SOURCE: AFI
India’s ambitious Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), has hit turbulence amid revelations of unresolved design issues flagged by a senior experimental test pilot (ETP). Capt K.P. Sanjeev Kumar, a former Indian Navy test pilot and prolific aviation blogger, detailed these concerns in a March 2025 post on his website, www.kaypius.com. Drawing from confirmed sources and personal interactions, Kumar recounts how a veteran IAF test pilot, employed by HAL, escalated serious safety concerns about the LUH—particularly its autorotation and directional stability—to the company’s leadership as early as November 2023. Despite internal reviews and customer demonstrations at Aero India 2025, these issues remain unaddressed, casting a shadow over the program’s credibility and raising questions about the certification process.
The whistleblower, described as a senior IAF veteran and ETP with deep ties to the LUH program, first raised red flags early in its development. According to Kumar, the pilot warned HAL officials of “serious design issues” that threatened the helicopter’s safety and performance. As HAL prepared to sign a contract for 12 Limited Series Production (LSP) units in 2023—part of a broader plan to supply 187 LUHs to the Indian Army and Air Force—the ETP escalated his concerns to the Chairman of HAL in November 2023, citing critical gaps in flight testing that had not been resolved.
HAL responded by forming an internal committee to investigate. While due process was followed, including discussions between design experts and test crew, the solutions proposed failed to address the root causes. The ETP, dismayed by what he described to Kumar as “preposterous” fixes, withdrew from the LUH program to focus on other HAL projects. Post-retirement in September 2024, he took his concerns directly to service headquarters via an unclassified letter, warning that “hapless customers” could bear the brunt of these oversights. As of March 2025, no response has been forthcoming, and the LSP contract remains unsigned—a delay Kumar attributes to this unresolved saga.
The ETP’s primary grievance centers on the LUH’s autorotation performance, a critical safety feature for helicopters. Autorotation allows a helicopter to land safely following an engine failure by using airflow to keep the rotor spinning. Federal regulations, such as those from the FAA, mandate that rotorcraft demonstrate this capability “with no excessive vertical acceleration” and without requiring “exceptional piloting skill or exceptionally favorable conditions.” For single-engine helicopters like the LUH, this must be proven in “power-off” mode from steady-state autorotation.
The ETP contends that the LUH falls short of this standard, with its high landing speed during autorotation posing a fatal risk. Kumar, leveraging his own experience as a test pilot and instructor, explains that even skilled ETPs struggle to achieve survivable zero-speed landings in the LUH. In real-world engine failure scenarios, less-experienced line pilots could face catastrophic outcomes, especially outside ideal airfield conditions. “If experienced ETPs have not been able to achieve such landings, the outcome will in all likelihood be catastrophic in the hands of line pilots up against an actual engine failure,” Kumar writes, echoing the veteran’s alarm.
The secondary issue involves the LUH’s directional stability—the effort required to maintain heading across various flight conditions. For light single-engine helicopters, Level 1 handling qualities (HQR 1-3 on the Cooper-Harper scale) are a non-negotiable benchmark, ensuring ease of control for entry-level pilots without reliance on stability augmentation systems (SAS) or autopilots. The ETP rated the LUH’s directional stability above HQR 3, deeming it “unsatisfactory” and potentially as high as HQR 6 (“very objectionable but tolerable”), a level that demands design correction before customer release.
Kumar warns that HAL may resort to retrofitting an SAS or autopilot—neither originally specified by customers—to mask these flaws. This added complexity, he argues, is a “needless” burden for an entry-level platform like the LUH, designed for basic utility roles in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR). In marginal weather or with SAS/AP disengaged, pilots risk spatial disorientation (SD) or loss of control in-flight (LOC-I)—accidents often misattributed to “human error” rather than underlying design deficiencies. “The basic helicopter is simply too difficult to fly without assistance of SAS/AP,” Kumar quotes the ETP, calling this unacceptable for a light single-engine craft.
The ETP’s warnings cast a troubling light on the LUH’s Initial Operational Clearance (IOC), granted by the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) and the Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) in February 2020. Despite IOC, critical flight tests remained incomplete, yet HAL proceeded with customer demonstration flights at successive air shows, including Aero India 2023 and 2025. Kumar, who observed the 2025 event with “mute disbelief,” questions how certification agencies approved the LUH for IOC and public demos given these unresolved issues. “If the concerns are found true and valid, it is alarming that certification agencies handed out IOC certificates and even allowed customer demonstration flights,” he writes.
As of now, neither HAL nor military experts have publicly invalidated the ETP’s claims, leaving the program’s safety credentials in limbo. The Indian Army and Air Force, the primary customers, have yet to comment officially, though the delay in the LSP contract suggests internal reevaluation.
Kumar, a self-described “avid observer” of India’s indigenous aerospace efforts, initially refrained from public commentary, hoping HAL’s Flight Operations department would intervene. He also avoided raising the issue before Aero India 2025, reluctant to “spook display pilots or audience” during a flagship national event. However, the persistence of these concerns—and HAL’s apparent inaction—prompted his detailed exposé. “Both my hopes were dashed after I watched the proceedings of Aero India 2025 & LUH customer flights,” he admits, urging transparency and accountability.
The LUH, intended to replace aging Cheetah and Chetak helicopters, is a linchpin of India’s self-reliance in rotorcraft production. With a 3-ton maximum takeoff weight, a 350-km range, and a service ceiling of 6,500 meters, it promises versatility for high-altitude operations along India’s northern borders. Yet, these revelations threaten to undermine confidence in HAL’s design and certification processes, potentially delaying induction and tarnishing India’s aerospace reputation.
If the ETP’s concerns hold, HAL faces a choice: overhaul the LUH’s rotor and stability systems—a costly and time-intensive fix—or risk fielding a helicopter that falls short of safety standards. For the Indian armed forces, already grappling with rotorcraft shortages, such delays could exacerbate operational gaps, forcing reliance on foreign alternatives like the Ka-226T.
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