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SOURCE: AFI

Declassified US intelligence reports from the 1980s and 1990s, released amid widespread outrage over the recent Pahalgam terror attack, have raised alarming concerns about the potential for a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. The documents, published by the National Security Archive on April 22, 2025, suggest that while the likelihood of war between the two South Asian rivals remains low, a “miscalculation or irrational response” could escalate a conventional conflict into a nuclear exchange, with catastrophic consequences for the region and beyond.

The release of these reports coincides with heightened tensions following a deadly terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 23, 2025, which claimed the lives of 26 people, mostly tourists. India has attributed the attack to Pakistan-based terror groups, with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh vowing a “loud and clear” response. The attack is believed to have been triggered by provocative rhetoric from Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, who recently reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to the “liberation” of Kashmir, calling it the country’s “jugular vein.”

The timing of the declassified reports has amplified concerns, as India and Pakistan navigate a volatile period marked by mutual distrust, competing nuclear capabilities, and unresolved disputes, particularly over Kashmir.

The declassified documents, spanning intelligence assessments from the 1980s and 1990s, provide a sobering look at the US government’s historical concerns about the India-Pakistan rivalry. A 1981 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) titled “India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan” evaluated the possibility of India launching a preemptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities if it perceived a threat to its security. The SNIE concluded that India would likely adopt a “wait and see” approach before attacking, basing its decision on whether Pakistan produced or stockpiled nuclear weapons.

By 1989, a State Department intelligence report warned that, although war was unlikely, the risk was “high” that a conventional conflict could spiral into a nuclear exchange due to miscalculations or irrational decisions. The 1993 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), “India-Pakistan: Prospects for War in the 1990s,” further heightened concerns, estimating a one-in-five chance of conflict driven by nuclear rivalries, the Kashmir dispute, and mutual suspicions of internal interference. The rise of “extremist” political movements, such as right-wing Hindu nationalism in India, was flagged as a potential trigger for escalation.

A State Department memo accompanying the 1981 SNIE also cited a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study, which analyzed the radiological consequences of a hypothetical Indian attack on Pakistan’s Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. Such an attack, the study warned, could cause significant environmental and humanitarian fallout, further complicating the regional security landscape.

The India-Pakistan rivalry has long been shaped by their nuclear capabilities. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, prompting Pakistan to accelerate its own nuclear program. By the 1980s, Pakistan’s advancements in producing fissile material raised fears in India and the US about the potential for preventive strikes. The 1998 nuclear tests by both nations formalized their status as nuclear powers, increasing the stakes of any conflict.

The declassified reports highlight past crises that brought the region close to the brink. In 1990, a crisis sparked by military exercises and instability in Kashmir led to fears of nuclear confrontation, defused only through US diplomatic intervention led by Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates. The 2019 Balakot crisis, following a suicide attack in Kashmir that killed 46 policemen, saw India conduct an airstrike on a terrorist camp in Pakistan, with both sides threatening missile strikes before tensions were de-escalated.

Today, both nations possess advanced nuclear arsenals. India is estimated to have approximately 160 nuclear warheads, while Pakistan has around 165, according to the Federation of American Scientists. India’s nuclear triad—comprising land-based missiles like the Agni-V, air-delivered gravity bombs, and sea-based missiles on submarines like INS Arighat—is being modernized with an eye on both Pakistan and China. Pakistan, meanwhile, relies heavily on land-based ballistic missiles like the Shaheen series and is developing sea-based cruise missiles.

The speed of modern missile systems exacerbates the risk. A Pakistani Shaheen missile could reach New Delhi in about seven minutes, while India’s Pralay missile could strike Islamabad in under six minutes. Such short flight times leave little room for decision-making, increasing the likelihood of a preemptive or retaliatory strike based on incomplete information.

The US reports underscore the danger of “irrational responses” in a crisis. For India, the temptation to strike Pakistan’s nuclear facilities or leadership preemptively could arise if it perceives an imminent threat, as noted in the 1981 SNIE. Pakistan, lacking a “no first use” nuclear policy, might respond disproportionately to even a conventional attack, as it threatened during the 2019 Balakot crisis.

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