SOURCE: AFI
The adaptation of deck-based fighter jets, originally designed for naval carrier operations, into land-based variants for air force use is a complex engineering feat that introduces a unique set of challenges. China’s Shenyang J-35A, unveiled as a land-based stealth fighter for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) at the Zhuhai Airshow in November 2024, exemplifies this trend.
Derived from the naval J-35, itself an evolution of the FC-31 prototype, the J-35A’s transition from sea to land highlights inherent design compromises and operational hurdles. As Pakistan emerges as a potential first export customer for this fifth-generation fighter, with reports suggesting a deal for 40 J-35A jets by 2027, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) is poised to become an experimental proving ground for China’s cutting-edge but untested technology. This article explores the problems of converting deck-based fighters like the J-35A for air force roles and why Pakistan’s adoption positions it as a testing bed for Chinese innovation.
Deck-based fighter jets are engineered with specific features to withstand the rigors of carrier operations—catapult launches, arrested landings, and corrosive maritime environments. Converting these designs for land-based air force use, as seen with the J-35A, introduces several technical and operational challenges.
Naval fighters like the J-35 are built with reinforced airframes, heavier landing gear (e.g., twin-wheel nose gear), and folding wings to endure high-impact carrier landings and fit cramped deck spaces. The J-35A, adapted for the PLAAF, swaps the twin-wheel gear for a single wheel and removes catapult bars and tailhooks, but retains a robust structure. This overbuilt design increases weight—estimated at 17-18 tons empty versus the F-35A’s 13 tons—reducing fuel efficiency and payload capacity for land-based missions where such durability is unnecessary. The smaller wing area of the J-35A, compared to its naval sibling, improves speed but may compromise lift and maneuverability at low speeds, critical for air force training or ground-attack roles.
The J-35A reportedly uses twin WS-21 engines (93-100 kN thrust each), an upgrade from the FC-31’s WS-13E, with plans for the more powerful WS-19. Naval engines prioritize thrust for short takeoffs and quick climbs from carriers, often at the expense of fuel economy and range—key for air force operations over vast landmasses. China’s historical struggles with jet engine reliability, compounded by the WS-21’s unproven status, raise concerns about maintenance complexity and longevity. The humid, saline conditions of Pakistan’s coastal bases like Karachi could exacerbate wear, testing the engine’s resilience beyond China’s controlled environments.
Stealth features like diverterless supersonic inlets (DSI) and internal weapons bays, shared by the J-35 and J-35A, are optimized for naval missions where radar evasion over open water is paramount. For air force roles, integrating these with land-based networks—AWACS like the KJ-500, ground radars, and data links—requires significant software and hardware tweaks. The J-35A’s stealth, while promising (akin to the F-35’s low radar cross-section), lacks the radar-absorbent coatings and manufacturing precision of U.S. designs, potentially reducing its edge against advanced air defenses. Pakistan’s less sophisticated command infrastructure may struggle to exploit this stealth fully, exposing integration gaps.
Naval fighters prioritize fleet defense and maritime strike, whereas air forces demand versatility—air superiority, ground support, and long-range interdiction. The J-35A’s medium size (55 feet long, 36-foot wingspan) and estimated 750-mile combat radius suit carrier task forces but may fall short for Pakistan’s need to patrol a 1,046 km border with India or counter IAF bases deep inland. Its internal payload (2,000 kg) and external hardpoints (6,000 kg) are constrained by its naval heritage, limiting munitions compared to dedicated air force jets like the J-20 or F-22.
Pakistan’s potential acquisition of 40 J-35A jets by 2027, as reported by South China Morning Post and NDTV in December 2024, positions the PAF as a de facto testing ground for China’s fifth-generation technology. Several factors underscore why Pakistan is becoming an experimental state for Beijing:
The J-35A, inducted into the PLAAF in 2024, remains a “black box” with limited public data on its performance, stealth, or reliability. Pakistan’s diverse terrain—deserts, mountains, and coastal zones—offers a live laboratory to stress-test the aircraft beyond China’s controlled trials. PAF operations against Indian S-400 systems or in contested airspace over Kashmir could reveal the J-35A’s counter-stealth capabilities (or lack thereof), providing China with invaluable combat data to refine the design.
Cash-strapped Pakistan, reliant on IMF bailouts and Chinese loans, cannot afford Western alternatives like the F-35 ($80 million/unit) but can procure the J-35A (estimated $40-50 million/unit) through Beijing’s flexible financing. This dependence, cemented by decades of collaboration (e.g., JF-17 Thunder), makes Pakistan a willing guinea pig. China’s $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) ties Islamabad’s military modernization to Beijing’s largesse, ensuring the PAF accepts experimental platforms like the J-35A despite risks.
China aims to break into the global fighter market, where the J-35A competes with Russia’s Su-75 and Western designs. Pakistan’s adoption—potentially the first export of a Chinese fifth-generation jet—serves as a proof-of-concept. Successful PAF operations could attract buyers like Egypt or Azerbaijan, while failures would highlight flaws for China to fix, all at minimal risk to the PLAAF’s own fleet. The PAF’s training on the J-31 (J-35A’s precursor) in China since August 2024, as per Pakistani media, accelerates this process.
Pakistan’s acquisition bolsters its air force against India’s Rafale and forthcoming AMCA, shifting regional dynamics. China benefits indirectly, using the PAF to test the J-35A’s mettle against India’s advanced sensors and missiles (e.g., Astra Mk-2, 160 km range). This proxy role lets China refine its technology without direct confrontation, while Pakistan absorbs the operational and financial burden of early adoption.
For the PAF, the J-35A promises a leap from its ageing F-16s and Mirage jets to fifth-generation stealth, potentially outmatching India’s Tejas Mk1A in stealth and sensors. However, risks abound. The aircraft’s unproven engines and systems could lead to high maintenance costs and downtime—issues the JF-17 faced with its Klimov RD-93. Integrating the J-35A with Pakistan’s ZDK-03 AWACS and JF-17 fleet demands untested interoperability, risking teething troubles in combat. Moreover, Pakistan’s economic fragility may limit spares and upgrades, leaving it dependent on Chinese goodwill.
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