, became a lightning rod for political controversy, with opposition parties questioning the transparency and integrity of the deal. By the time the UPA government left office in 2014, the deal was far from complete, and the IAF was still without the fighter jets it desperately needed.
When the BJP-led NDA took office in 2014, hopes were high that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would bring a decisive end to the MMRCA saga. In 2015, Modi announced a scaled-down emergency procurement of 36 Rafale jets, citing the IAF’s critical needs. The reduced number was justified as a “stop-gap” measure to address immediate requirements while India would work on its indigenous fighter projects, particularly the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.
However, this decision to slash the original requirement from 126 to 36 fighters only further underscored the lack of a cohesive strategy to address the IAF’s needs. The 36 Rafales were certainly a step forward, but they were far from sufficient to restore the IAF’s operational strength to required levels. The decision to cut the order drew criticism from defense experts and opposition parties, who argued that the government had simply postponed the inevitable need for a larger procurement plan.
Furthermore, the Rafale deal itself became embroiled in intense political controversy, with accusations of irregularities and allegations of favoritism in the offset deals. This controversy took up precious time and attention, and instead of moving forward with additional procurements, the government and opposition became locked in a bitter political battle, once again leaving the IAF’s needs unattended.
Today, the IAF’s fighter squadrons are down to around 30—well below the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons and far short of what is needed to secure India’s airspace against growing threats. Successive governments’ failure to fulfill the initial requirement has left the IAF operating with an outdated fleet, with a significant portion of its frontline fighters nearing the end of their service life.
This alarming gap in squadron strength weakens India’s combat readiness and complicates the IAF’s ability to project power in the region. In a strategic environment where neighboring Pakistan and China are aggressively expanding and modernizing their air forces, the IAF’s dwindling fleet is a clear vulnerability.
The Congress government’s indecision and the BJP government’s limited response have each, in different ways, contributed to the IAF’s current crisis. The MMRCA tender, which began as a bold initiative to revolutionize the IAF, has instead become emblematic of India’s inability to execute defense procurements effectively. While political parties argue over procedural details and offsets, the IAF has been forced to make do with aging jets, extending the operational life of platforms like the MiG-21 well past their prime.
India’s defense procurement process is clearly in need of reform. The repeated delays in the MMRCA program reveal a system hampered by political indecision, lack of accountability, and bureaucratic inefficiency. The protracted procurement timelines and lack of coherent strategy leave the IAF unable to maintain its operational edge—a consequence that could have serious implications for India’s national security.
Both the Congress and BJP governments have had the opportunity to address this crisis, yet neither has taken decisive action. The Congress failed to finalize the deal in its tenure, despite years of negotiations. The BJP’s response, while more decisive in some respects, has been limited in scope and overshadowed by political controversy.
The IAF’s squadron strength should not be held hostage to shifting political priorities or election cycles. India’s security depends on a well-equipped air force, capable of meeting both current and emerging threats. Successive governments have a responsibility to ensure that defense procurement is driven by strategic requirements, not by political calculations. The IAF cannot wait another 25 years for the political class to finally address its needs.