SOURCE: AFI
In a candid conversation with Snehesh Alex Phillip of The Print, Lt Gen PR Shankar (Retd), former Director General of Artillery, dropped a bombshell about the Indian Army’s experience with the Russian-made Smerch multiple rocket launcher system. According to Shankar, the Smerch that was ordered in 2005 and inducted into service by 2008, yet the Indian Army (IA) was unable to fire it until 2012 due to persistent technical issues. The statement, delivered with a mix of incredulity and frustration, has left defense enthusiasts and analysts questioning the procurement process and the prolonged delay in resolving the problem. “Did I hear it right?” quipped a Indian defence analysts, echoing the disbelief many might feel about this operational hiccup.
The Smerch, a 300mm rocket system with a range of up to 90 kilometers, was acquired from Russia to bolster India’s long-range artillery firepower. Touted as one of the most powerful multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the world, it was intended to give the IA a decisive edge in precision strikes and area saturation against enemy targets. The initial order, part of a broader modernization drive, came at a time when India sought to counter growing threats along its borders, particularly from Pakistan and China. The deal, reportedly worth over $500 million, included launchers, rockets, and support systems, with deliveries beginning in 2007-2008.
So, why did it take four years after induction to get the Smerch operational? Lt Gen Shankar pointed to unspecified “technical issues,” hinting at a deeper story of procurement woes and post-delivery challenges. While he didn’t delve into specifics during the The Print interview, the revelation aligns with broader critiques of India’s defense acquisition process—marked by delays, vendor disputes, and integration hurdles. Defense observers suggest that one key problem was a defective navigation system, with the Russians allegedly playing “hardball” on fixing it, leaving the IA in a bind.
The Smerch’s journey began with high expectations. Ordered in 2005 under a Congress-led government, it was part of a strategic push to upgrade artillery capabilities alongside systems like the Pinaka MLRS. Induction in 2008 marked its formal entry into service, with the IA establishing regiments to deploy the system along key fronts. However, the inability to fire it until 2012 suggests a significant gap between induction and combat readiness—a critical lapse for a system meant to deter adversaries.
The “how” of its procurement is a familiar tale: India, reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced weaponry, turned to Russia, a long-standing defense partner. The Smerch was chosen for its proven track record—used effectively by Soviet and Russian forces—and its ability to deliver devastating salvos over vast distances. But the “why” of the unresolved issues is murkier. Technical glitches, such as navigation system failures, could stem from poor quality control, inadequate testing, or mismatched specifications. The four-year delay also points to possible bureaucratic inertia, a lack of spare parts, or protracted negotiations with the Russian supplier, Rosoboronexport, to address the defects.
Lt Gen Shankar’s tenure as DG Artillery (until 2017) gave him a front-row seat to such challenges. His broader commentary on indigenous systems like the Pinaka and ATAGS reflects a frustration with India’s dependence on imports that often come with strings attached—or, in this case, malfunctioning parts. The Smerch saga isn’t an isolated incident; it mirrors issues with other imports, where vendors hold leverage post-sale, and India struggles to enforce accountability. As one X user noted, the Air Force even pushed to suppress CAG reports highlighting similar gaps, suggesting a systemic reluctance to air dirty laundry.
The resolution in 2012 likely involved technical fixes—possibly retrofitting navigation units or sourcing alternative components—though official details remain scarce. By then, the IA had lost valuable time, raising questions about deterrence credibility during those years. Shankar’s shock at this episode underscores a critical lesson: procurement isn’t just about buying hardware; it’s about ensuring it works when needed.
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