SOURCE: AFI


Ukraine executed a daring and unprecedented drone attack, codenamed “Operation Spider’s Web,” targeting Russian strategic aviation assets across multiple airbases, including Belaya in Siberia’s Irkutsk region, Olenya in Murmansk, Dyagilevo in Ryazan, and Ivanovo. The operation, meticulously planned over 18 months by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), reportedly destroyed or damaged over 40 Russian aircraft, including nuclear-capable Tu-95 “Bear” and Tu-22M3 “Backfire” strategic bombers, as well as A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft.
This audacious strike, conducted over 4,000 kilometers from Ukraine’s border, has sent shockwaves through global military circles and exposed critical vulnerabilities in airbase defense, particularly the lack of hardened aircraft shelters. For the Indian Air Force (IAF), this attack serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need to bolster its airbase infrastructure with Next Generation Hardened Aircraft Shelters (NGHAS) to protect its own high-value assets.
Ukraine’s attack was a logistical triumph, involving the covert smuggling of first-person-view (FPV) drones into Russia, concealed in wooden crates or mobile cabins mounted on trucks. These drones were launched from close proximity to their targets, bypassing Russia’s advanced S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, which proved ineffective against low-flying, small-signature drones. Social media footage and SBU-released videos showed Tu-95 bombers engulfed in flames at Olenya and Belaya airbases, with estimates suggesting damages exceeding $7 billion and the loss of 34% of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers.
The operation targeted aircraft parked in open tarmacs, a critical vulnerability that allowed Ukraine’s low-cost FPV drones to wreak havoc. Russian strategic bombers, including the Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160, are high-value assets integral to Moscow’s nuclear and conventional long-range strike capabilities. The Tu-95, for instance, can carry up to 16 Kh-55 or Kh-101 cruise missiles, while the Tu-22M3 is armed with supersonic Kh-22 missiles, posing significant threats to distant targets. The destruction of these assets, many of which are irreplaceable due to Russia’s inability to produce new airframes amid sanctions, represents a significant blow to its strategic aviation.
The success of Ukraine’s drones highlights the evolving nature of modern warfare, where inexpensive, agile, and precise unmanned systems can neutralize high-value targets traditionally protected by sophisticated air defenses. The operation also underscores the critical importance of hardened aircraft shelters, which could have mitigated the damage by shielding aircraft from such attacks.
The Indian Air Force, operating in a volatile region with capable adversaries like China and Pakistan, faces similar risks to its airbases. India’s fleet of advanced aircraft, including Su-30 MKI fighters, Rafale jets, and Mirage 2000s, along with its BrahMos missile units and potential S-400 air defense systems, are critical to its strategic deterrence. However, many IAF airbases, particularly those near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China and the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, lack sufficient Next Generation Hardened Aircraft Shelters to protect these assets from drone or missile strikes.
NGHAS are advanced, reinforced structures designed to withstand a range of threats, including precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, and small drones like those used by Ukraine. Unlike traditional shelters, NGHAS incorporate blast-resistant materials, modular designs, and enhanced camouflage to protect aircraft from both kinetic and electronic warfare threats. They are particularly effective against low-cost FPV drones, which, as demonstrated in Russia, can exploit exposed aircraft with devastating results.
India’s airbase infrastructure has been a point of concern for years. While some bases, such as Ambala (home to Rafale jets) and Hasimara, have limited hardened shelters, many others rely on open tarmacs or outdated shelters that offer little protection against modern threats. The IAF operates approximately 30 major airbases, but only a fraction are equipped with shelters capable of withstanding drone swarms or precision strikes like those seen in Ukraine’s attack. This vulnerability is particularly acute in forward bases like Leh, Thoise, and Srinagar, which are within range of Chinese and Pakistani missile and drone systems.
