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On March 12, 1993, Mumbai was shattered by a series of 13 coordinated bomb blasts that killed 257 people and injured over 700. The mastermind behind this heinous act, Dawood Ibrahim, remains one of India’s most wanted terrorists.

Recently, former Indian diplomat Ruchi Ghanashyam stirred debate by stating, “Every resident of Karachi is familiar with fugitive gangster Dawood Ibrahim’s whereabouts in the Pakistani city.” Her remark, while not surprising to those familiar with the long-standing speculation about Dawood’s presence in Pakistan, raises a critical question: Why has India not targeted Dawood Ibrahim, despite reportedly knowing his location for decades, including during covert operations like Operation Sindoor?

The 1993 Mumbai blasts targeted key locations across the city, including the Bombay Stock Exchange, hotels, and crowded markets. The attacks were meticulously planned, and investigations pointed to Dawood Ibrahim, then a prominent underworld don, as the orchestrator. His criminal empire, known as D-Company, had deep ties to smuggling, extortion, and, crucially, terrorist networks. The blasts were allegedly executed in retaliation for communal riots following the Babri Masjid demolition, with Dawood collaborating with Pakistan-based terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Following the attacks, Dawood fled India, reportedly finding safe haven in Karachi, Pakistan, under the protection of certain elements within the Pakistani establishment. Over the years, India has repeatedly accused Pakistan of sheltering him, a charge Islamabad denies. Yet, Ghanashyam’s recent statement underscores a widely held belief: Dawood’s presence in Karachi is an open secret.

Operation Sindoor, a Indian Air strike operation targeting Lashkar-e-Taiba terror facilty inside Pakistan, demonstrated India’s ability to conduct precise strikes against high-value terrorist targets across the border. The operation reportedly neutralized key figures responsible for attacks on Indian soil. and man Masood Azhar were also killed in recent air strike by India. However, Dawood Ibrahim, despite being a prime target for decades, was conspicuously absent from the list of those targeted.

This omission raises several questions. If India possesses credible intelligence about Dawood’s whereabouts—as Ghanashyam’s statement and other reports suggest—why has he not been prioritized? Several factors may explain India’s apparent restraint.

Intelligence and Operational Risks: While India may have general knowledge of Dawood’s location, pinpointing his exact movements and executing a strike without detection is a logistical nightmare. Dawood is believed to operate under heavy protection, possibly with the complicity of elements within Pakistan’s security apparatus. A failed operation could compromise India’s intelligence networks and embolden terrorist groups.

Strategic Priorities: India’s counterterrorism strategy has often prioritized groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which pose immediate and ongoing threats through active terror campaigns. While Dawood remains a high-profile target, his current role in orchestrating attacks is less clear. His criminal empire, though still influential, may not be the top priority compared to groups executing frequent cross-border attacks.

Diplomatic and Legal Constraints: Extraditing Dawood or pressuring Pakistan through international forums has yielded little success, given Pakistan’s denials and lack of cooperation. Meanwhile, unilateral action, such as a targeted strike, could invite international criticism and strain India’s relations with other global powers.

Operation Sindoor, while a bold demonstration of India’s capabilities, was likely designed with specific, achievable objectives in mind. Targeting Lashkar operatives in their base, who are often based in less sensitive areas, may have been deemed more feasible than a high-risk operation against Dawood in Karachi. Additionally, the political and diplomatic costs of targeting a figure as entrenched as Dawood may have outweighed the benefits, especially if his current influence on active terror plots is diminished.

Dawood Ibrahim’s continued freedom is a sore point for India, symbolizing the challenges of combating terrorism when state actors allegedly provide safe havens. Ghanashyam’s statement reflects the frustration felt by many in India, who see Dawood’s impunity as a failure of justice for the 1993 blast victims. However, it also highlights the complexities of international relations and counterterrorism in a volatile region.

For India, targeting Dawood would not only deliver justice but also send a strong message to terrorist networks. Yet, the risks of such an operation—diplomatic, operational, and strategic—cannot be understated. Until these hurdles are overcome, Dawood may continue to evade India’s grasp, even as his whereabouts remain an “open secret.”

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