SOURCE: AFI
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has recently restructured its fighter fleet into a tiered system: the JF-17 Block 3 as the lower/mid-tier, the J-10C as the mid/upper-tier, and the anticipated acquisition of the Chinese J-35 stealth fighter as the upper-tier. While this modernization appears to bolster the PAF’s capabilities on paper, a closer examination reveals why this development might actually be advantageous for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
This article explores the operational dynamics of each jet, their estimated mission readiness rates, and the strategic implications for India, focusing on how these developments could expose vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s air strategy.
Understanding the PAF’s Tiered Structure
- JF-17 Block 3 (Lower/Mid-Tier)
The JF-17 Block 3, a joint venture between Pakistan and China, is a lightweight, single-engine, multi-role fighter designed to replace aging aircraft like the Mirage III and F-7P. It features upgrades like an AESA radar, improved avionics, and enhanced weapons capabilities, positioning it as a “4.5 generation” fighter. The PAF reportedly operates around 50 JF-17 Block 3 jets as of early 2025, with plans to expand this number to over 100 in the coming years. - J-10C (Mid/Upper-Tier)
The J-10C, a Chinese-built 4.5-generation fighter, brings advanced avionics, an AESA radar, and compatibility with long-range missiles like the PL-15. The PAF has acquired around 25 J-10C jets, with reports suggesting plans to increase this to 50 or more. It serves as a counterbalance to the IAF’s Rafale and Su-30 MKI, offering improved range and payload over the JF-17. - J-35 (Upper-Tier, Prospective)
The J-35, a Chinese stealth fighter (often linked to the J-31 program), is a fifth-generation platform with radar-evading capabilities and advanced sensors. While not yet in PAF service, its acquisition has been hinted at by Pakistani officials, with estimates suggesting 40–50 units could join the fleet by 2030. Its stealth features and potential for network-centric warfare aim to give the PAF a qualitative edge over non-stealth IAF jets.
Operational rates—the percentage of aircraft ready for missions at any given time—depend on maintenance cycles, spare parts availability, pilot training, and logistical support. Without specific, up-to-date data from the PAF, we can infer approximate figures based on global averages for similar aircraft and known challenges in Pakistan’s defense ecosystem.
- JF-17 Block 3
The JF-17 series has been in service for over a decade, with earlier blocks (1 and 2) achieving operational rates of around 60–65%, according to anecdotal reports from defense circles. The Block 3, being newer and more complex, might face teething issues but benefits from a mature production line at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). Assuming a fleet of 50 jets and a 65% operational rate, approximately 32–35 JF-17 Block 3 jets could be mission-ready at any time. However, reliance on Chinese supply chains for critical components like engines (RD-93MA) and electronics could delay repairs, especially under sanctions or economic strain. - J-10C
The J-10C, operated by the Chinese PLAAF in larger numbers, reportedly maintains operational rates of 65–70% due to better industrial support. For the PAF, with a smaller fleet of 25 jets and less experience with the platform, a conservative estimate of 65–70% readiness seems reasonable. This translates to about 16–18 J-10C jets available for missions. Integration challenges, including training pilots and ground crew on a new platform, might temporarily lower this rate, particularly in the early years of service. - J-35 (Hypothetical)
Since the J-35 is not yet in PAF service, we can look at fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 or J-20 for benchmarks. The F-35, for instance, has struggled with operational rates, often hovering around 50–60% due to its complexity and maintenance demands. The J-20, less documented, likely faces similar issues. Assuming the PAF acquires 40 J-35 jets by 2030 and manages a 55% operational rate (optimistic for a new stealth platform in a smaller air force), around 22 jets might be mission-ready. This assumes China provides robust support, which is uncertain given Pakistan’s financial constraints.
Operating three distinct platforms—each with different maintenance needs, spare parts pipelines, and training requirements—places a heavy burden on the PAF’s limited budget and infrastructure. The JF-17 relies on Russian-derived engines, the J-10C on Chinese WS-10 engines, and the J-35 will likely use an untested Chinese powerplant. Managing these diverse supply chains, especially under economic pressure, could lead to inconsistent operational rates and reduced sortie generation during conflicts. The IAF, with a more unified logistics chain for its Su-30 MKI and Rafale fleets, can maintain higher readiness over prolonged engagements.
The estimated operational rates suggest that even at peak readiness, the PAF can field only a fraction of its fleet simultaneously. For instance, with 50 JF-17 Block 3s, 25 J-10Cs, and (hypothetically) 40 J-35s, the PAF might have 70–75 jets mission-ready across all tiers. In contrast, the IAF’s fleet of over 250 Su-30 MKIs, 36 Rafales, and growing numbers of Tejas Mk1A jets can generate significantly higher numbers—potentially 150–200 mission-ready aircraft—based on historical readiness rates of 60–75% for mature platforms. This numerical edge allows the IAF to sustain operations longer and overwhelm the PAF in a multi-front scenario.
The J-35’s stealth capabilities are unproven in combat, and even advanced stealth fighters like the F-35 rely on robust electronic warfare and networked operations to survive. The IAF’s integrated air defense systems, including S-400 batteries, Barak-8 missiles, and upgraded Su-30 MKI sensors, are well-equipped to detect and engage stealth threats at range. Additionally, the J-35’s limited numbers and high maintenance demands mean it cannot dominate the battlespace alone, giving the IAF opportunities to exploit gaps in the PAF’s coverage.
Introducing advanced platforms like the J-10C and J-35 requires years of pilot training and doctrinal integration. The PAF, while competent, lacks the depth of experience the IAF has gained from operating diverse platforms in complex exercises like Red Flag and Garuda. The IAF’s focus on network-centric warfare, AWACS support, and beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements—bolstered by missiles like the Meteor—gives it a tactical edge over a PAF still adapting to new systems.
The PAF’s moves provide a clear signal for the IAF to accelerate its own modernization. Programs like the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) and additional Rafale acquisitions can directly counter the J-35 threat. Moreover, the IAF’s emphasis on indigenous platforms like the Tejas Mk1A and Mk2 ensures a steady pipeline of cost-effective fighters, contrasting with Pakistan’s reliance on Chinese imports, which could falter under geopolitical or financial strain.
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