You dont have javascript enabled! Please enable it! Why India Should Prioritize Development of Nuclear-Armed Torpedoes for Strategic Deterrence - Indian Defence Research Wing
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SOURCE: AFI

As India navigates an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape, marked by tensions with China and Pakistan, the development of nuclear-armed torpedoes emerges as a strategic imperative to bolster its maritime deterrence and secure its interests in the Indo-Pacific. While India’s nuclear triad—comprising land-based missiles, air-launched weapons, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—is robust, the absence of a nuclear-armed torpedo capability represents a gap in its underwater warfare arsenal. Investing in this technology would enhance India’s second-strike capability, counter regional naval threats, and strengthen its strategic posture in the face of evolving maritime challenges.

Nuclear-armed torpedoes, designed to deliver high-yield warheads via submarine or surface platforms, offer unique advantages in maritime warfare. Unlike conventional torpedoes, which target individual ships, nuclear torpedoes can neutralize entire naval formations, disrupt anti-submarine warfare (ASW) networks, and destroy critical coastal infrastructure, such as ports or naval bases, with minimal warning. Their ability to operate in contested waters, leveraging the stealth of submarines, makes them a potent tool for deterrence, particularly against adversaries with advanced naval capabilities.

India’s maritime security faces dual challenges: China’s expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Pakistan’s growing submarine fleet, including Chinese-supplied Hangor-class boats with AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion). China’s Type 093B Shang-class nuclear submarines and Type 055 destroyers, equipped with advanced ASW systems, pose a threat to India’s surface and sub-surface assets. Pakistan’s deployment of Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and potential nuclear warheads further complicates the regional balance. A nuclear-armed torpedo, with a range of 20–30 km and a 20–200 kT warhead, would provide India with a credible counter, capable of neutralizing carrier strike groups, submarine wolfpacks, or coastal command centers in a single strike.

India’s nuclear doctrine emphasizes a credible minimum deterrent with a no-first-use policy, relying heavily on a survivable second-strike capability. The Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), armed with K-15 (750 km) and K-4 (3,500 km) SLBMs, form the maritime leg of this triad. However, SLBMs are primarily strategic weapons designed for counter-value strikes against cities or large military installations. Nuclear torpedoes, by contrast, offer tactical flexibility, enabling precise counter-force strikes against naval assets or infrastructure in a theater of operations, such as the Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal.

The development of nuclear torpedoes would complement India’s existing underwater arsenal, including the Varunastra heavy-weight torpedo and SMART (Supersonic Missile-Assisted Release of Torpedo) system, which has a 650 km range but is conventionally armed. A nuclear-armed variant, potentially delivered by SMART or integrated with Arihant- and Kalvari-class submarines, would enhance India’s ability to deter naval aggression in choke points like the Malacca Strait or the Gulf of Aden, critical for global trade and energy security.

China’s aggressive naval expansion, with over 370 ships and 60–70 submarines, including six SSBNs, threatens India’s maritime dominance in the IOR. Its “String of Pearls” strategy, involving bases in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Djibouti, aims to encircle India, necessitating a robust countermeasure. A nuclear torpedo, capable of destroying Chinese naval assets or disrupting logistics at ports like Gwadar, would serve as a powerful deterrent, signaling India’s resolve to protect its maritime boundaries.

Pakistan’s naval modernization, backed by China, includes eight Hangor-class submarines and Babur-3 SLCMs with a 450–700 km range, potentially nuclear-capable. During Operation Sindoor in May 2025, Pakistan’s failure to counter Indian air strikes exposed weaknesses in its air defenses, but its submarine fleet remains a concern for India’s coastal security. A nuclear torpedo would provide a disproportionate response capability, deterring Pakistan from deploying submarines for nuclear or conventional strikes near Indian waters.

India possesses the foundational technologies to develop nuclear-armed torpedoes. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) have expertise in miniaturizing nuclear warheads, as demonstrated by the 12–45 kT warheads on Agni and K-series missiles. The Varunastra torpedo, with a 250 kg warhead and 40 km range, provides a platform for adaptation, potentially scaled to carry a 20–100 kT nuclear payload. The SMART system, successfully tested in 2020, could be modified to deliver a nuclear torpedo over long distances, enhancing stand-off capabilities.

Collaboration with Russia, a historical partner in India’s submarine and nuclear programs, could accelerate development. Russia’s Poseidon nuclear torpedo, with a 10,000 km range and 2 MT warhead, offers a model, though India’s requirements would focus on smaller, tactical systems. Partnerships with private firms like Larsen & Toubro, which builds Arihant-class submarines, and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), a missile manufacturer, could streamline production under the Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative.

Developing nuclear-armed torpedoes raises ethical and strategic questions, given India’s no-first-use policy. However, as a second-strike weapon, they align with India’s doctrine, providing a credible response to maritime nuclear threats without escalating to strategic-level exchanges. The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which India is not a signatory, poses no legal barrier, but global perceptions of India’s nuclear posture could invite scrutiny. Transparent communication of the weapon’s defensive intent, akin to India’s SLBM program, would mitigate concerns.

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