SOURCE: AFI
India’s pursuit of self-reliance in defense manufacturing has been marked by both successes and setbacks, with the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) program often cited as a significant lesson in the challenges of indigenous defense production. As the Indian Army embarks on its Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV) program to replace its ageing fleet of T-72 MBTs, the critical question remains: has the Army learned from the shortcomings of the Arjun MBT program, or will it once again lean towards foreign imports for its armored capabilities?
The Arjun MBT program, conceived in the 1970s and delivered decades later, highlighted numerous issues in India’s indigenous defense manufacturing capabilities. The tank faced problems related to weight, mobility, and integration of advanced technologies. It was also subjected to delays, cost overruns, and shifting operational requirements from the Army, leading to a long development cycle.
When the Arjun Mk I finally entered service in 2004, it was not well-received by the Army, which preferred the more familiar and lighter Russian T-90s. While the Arjun Mk II incorporated over 80 improvements, including an upgraded fire control system and explosive reactive armor, the Indian Army’s hesitation to embrace it fully reflected a lack of confidence in its long-term viability compared to imported systems.
Several factors contributed to the Arjun’s lukewarm reception, At over 68 tons, the Arjun MBT was significantly heavier than the T-90 and faced operational challenges, particularly in the western desert regions bordering Pakistan. The Arjun’s heavier and more complex systems necessitated a more extensive logistical and maintenance framework than the Army was accustomed to with the T-series tanks.
The Army’s shifting specifications during the development phase led to delays and compromised the design, creating friction between the defense production ecosystem and the end user. Despite the “Make in India” push, the Indian Army showed a strong preference for foreign MBTs, particularly the Russian T-90, due to familiarity, lower weight, and established logistical frameworks.
The FRCV program is envisioned to replace over 2,000 T-72 MBTs, and India aims to acquire a state-of-the-art platform that can operate across varied terrain and in the future battlespace of the 21st century. The program is designed to bring in advanced capabilities, such as modularity, AI-assisted systems, and improved lethality, while ensuring interoperability with other modern Indian Army platforms.
However, the key challenge for the FRCV program is whether India can achieve a balance between indigenous production and foreign collaboration. Several indicators suggest that the Indian Army has made progress in addressing the pitfalls of the Arjun MBT program, but hurdles remain:
The FRCV is envisioned as a multi-role platform, and the Indian Ministry of Defence has opened the program to both domestic and foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). This approach allows India to leverage foreign technology while building local manufacturing capabilities. Domestic defense giants like DRDO and private sector companies such as Tata and L&T are expected to play critical roles in the design and production of the FRCV, marking a shift toward greater industry involvement.
The Indian Army is now more aware of the importance of setting clear, stable requirements early in the development process. The Request for Information (RFI) for the FRCV program was issued with a focus on ensuring operational requirements are aligned with the realities of indigenous production, minimizing the risk of mid-program changes that plagued the Arjun.
India has matured in managing defence technology transfers through joint ventures. With the FRCV, India could avoid the pitfalls of a purely indigenous solution by seeking partial technology transfers from foreign OEMs. The involvement of foreign companies like Russia’s Uralvagonzavod (T-90 manufacturer), South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem, or even Western manufacturers like General Dynamics (makers of the Abrams) could help provide India with critical technological expertise while still fostering local production.
While the Army has favored foreign MBTs in the past, the FRCV program appears to prioritize a balanced approach that involves a collaborative, hybrid platform. The focus is on integrating cutting-edge foreign technologies into a largely domestically produced tank, similar to the Tejas fighter jet program, which integrates foreign components but is locally produced.
Despite these improvements, there remains the risk that the Indian Army could fall back into its preference for foreign imports. Global manufacturers, particularly from Russia, Israel, and Western Europe, have made aggressive pitches for their latest MBTs. The French Leclerc, Russian T-14 Armata, and even the German Leopard 2 have been floated as potential alternatives to an indigenous solution.
While the Indian Army has undoubtedly learned valuable lessons from the Arjun MBT program, whether those lessons translate into the success of the FRCV program remains to be seen. The push for a locally developed, advanced combat vehicle is clear, but the allure of proven, foreign-imported MBTs is strong. The success of the FRCV will hinge on how well India balances the desire for self-reliance with the practical operational needs of its Army.