India’s Border Security: The Case for a National Border Management Authority

SOURCE: AFI

India’s vast and diverse borders—spanning 15,106.7 km of land and 7,516.6 km of coastline—present a complex security challenge, compounded by varied terrain, geopolitical tensions, and evolving threats like smuggling, infiltration, and hybrid warfare. Recently, Rajya Sabha MP Ajeet Madhavarao Gochade, from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), proposed the creation of a National Border Management Authority (NBMA) to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

This “all-encompassing” authority aims to establish a unified command structure for border guarding, streamlining India’s fragmented border management architecture. As reported in newspapers, Gochade’s proposal seeks to address the lack of a cohesive national border policy, a gap that has long hindered effective security and coordination. The idea holds significant merit, particularly in light of India’s diverse border dynamics and the urgent need for integrated coastal policing.

India’s Fragmented Border Management Architecture

India’s borders are guarded by multiple forces, each with distinct mandates and operational cultures, under the administrative control of the MHA, except for the Assam Rifles, which is operationally controlled by the Ministry of Defence:

• Border Security Force (BSF): Guards the 3,323 km Indo-Pakistan and 4,096.7 km Indo-Bangladesh borders, known as India’s “First Line of Defence.” The BSF, with 193 battalions and 270,000 personnel, employs stringent measures along the volatile Pakistan border but faces challenges with the porous, riverine Indo-Bangladesh border, where illegal immigration and smuggling persist.
• Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB): Manages the 1,751 km Indo-Nepal and 699 km Indo-Bhutan borders, which are open and unfenced, allowing free movement up to 16 km on either side. The SSB’s 97,014 personnel in 73 battalions struggle with trans-border crimes like smuggling and human trafficking due to cultural and ethnic ties across these borders.
• Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP): Secures the 3,488 km Indo-China border (Line of Actual Control, LAC), a contentious region marked by recent tensions, such as the 2020 Galwan clash. The ITBP, with 173 border outposts, has been augmented with technology like thermal imagers but faces challenges in harsh terrain and limited infrastructure.
• Assam Rifles (AR): Protects the 1,643 km Indo-Myanmar border, with 46 battalions and 66,412 personnel. Operating in remote areas, the AR also conducts counter-insurgency operations, but its dual role and lack of dedicated border focus have prompted calls for a specialized force.
• Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and State Coastal Police: The ICG, under the Ministry of Defence, secures India’s 7,516.6 km coastline, with 5,422 km on the mainland and 2,094 km around islands. State coastal police serve as the second line of defense, but their limited infrastructure and manpower hinder effective policing.

The Indian Army supports these forces along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan and the LAC with China, while the Indian Navy oversees maritime security. This multi-agency structure, while robust, lacks unified command, leading to coordination gaps, overlapping mandates, and inconsistent policies. For instance, the Indo-Pakistan border’s “shoot-on-sight” approach contrasts sharply with the Indo-Bangladesh border’s softer stance, which has fueled illegal immigration for decades, with estimates of over 3 crore illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India.

Gochade’s proposal for an NBMA envisions a centralized body to formulate policies, oversee border infrastructure, define rules of engagement, and coordinate intelligence sharing among border guarding forces, the ICG, and state police. Drawing parallels with the Indian Armed Forces’ restructuring under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the NBMA would report to the Union Home Minister, ensuring a streamlined chain of command.

The NBMA’s potential benefits include:

1. Unified Policy Framework: India lacks a national border policy, resulting in ad-hoc approaches tailored to each border. The NBMA could standardize rules of engagement, balancing security with diplomatic considerations, such as stricter measures for the Indo-Bangladesh border or enhanced fencing along the Indo-Myanmar border, now underway to curb narcotics and infiltration.
2. Enhanced Coordination: Multiple forces with distinct ethos create command-and-control challenges. For example, along the LAC, the ITBP, Army, and Vikas battalions operate separately, while China employs a single PLA commander. The NBMA could integrate operations, reducing inefficiencies and improving intelligence sharing.
3. Infrastructure Development: The NBMA could prioritize border infrastructure, addressing delays in fencing, floodlighting, and road construction. For instance, only 22 of 73 Indo-China Border Roads (ICBRs) were completed by 2016 against a 2012 target, and 4,210 km of BSF roads remain pending.
4. Manpower Optimization: Vacancies plague border forces, with 83,127 posts vacant in CAPFs and AR as of January 2023. The NBMA could streamline recruitment and training, reducing overwork (e.g., 16-18 hour shifts for jawans) and enhancing operational readiness.
5. Countering Hybrid Threats: Modern border challenges—narcotics smuggling, fake currency, arms trafficking, and radicalization—require a synchronized response. The NBMA could integrate technology, such as the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS), and coordinate with state authorities to address hinterland impacts.

Gochade’s proposal raises a pivotal question: should the NBMA include a Central Marine Police Force (CMPF) or empower the ICG with a ground force for coastal policing? India’s coastline, vulnerable to smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism (e.g., the 26/11 Mumbai attacks), is secured by a three-tier structure: the Navy for offshore waters, the ICG for territorial waters, and state coastal police for shorelines. However, state police lack adequate infrastructure, manpower, and training, leaving coastal security fragmented.

Post-26/11, the ICG’s capacity was augmented with 197 ships, 81 aircraft, and advanced surveillance systems like the National Automatic Identification System. Yet, the Coastal Security Scheme’s Phase II, aimed at equipping state police with marine stations and boats, missed its 2016 target. A CMPF, modeled on the BSF, could centralize coastal policing, standardizing training and equipment. Alternatively, creating a ground force for the ICG, currently ship-based, would enhance its shore-based capabilities without duplicating roles. Either approach would reduce reliance on under-resourced state police, ensuring a robust coastal defense under the NBMA’s oversight.

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