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SOURCE: AFI

On April 16, 2025, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Air Force and Air Defence (AFAD) signed a letter of intent (LOI) with the Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) for “comprehensive co-operation” on South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae, a 4.5-generation fighter jet developed by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). This agreement, which includes UAE participation in KF-21 exercises and visits to South Korean operational units, signals the UAE’s keen interest in potentially acquiring the aircraft, even amidst its existing commitment to 80 Dassault Rafale F4 jets.

The UAE’s engagement with the KF-21, alongside reported interest in Turkey’s TF Kaan fighter, underscores a growing trend of Gulf nations diversifying their defence portfolios through partnerships with emerging aerospace powers. For India, which is developing its 5.5-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), this development highlights the critical need to secure international partners early to ensure export success and global competitiveness.

The KF-21 Boramae, designed to replace South Korea’s aging F-4E Phantom II fleet, is a twin-engine, multirole fighter bridging the gap between fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft. With a payload capacity across 10 external hardpoints, compatibility with NATO-standard munitions like the Meteor and AIM-120 AMRAAM, and a new indigenous Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile-II (SRAAM-II), the KF-21 offers cost-effective performance for nations seeking advanced yet affordable fighters. Serial production began in July 2024, with the RoKAF expecting initial deliveries by late 2026.

The UAE’s interest in the KF-21, formalized during a ceremony in Gyeryong, South Korea, where Major General Rashed Mohammed A. Al Shamsi flew the two-seat variant, stems from its strategic pivot toward diversifying defence suppliers. The LOI enables UAE personnel to observe KF-21 air exercises and gain insights into its operational framework, potentially paving the way for a future procurement deal. This move follows the UAE’s 2023 expression of interest via the Tawazun Economic Council and comes amid strained relations with Indonesia, a former KF-21 co-developer that has faltered on payments.

The UAE’s engagement mirrors broader regional trends. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has explored both the KF-21 and Turkey’s TF Kaan, a 4.75-generation fighter, as alternatives to Western platforms like the F-35, reflecting a desire to hedge against geopolitical dependencies. These partnerships highlight how South Korea and Turkey have proactively courted international allies to bolster their fighter programs’ financial viability and export potential.

India’s AMCA, spearheaded by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), is envisioned as a 5.5-generation stealth fighter to replace the IAF’s aging Mirage 2000 and Jaguar fleets by the mid-2030s. With features like a low radar cross-section, internal weapons bays, advanced avionics, and supercruise capability, the AMCA aims to rival platforms like the F-35 and China’s J-20. The program, approved for prototype development in September 2024, is expected to see its first flight by 2029 and induction by 2035, with an estimated cost of Rs 15,000 crore for five prototypes.

Unlike the KF-21, which prioritizes affordability and interoperability, or the Kaan, which balances stealth with regional geopolitical signaling, the AMCA targets cutting-edge stealth and multi-role capabilities, positioning it as a premium offering. However, India’s domestic focus and lack of early international partnerships risk limiting its export potential, especially in a crowded global fighter market where South Korea, Turkey, and China are aggressively pitching their platforms.

Why India Needs Early Partners for AMCA Exports
The UAE-South Korea KF-21 partnership offers critical lessons for India’s AMCA program, particularly the importance of securing international partners early to ensure export orders and program sustainability. Here’s why India must act proactively:

Financial and Technological Collaboration: Fighter development is prohibitively expensive, with the AMCA’s R&D costs already straining India’s defence budget of Rs 6.21 lakh crore (2024-25). International partners, like Indonesia’s initial 20% stake in the KF-21, can share costs and risks. The UAE’s potential investment in the KF-21 could fund further upgrades, a model India could emulate to offset AMCA’s costs and enhance its technological edge, such as integrating indigenous Uttam AESA radars or hypersonic missiles.

Market Access and Credibility: Early partnerships signal market confidence and secure export orders before production ramps up. South Korea’s outreach to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and Turkey’s to Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how Middle Eastern nations, flush with defence budgets, are prime targets. India, yet to identify AMCA partners, risks losing out to competitors if it delays engagement with nations like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, which operate Indian-origin platforms like the Su-30 MKI.

Geopolitical Leverage: Partnering with Gulf nations or ASEAN countries could bolster India’s strategic influence, countering China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East. The UAE’s interest in non-Western platforms reflects a desire for diversified suppliers, a gap India could fill with the AMCA, especially given its neutral geopolitical stance compared to China or Turkey.

Production and Supply Chain Integration: Early partners can integrate their industries into the AMCA’s supply chain, as seen with South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace supplying KF-21 parts. This not only reduces costs but also creates stakeholder commitment, ensuring long-term orders. India’s private sector, including Tata and Mahindra, could benefit from such collaborations, enhancing domestic defence manufacturing.

Countering Regional Competitors: China’s promotion of the J-35 and reported sixth-generation fighter at Middle Eastern expos underscores the urgency for India to position the AMCA as a viable alternative. South Korea’s KF-21, already in production, and Turkey’s Kaan, with its first flight in 2024, are ahead in the export race. India must engage potential buyers now to avoid being outpaced.

India faces hurdles in securing AMCA partners. The program’s delayed timeline—first flight in 2029 versus the KF-21’s operational entry in 2026—may deter buyers seeking near-term solutions. HAL’s history of delivery delays, as seen with the Tejas LCA, could undermine confidence, necessitating robust project management reforms. Additionally, the AMCA’s advanced features, while competitive, increase costs, potentially pricing it out of markets favoring cheaper 4.5-generation fighters like the KF-21.

To overcome these, India could target nations with existing defence ties, such as Vietnam, which operates Indian-supplied equipment, or the UAE, which has explored Indian defence systems like the Akash missile. Offering co-development roles, technology transfers, or offset agreements, as South Korea did with Indonesia, could sweeten deals. India must also leverage international air shows, like Aero India, to showcase AMCA mock-ups and engage potential partners, emulating China’s aggressive marketing at IDEX 2025.

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