SOURCE: AFI
Recent reports have spotlighted China’s development of interconnected jack-up barges, dubbed “invasion barges” by some analysts, as a potential tool for amphibious operations, particularly in the context of a possible invasion of Taiwan. These barges, designed to form temporary piers by linking together with jack-up supports for stability, could theoretically enable the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to offload troops, tanks, and supplies onto Taiwan’s shores with greater speed and flexibility. However, while this innovation might appear to enhance China’s military capabilities on paper, there are significant reasons to question whether these barges would succeed—or fail spectacularly—in a real-world conflict scenario.
The interconnected jack-up barges are a novel design, reportedly under construction at facilities like the Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI). These vessels are equipped with long ramps or bridges—some extending over 120 meters—and stabilizing jack-up legs that anchor them to the seabed. In theory, they could form a makeshift pier, connecting larger ships (including civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries often used by the PLAN) to the shore, even in areas lacking traditional port infrastructure. This would allow China to bypass heavily defended Taiwanese ports or beaches, landing forces at less fortified coastal sites, such as rocky shores or mudflats.
For an invasion of Taiwan, this capability could be significant. Taiwan’s western coastline features a limited number of suitable landing beaches—perhaps 14 to 24, depending on the analysis—many of which are fortified with anti-landing obstacles, mines, and coastal defenses. The barges could, in principle, expand the range of potential landing zones, complicating Taiwan’s defensive strategy by forcing it to spread its resources thinner. Moreover, the use of civilian ferries in tandem with these barges aligns with China’s civil-military fusion strategy, potentially amplifying the PLAN’s amphibious capacity beyond its organic fleet of landing ships.
Despite their apparent promise, the jack-up barges come with vulnerabilities that could render them ineffective—or even disastrous—in a real conflict. These weaknesses span operational, tactical, and strategic dimensions, each of which could undermine their utility in an invasion of Taiwan.
1. Vulnerability to Attack: A Static, High-Value Target
Once deployed, these interconnected barges would become large, static targets, anchored in place with their jack-up legs embedded in the seabed. In a contested environment, they would be sitting ducks for Taiwan’s arsenal of anti-ship missiles, such as the Hsiung Feng III, which can strike with precision at ranges exceeding 150 kilometers. Taiwan has heavily invested in coastal defense systems, including mobile missile launchers and artillery, specifically to counter amphibious threats. A single well-placed strike could disable or destroy a barge, severing the temporary pier and disrupting the entire offloading process.
Moreover, Taiwan wouldn’t be alone in targeting these barges. In a conflict scenario, the United States and potentially other allies (like Japan or Australia) could deploy air and naval assets—think F-35 jets, P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft, or Arleigh Burke-class destroyers armed with Harpoon missiles—to strike these vulnerable structures from a distance. The barges’ lack of mobility while jacked up and their predictable positioning near landing zones would make them prime targets for preemptive or retaliatory strikes.
2. Weather and Environmental Challenges
While the jack-up legs are designed to provide stability in rough seas, they don’t eliminate the risks posed by the Taiwan Strait’s volatile weather. Typhoons, high waves, and strong currents are common, especially from May to October, and could still disrupt operations or damage the barges. The U.S. military’s recent experience with a temporary pier off Gaza in 2024 offers a cautionary tale: despite modern engineering, that pier broke apart in a squall after less than two weeks, requiring repairs that delayed humanitarian aid deliveries. China’s barges, even with their struts, might face similar challenges, particularly if deployed in haste during a narrow invasion window.
Additionally, Taiwan’s coastline isn’t a uniform sandy beach waiting to welcome invaders. Many areas feature rocky shores, cliffs, or tidal mudflats that could complicate anchoring or offloading. If the barges can’t find stable footing or if their ramps can’t reach firm ground, their utility could be severely diminished.
3. Logistical and Operational Bottlenecks
Even if the barges survive initial attacks and weather, their effectiveness depends on seamless coordination with other elements of an invasion force—a tall order in the chaos of war. Offloading heavy equipment onto a temporary pier requires precise timing, protection from air and sea threats, and rapid dispersal of forces to avoid bottlenecks. If Taiwanese or allied forces disrupt this process—say, by targeting the ferries queuing up to unload or the troops moving ashore—the entire operation could grind to a halt.
Furthermore, the barges are likely intended as follow-on assets, deployed after an initial beachhead is secured, rather than in the first wave of an assault. This means their success hinges on the PLAN’s ability to establish air and naval superiority early in the conflict—a daunting task given Taiwan’s layered defenses and the potential for U.S. intervention. Without that dominance, the barges might never reach their deployment zones intact.
4. Strategic Overreach: A Signal of Intent, Not Victory
The development of these barges also risks tipping China’s hand strategically. Their construction has already drawn international attention, prompting analysts to speculate about Beijing’s intentions. This heightened scrutiny could galvanize Taiwan and its allies to bolster defenses further—whether by acquiring more anti-ship missiles, conducting targeted exercises, or prepositioning forces to counter unconventional landing sites. In essence, the barges might provoke a stronger response before they’re even used, negating their surprise factor.
More broadly, an invasion of Taiwan isn’t just a military operation—it’s a geopolitical gamble with catastrophic stakes. Even if the barges work as intended, they don’t address the larger challenges of sustaining a campaign across the Taiwan Strait, where China would face relentless counterattacks, international sanctions, and the prospect of a prolonged insurgency on Taiwanese soil. The barges might get troops ashore, but they can’t guarantee victory in a war of attrition.
China’s interconnected jack-up barges represent an innovative attempt to solve the logistical puzzle of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. Their ability to form temporary piers could, in theory, expand the PLAN’s operational flexibility, allowing landings at unexpected sites and reducing dependence on Taiwan’s fortified ports. However, their vulnerabilities—exposure to attack, susceptibility to environmental hazards, and reliance on broader battlefield success—suggest they’re far from a silver bullet.
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