SOURCE: AFI
India’s recent unveiling of its Gallium Nitride (GaN)-based Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the Super Sukhoi upgrade program has ignited a fresh debate within defence circles. The indigenous radar, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), represents a leap forward in India’s self-reliance in critical military technologies.
However, its emergence has raised questions about why India isn’t leveraging this cutting-edge radar and mission computers to upgrade its fleet of 36 Rafale fighter jets, which currently rely on Gallium Arsenide (GaS)-based AESA radars and foreign avionics. Such an upgrade could potentially eliminate the need for French approvals for integrating more Indian weapons systems, but intellectual property rights (IPR) and geopolitical realities present significant hurdles.
India’s GaN-based AESA radar, developed by the Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) under DRDO, is a significant advancement over the GaS-based systems currently in use. GaN technology offers higher power efficiency, greater detection range, improved resistance to jamming, and better thermal management compared to GaS. For the AMCA—a fifth-generation stealth fighter—and the Super Sukhoi upgrade program, which aims to modernize India’s fleet of Su-30 MKI jets, this radar promises to deliver enhanced situational awareness and combat effectiveness. The Virupaksha radar, a GaN-based derivative of the Uttam AESA radar, is reportedly being tailored for the Sukhoi upgrade, with plans to integrate it into 84 Su-30 MKIs in the first phase.
The success of this indigenous radar has prompted defence analysts to question why India isn’t considering a similar upgrade for its Rafale fleet. The Rafale jets, acquired from France’s Dassault Aviation in a 2016 deal for 36 aircraft, are equipped with the Thales RBE2 AESA radar, which uses GaS technology. While the RBE2 is a proven and capable system, it lacks the advanced capabilities of GaN-based radars, and its integration with Indian weapons systems has been constrained by French oversight and approval processes.
One of the primary arguments for upgrading the Rafale with indigenous GaN-based AESA radars and mission computers is the potential for greater operational autonomy. Currently, integrating Indian weapons systems—like the Astra Mk-1 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile and the Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW)—onto the Rafale requires French approvals, as the aircraft’s avionics and radar software are proprietary to Dassault and Thales. This dependency has been a point of contention, as it limits India’s ability to independently tailor the Rafale to its specific operational needs.
Recently, Dassault secured a deal to integrate the Astra Mk-1 and SAAW onto India’s Rafale fleet, a move that enhances the jets’ compatibility with indigenous weapons but comes at a cost—both financial and strategic. Each integration requires extensive testing, certification, and software updates by the French side, often leading to delays and additional expenses. By replacing the Rafale’s GaS-based radar and mission computers with indigenous systems, India could theoretically bypass these hurdles, enabling faster and more cost-effective integration of its weapons systems.
Moreover, indigenous mission computers could provide India with greater control over the aircraft’s software ecosystem, allowing for seamless upgrades and modifications without relying on foreign vendors. This would align with India’s broader goal of self-reliance under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” initiative, reducing dependency on foreign technology and mitigating risks associated with supply chain disruptions or geopolitical tensions.
Despite the potential benefits, upgrading the Rafale with indigenous systems faces a significant obstacle: intellectual property rights (IPR). Sources cited by idrw.org indicate that the French are unlikely to grant India any leeway when it comes to the radar and avionics on the Rafale. The RBE2 AESA radar and associated avionics are proprietary technologies developed by Thales and Dassault, and France has maintained a firm stance on protecting its IPR. Allowing India to replace these systems with indigenous alternatives would not only undermine France’s commercial interests but also set a precedent for other Rafale customers to seek similar modifications.
The Rafale deal, while including India-specific enhancements (ISE) such as helmet-mounted displays and the integration of certain Indian weapons, did not encompass technology transfer for the radar or avionics. France’s reluctance to share source codes or allow third-party modifications stems from both strategic and economic considerations. The Rafale’s avionics suite is a cornerstone of its combat capability, and maintaining control over this technology ensures France’s influence over how the aircraft is used and upgraded by its operators.
Furthermore, replacing the Rafale’s radar and mission computers would require extensive re-certification of the aircraft’s systems, a process that could take years and involve significant costs. The integration of new hardware would necessitate rewriting software, recalibrating flight control systems, and ensuring compatibility with the Rafale’s other subsystems—all of which would require French cooperation. Without access to proprietary data and source codes, India would face formidable technical and logistical challenges in executing such an upgrade.
Beyond the IPR constraints, there are strategic and operational factors to consider. The Rafale fleet, though small at 36 aircraft, is a critical asset for the Indian Air Force (IAF), providing a technological edge in air superiority and precision strike missions. Any upgrade involving the replacement of its radar and avionics would temporarily ground these jets for testing and integration, potentially impacting the IAF’s operational readiness at a time when regional tensions with China and Pakistan remain high.
Additionally, the RBE2 radar, while GaS-based, is a mature and battle-proven system optimized for the Rafale’s airframe and weapons suite. Replacing it with an indigenous GaN-based radar, though technologically superior in certain aspects, carries risks of unforeseen integration issues. The IAF may prefer to avoid such uncertainties, especially given the Rafale’s role as a frontline fighter in its current configuration.
While a full-scale replacement of the Rafale’s radar and avionics may not be feasible in the near term, there is scope for incremental collaboration with France to enhance the aircraft’s compatibility with Indian systems. The recent deal to integrate the Astra Mk-1 and SAAW is a step in this direction, and future negotiations could focus on securing greater access to software interfaces or co-developing upgrades that incorporate GaN-based technologies without replacing the core systems entirely.
Simultaneously, India’s focus on indigenous programs like the AMCA and Super Sukhoi upgrade offers a more viable path for leveraging its GaN-based AESA radar. By equipping its homegrown and Russian-origin platforms with advanced indigenous systems, India can build a robust ecosystem of domestically developed technologies, reducing reliance on foreign vendors over time. The AMCA, in particular, represents an opportunity to showcase India’s advancements in stealth, radar, and avionics, potentially positioning it as a competitor to foreign fighters like the Rafale in the future.
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