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SOURCE: AFI

Bharti Airtel, one of India’s leading telecommunications providers, announced a landmark agreement with SpaceX to bring Starlink’s high-speed satellite internet services to India. This partnership aims to bridge the digital divide by delivering broadband connectivity to even the most remote corners of the country, marking a significant milestone in India’s telecom landscape. However, the move has sparked concerns among defence analysts, who warn that the technology could be exploited by non-state actors, terrorists, and insurgents to wage war against the nation, potentially destabilizing India’s security apparatus.

The collaboration between Airtel and SpaceX is poised to revolutionize internet access in India, a country where vast rural and remote regions remain underserved by traditional telecom infrastructure. Starlink, operated by SpaceX, leverages a constellation of thousands of low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites to provide high-speed internet with low latency, capable of supporting streaming, online gaming, and video conferencing even in areas with little to no terrestrial connectivity. Airtel plans to explore offering Starlink equipment through its retail stores and providing services to businesses, communities, schools, and health centers, particularly in underserved areas.

Gopal Vittal, Managing Director and Vice Chairman of Bharti Airtel, hailed the partnership as a “significant milestone” in the company’s commitment to next-generation satellite connectivity. “This collaboration enhances our ability to bring world-class high-speed broadband to even the most remote parts of India, ensuring that every individual, business, and community has reliable internet,” Vittal stated. Airtel’s existing partnership with Eutelsat OneWeb for satellite broadband will be complemented by Starlink, further expanding its reach and capabilities.

The deal, however, is contingent on SpaceX receiving regulatory approvals from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). These approvals are critical, as India’s telecom sector is heavily regulated, with stringent security requirements for foreign operators.

While the promise of enhanced connectivity is undeniable, the entry of Starlink into India has raised red flags among defence analysts and security experts. The primary concern stems from the potential misuse of satellite internet by non-state actors, including terrorist groups, insurgents, and criminal networks, to orchestrate activities against the Indian state.

Starlink’s technology, which provides direct-to-user satellite connectivity without reliance on local ground infrastructure, has been used in conflict zones globally, sometimes by non-state actors to bypass government-controlled communication networks. In India, where security challenges persist in regions like Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast, and Naxal-affected areas in Central and Eastern forests, the fear is that such technology could empower hostile groups to coordinate attacks, evade surveillance, and operate with impunity.

Defence analysts point to India’s historical struggles with fraudulent telecom practices as a precursor to potential misuse of Starlink. For years, SIM cards have been issued using fake or forged documents, enabling criminals and terrorists to communicate anonymously. The same vulnerability could extend to Starlink, where lax Know Your Customer (KYC) protocols or fraudulent subscriptions might allow malign actors to acquire satellite terminals. Once in possession of such devices, groups like Pakistan-backed terrorists in Kashmir, insurgent factions in the Northeast, or Naxalites in forested regions could establish secure communication networks beyond the reach of Indian authorities.

The concerns are not unfounded. India’s security apparatus has long grappled with the challenge of monitoring communications in its border regions and conflict zones. In Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan-supported terrorist outfits have exploited communication gaps to coordinate attacks, while in the Northeast, various insurgent groups operate across porous borders with Myanmar and Bangladesh. Similarly, Naxalites in Central and Eastern India rely on encrypted communications and local networks to evade detection. Starlink’s ability to provide unmonitored, high-speed internet in these areas could exacerbate these threats, enabling real-time coordination and intelligence-sharing among hostile actors.

Moreover, the decentralized nature of Starlink’s operations poses a unique challenge for India’s security establishment. Unlike terrestrial telecom networks, which can be monitored and shut down during crises (as seen with frequent internet blackouts in conflict zones like Manipur), satellite internet is harder to control. Even if Starlink complies with local data termination requirements—mandating that data from Indian airspace be routed through ground stations within the country—there remains a risk of cross-border exploitation, particularly near borders where signals from neighboring countries like Myanmar (where Starlink operates legally) could be accessed.

The potential for misuse is compounded by Starlink’s global track record. While the company has denied providing services in India without authorization, reports of its devices being used by insurgents and smugglers in regions like Manipur and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have raised alarms. In these instances, the devices were reportedly smuggled from neighboring countries, highlighting the difficulty of regulating access to satellite technology in a region with porous borders.

To address these concerns, India’s regulatory framework will need to evolve rapidly. The DoT and MHA must impose stringent KYC norms for Starlink subscriptions, ensuring that every terminal issued can be traced back to a verified user. Additionally, Starlink should be required to implement robust geofencing measures to disable services in unauthorized areas or during security crises, a capability the company has demonstrated in other regions.

Collaboration between Starlink, Airtel, and Indian security agencies will be crucial to prevent misuse. This could include real-time monitoring of traffic for suspicious activity, mandatory integration with India’s Central Monitoring System (CMS), and provisions for immediate service termination in areas of concern. The government may also consider designating sensitive regions—such as border areas and Naxal-affected zones—as restricted zones for Starlink operations unless explicitly approved for strategic purposes.

Furthermore, India’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies must enhance their capabilities to detect and intercept satellite communications. While Starlink’s data encryption poses a challenge, investments in signals intelligence (SIGINT) and partnerships with global tech firms could help bridge the gap. The government should also explore legal frameworks to hold Starlink accountable for any misuse of its services, including penalties for failing to cooperate with investigations into unauthorized usage.

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