SOURCE: AFI
Abhijit Singh, a former naval officer and Senior Fellow heading the Maritime Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), recently discussed India’s evolving nuclear posture in his latest column. Singh highlighted the induction of India’s second indigenous nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the INS Arighat, and explored the implications of this development for India’s nuclear doctrine. The discussion has brought to light a critical debate: Should India reconsider its No First Use (NFU) policy as strategic competition in the Indian Ocean intensifies?
The induction of INS Arighat marks a significant milestone in India’s strategic capabilities, further strengthening its nuclear triad. However, it also raises questions about the future direction of India’s nuclear policy. As Singh notes, there is an ongoing debate among strategic thinkers and policymakers about whether India should rethink its commitment to the NFU policy, which pledges not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary with nuclear weapons.
Critics of India’s current nuclear doctrine argue that the three core tenets — credible minimum deterrence, massive retaliation, and NFU — are increasingly seen as outdated. They point out that the boundaries between conventional and nuclear deterrence are becoming increasingly blurred. In this context, they believe that India’s commitment to NFU and a “minimum deterrence” posture limits the size and scope of its nuclear arsenal, potentially undermining credible deterrence, especially as regional adversaries like China and Pakistan continue to expand and modernize their nuclear capabilities.
Proponents of a more flexible nuclear policy suggest that India’s NFU stance might no longer be sufficient to deter adversaries in a rapidly changing strategic environment. They argue that India’s adherence to NFU constrains its strategic options and places it at a disadvantage, particularly in light of the nuclear postures of China and Pakistan. These countries have not committed to a NFU policy and have been aggressively upgrading their nuclear arsenals, raising concerns about the sufficiency of India’s deterrent capabilities under its current doctrine.
Furthermore, critics argue that the concept of credible minimum deterrence might not hold in an era where technological advancements and strategic ambiguity can potentially undermine deterrence. They advocate for a more dynamic nuclear posture that allows India to respond more flexibly to evolving threats.
The commissioning of INS Arighat has brought this delicate issue back into focus. As India continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, it must carefully consider the implications of its nuclear doctrine and strike a balance between deterrence and restraint.