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SOURCE: AFI

India’s military aviation sector stands at a critical juncture, grappling with inefficiencies that threaten its ability to deliver cutting-edge capabilities to the armed forces. As global warfare evolves—evidenced by the transformative use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in conflicts like Armenia-Azerbaijan and Russia-Ukraine—the Indian Air Force (IAF) remains the nation’s primary deterrent, reliant on Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as its main equipper.

Yet, a fragmented ecosystem of overlapping government agencies, redundant projects, and organizational bloat hampers progress toward self-reliance. A time-bound review and rationalization of these entities, as argued by retired Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur in a recent opinion piece, is essential to ensure a focused path to indigenous excellence. This article explores the challenges and proposes a roadmap for reform, drawing on the need for efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision.

India’s military aviation sector is a labyrinth of agencies, each pursuing parallel goals with little coordination. HAL, a Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU), is tasked with delivering aircraft, helicopters, and related systems to the armed forces. Yet, its activities extend far beyond this core mandate, encompassing subsidiaries like a helicopter training academy and a management academy offering postgraduate diplomas. This diversification dilutes HAL’s focus on its primary role: timely production of aviation assets.

Beyond HAL, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) operates multiple labs—such as the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), Centre for Airborne Systems (CABS), and Defence Bioengineering and Electromedical Laboratory (DEBEL)—each engaged in aerospace R&D. Meanwhile, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) runs the National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL), which develops its own light transport aircraft, duplicating efforts by HAL and ADA. Bengaluru, India’s aerospace hub, exemplifies this clutter: a stone’s throw from HAL’s facilities, NAL and ADA maintain separate design and flight test centers, wasting resources on redundant infrastructure.

This sprawl extends nationwide, with facilities in Hyderabad, Lucknow, Nashik, and Koraput, among others. The proliferation of UAV projects—undertaken by public and private players without a unified strategy—further underscores the lack of a national vision. As Bahadur notes, “Throw a stone near the old airfield in Bengaluru, and nine times out of ten, it will hit an aviation entity.” This fragmentation undermines efficiency and delays critical programs like the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

Global aerospace leaders like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Airbus demonstrate the value of specialization and consolidation. No major aircraft manufacturer produces its own engines; instead, they partner with dedicated firms like Rolls-Royce or Pratt & Whitney. HAL, however, maintains separate engine divisions for aircraft and helicopters, each with independent R&D centers. DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), tasked with developing a fighter engine for decades, has yet to deliver a viable product. Merging HAL’s engine R&D with GTRE into a single, focused entity could optimize intellectual and financial capital, accelerating projects like the Kaveri engine.

The Ordnance Factory Board’s (OFB) restructuring offers a domestic precedent. In 2021, the inefficient OFB was divided into seven corporate entities to enhance accountability and performance. Applying a similar model to HAL—by excising non-core divisions like engine manufacturing or training academies for corporatization or privatization—could streamline operations and attract private investment. Such reforms would align with the government’s push for indigenization while fostering competition and innovation.

HAL’s centrality to India’s air power makes its inefficiencies particularly concerning. Delays in delivering Tejas variants, prolonged grounding of Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) due to technical issues, and slow progress on projects like the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) have frustrated the IAF and Army. The recent ALH crisis, with over 330 helicopters grounded after a fatal crash in January 2025, highlights HAL’s struggles with quality control and responsiveness.

A glaring governance gap compounds these issues: the IAF, HAL’s primary customer, has no representation on its Board of Directors. This anomaly, as Bahadur emphasizes, must be rectified immediately to ensure alignment between HAL’s output and the IAF’s operational needs. Including IAF officers in HAL’s decision-making could bridge communication gaps, prioritize critical projects, and foster accountability.

Modern warfare increasingly relies on UAVs, from low-cost drones to sophisticated systems like the U.S.’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). India, however, lacks a cohesive strategy to harness this technology. Multiple agencies—HAL, DRDO, NAL, and private firms—are developing UAVs independently, leading to fragmented efforts and suboptimal designs. A national UAV roadmap, overseen by a centralized authority, could prioritize requirements, standardize platforms, and integrate private-sector innovation. Without such a framework, India risks falling behind adversaries like China, which has rapidly scaled its drone capabilities.

A Roadmap for Reform

To reorganize India’s military aviation sector, the government must act decisively:

  1. Time-Bound Review: Establish a high-level committee, including MoD, IAF, and industry experts, to audit HAL, DRDO, and NAL’s projects within six months. Identify overlaps, redundancies, and non-core activities for restructuring.
  2. Consolidate R&D: Merge HAL’s engine divisions and GTRE into a single entity focused on aero-engine development. Similarly, unify UAV efforts under a dedicated agency to streamline design, testing, and production.
  3. Corporatize Non-Core Divisions: Spin off HAL’s training academies, engine manufacturing, and other subsidiaries into separate entities, inviting private participation to enhance efficiency.
  4. Strengthen Governance: Appoint IAF representatives to HAL’s Board and mandate regular performance audits to ensure accountability.
  5. National Aerospace Vision: Formulate a 20-year roadmap integrating manned and unmanned platforms, prioritizing modularity, interoperability, and export potential. Engage private players like Tata and Mahindra to complement public-sector efforts.

Reforms are not just about efficiency; they’re about national security. The IAF, facing a squadron strength of 30 against a sanctioned 42, relies on HAL to deliver Tejas, ALH, and future platforms like AMCA and TEDBF. China’s rapid aerospace advances—fielding 5th-generation fighters and hypersonic drones—demand urgency. A streamlined sector could also boost exports, with platforms like Tejas and BrahMos gaining traction in markets like Vietnam and the Philippines.

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