Lessons from Ukraine’s Strike
The Ukrainian operation offers several critical lessons for the IAF:
- Vulnerability of Exposed Aircraft: Russia’s failure to house its Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers in hardened shelters left them exposed to Ukraine’s FPV drones. Social media reports and Russian military bloggers have long warned of the dangers of parking strategic assets in open bays, a concern echoed by analysts for India’s airbases. The IAF must prioritize NGHAS to protect its aircraft, particularly high-value assets like the Rafale and Su-30 MKI, which are critical for both conventional and nuclear roles.
- Ineffectiveness of Traditional Air Defenses: Russia’s S-300 and S-400 systems, similar to those operated by India, failed to intercept Ukraine’s low-flying drones launched from close proximity. This highlights the limitations of long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) against small, agile threats. The IAF’s reliance on S-400 systems, recently acquired from Russia, must be complemented by short-range defenses like the Akash or Barak-8 systems and dedicated counter-drone technologies.
- Sophistication of Drone Warfare: Ukraine’s use of FPV drones, smuggled and launched from trucks, demonstrates the growing accessibility and lethality of drone technology. Pakistan, which has acquired Chinese drones like the Wing Loong-II, and China, with its advanced drone programs, pose credible threats to Indian airbases. The IAF must invest in counter-drone systems, including electronic jamming and laser-based defenses, to neutralize such threats.
- Strategic Importance of Forward Planning: The 18-month preparation for Operation Spider’s Web underscores the value of meticulous planning and covert operations. The IAF must enhance its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to detect and preempt similar attacks, particularly along its contested borders.
The IAF has recognized the need for modernized infrastructure, but progress has been slow. The Ministry of Defence has initiated projects to construct hardened shelters at select bases, but budgetary constraints and bureaucratic delays have hampered implementation. The cost of NGHAS, estimated at $10–20 million per shelter depending on specifications, is a significant investment, but the loss of a single Rafale ($120 million) or Su-30 MKI ($40–50 million) far outweighs the expense. Moreover, NGHAS can be paired with decoy shelters to confuse adversaries, a strategy recommended by analysts like Justin Bronk of RUSI, who noted that combining shelters with limited air defenses can significantly increase the cost of an attack for adversaries.
Recommendations for the IAF
To address these vulnerabilities, the IAF must adopt a multi-pronged approach:
- Accelerate NGHAS Deployment: Prioritize the construction of NGHAS at forward bases like Leh, Srinagar, and Ambala, ensuring coverage for high-value assets. Modular, cost-effective designs can expedite deployment while maintaining resilience against drone and missile threats.
- Enhance Counter-Drone Capabilities: Invest in advanced counter-drone systems, including electronic warfare platforms, laser defenses, and short-range SAMs, to complement the S-400. The IAF should also explore AI-based detection systems to identify and neutralize FPV drones.
- Strengthen Base Perimeter Security: Ukraine’s success relied on launching drones from trucks near Russian airbases, highlighting the need for robust perimeter security. The IAF should enhance ISR and ground-based defenses to prevent covert infiltration by adversaries.
- Learn from Global Best Practices: The UK’s RAF, as noted by RUSI’s Justin Bronk, has mitigated drone threats by combining hardened shelters with systems like Sky Sabre and Typhoon jets. The IAF could adopt similar strategies, tailoring them to India’s operational environment.
- Diversify Airbase Infrastructure: Disperse critical assets across multiple bases and invest in decoy shelters to complicate enemy targeting. This approach, combined with NGHAS, would significantly enhance survivability.
Ukraine’s drone strike on Russian strategic bombers, which crippled a significant portion of Moscow’s air capabilities, is a clarion call for the Indian Air Force to address its own vulnerabilities. The destruction of over 40 Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and A-50 aircraft, facilitated by the absence of hardened shelters, underscores the dangers of leaving high-value assets exposed. With adversaries like China and Pakistan advancing their drone and missile technologies, the IAF must urgently prioritize the deployment of Next Generation Hardened Aircraft Shelters, bolster counter-drone defenses, and enhance base security to safeguard its airbases. Failure to act risks catastrophic losses in a future conflict, undermining India’s strategic deterrence in an increasingly volatile region.
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