SOURCE: AFI
In any modern conflict, information dominance and situational awareness are often the deciding factors between success and failure. For the Indian Air Force (IAF), a potential future conflict with Pakistan demands a strategy that goes beyond tactical airstrikes and punitive retaliation. It requires shaping the battlespace by blinding the enemy early—specifically by targeting critical assets such as the Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) operated by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
AWACS aircraft like the Saab 2000 Erieye are strategic force multipliers, enabling long-range detection, real-time command and control, and coordinated interception operations. These platforms serve as the eyes and ears of the PAF, extending radar coverage deep into Indian airspace and enabling early warning of IAF fighter or missile movements.
Neutralizing these platforms—especially in the opening hours of a larger conflict—would severely degrade Pakistan’s ability to mount an effective aerial defense or coordinate its fighter assets.
India has recently inducted advanced long-range surface-to-air missile (LRSAM) systems, including the Barak-8ER and the S-400 Triumf, capable of engaging high-value airborne targets well beyond 250–400 kilometers depending on the variant. These platforms offer the IAF and Indian strategic command the capability to strike deep targets inside Pakistan’s airspace or air defense bubble without crossing the international border, thereby reducing risk while maintaining escalation control.
Utilizing such systems to interdict high-value airborne targets like AWACS or even aerial tankers and ELINT aircraft during heightened alert periods could lay the groundwork for:
- Crippling PAF’s Battle Management Network : Without airborne radar coverage, the PAF would be forced to depend on ground-based radars, which are limited in range, mobility, and survivability, especially in mountainous terrain or heavily contested environments.
- Enabling Deeper IAF Strikes ; With reduced detection ranges, the IAF could penetrate deeper with strike aircraft, stand-off weapons, or hypersonic missiles, striking high-value targets with lower risk of interception.
- Forcing Pakistan into a Defensive Posture : Such an attack would place the PAF on the strategic backfoot, compelling it to pull back air assets, reconfigure defensive operations, and divert resources away from offensive planning.
A strike on an AWACS platform—especially preemptively—would be viewed as a highly escalatory act under international norms. However, in the face of credible intelligence pointing to an imminent threat, such a move can be framed as a preventive strike within the context of national defense, especially if Pakistan’s AWACS is actively tracking Indian airspace or coordinating hostile activities.
Moreover, using surface-based air defense systems rather than manned fighter aircraft allows India to maintain strategic ambiguity, preserving a degree of plausible deniability in the early stages of engagement.
The IAF must shift from a reactive to a proactive warfighting mindset. Taking out deep assets like AWACS isn’t just about causing damage—it’s about shaping the conditions for decisive action. In the age of network-centric warfare, the first moves must aim at decapitating the enemy’s ability to see, decide, and respond.
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