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SOURCE: AFI

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is grappling with a critical challenge as it struggles to replace its ageing fleet of SEPECAT Jaguar aircraft, a situation exacerbated by dangerously low squadron levels and a historical lack of self-sufficiency in aircraft production. Wing Commander (Retd) Praful Bakshi, a veteran IAF pilot and accident investigator, recently shared his insights in an interview, shedding light on the systemic issues that have forced the IAF to continue operating the Jaguars despite their age and recent crashes. With India’s squadron strength dwindling to 30–31 against an authorized level of 42, and geopolitical threats looming on both its western and eastern borders, the IAF’s predicament underscores the urgent need for indigenization and a robust defense industrial base.

The SEPECAT Jaguar, a deep-strike and ground-attack aircraft jointly developed by the UK and France, has been a mainstay of the IAF since its induction in 1979. Originally acquired to replace the ageing Canberra bombers, the Jaguar fleet—comprising around 120 aircraft across six squadrons—has served the IAF well in roles such as close air support, interdiction, and maritime strike. However, the aircraft, now over four decades old, is increasingly showing its age. Many countries that once operated the Jaguar, including the United Kingdom, France, Chad, and Nigeria, have retired their fleets, replacing them with more modern platforms like the Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, and F-16.

In contrast, the IAF continues to rely on the Jaguars, a decision driven by necessity rather than choice. WG CDR Bakshi emphasized that the IAF’s squadron strength has plummeted to 30–31, far below the sanctioned level of 42 squadrons required to address threats on India’s two-front borders with Pakistan and China. “We are short of aircraft, dangerously short,” Bakshi stated, highlighting the IAF’s reluctance to retire the Jaguars despite their obsolescence. The aircraft’s age has led to maintenance challenges, and recent crashes have raised concerns about their operational safety. However, Bakshi cautioned against labeling the Jaguar as inherently dangerous, noting that fighter aircraft operate at the “extreme edge” of their performance parameters, subjecting both the aircraft and pilots to immense stress.

“Fighter aircraft are not like civil aviation where you can take off your shoes, have coffee, and fly,” Bakshi explained. “The pressures on the pilot and the aircraft are extreme, and that is why the rate of accidents is expected to be higher than others.” While the Jaguar’s accident rate is not alarmingly high compared to other fighters, Bakshi acknowledged that recent crashes have drawn attention to the fleet’s age and the risks of continued operation. As an accident investigator, he stressed the importance of awaiting official statements from pilots, air traffic control (ATC), and other sources before speculating on the causes of these incidents. “It is very dangerous to conjecture without inputs,” he warned, underscoring the need for a thorough investigation to determine the reasons behind the crashes.

The IAF’s inability to retire the Jaguars is a direct consequence of its dwindling squadron strength, a problem that has persisted for over a decade. The sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons—approximately 840 aircraft, assuming 20 aircraft per squadron—is deemed necessary to counter a two-front threat from Pakistan and China. However, the IAF’s active strength has fallen to 30–31 squadrons, with the retirement of legacy platforms like the MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 outpacing the induction of new aircraft. The delay in delivering the Tejas Mk1A, the IAF’s indigenous replacement for the MiG-21, has further exacerbated the shortfall, with the first aircraft now expected by March 31, 2025, following supply chain issues with GE Aerospace’s F404 engines.

The Jaguar fleet, despite upgrades like the DARIN (Display Attack Ranging Inertial Navigation) system, is ill-equipped to meet modern warfare demands, particularly against China’s advanced J-20 stealth fighters and sophisticated air defense systems along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The aircraft’s subsonic speed (Mach 1.6), limited payload (4,500 kg), and lack of advanced avionics make it vulnerable in contested environments. Yet, with no immediate replacement available, the IAF has been forced to extend the Jaguar’s service life, investing in upgrades such as new engines (Honeywell F125IN, offering 5% more thrust and 10% better fuel efficiency) and avionics to keep the fleet operational until at least 2030.

WG CDR Bakshi’s critique of the IAF’s predicament extends beyond the Jaguar to India’s broader struggle with self-sufficiency in aircraft production. He pointed to the historical example of the HF-24 Marut, India’s first indigenous jet fighter, developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in the 1960s under the leadership of German designer Kurt Tank. Bakshi, who flew the Marut during his service, described it as a promising aircraft that was grounded prematurely due to external pressures and a lack of domestic engine development.

“We did make one fighter aircraft earlier, the HF-24, which I flew,” Bakshi recalled. “But because of our policies at the time, we would rather go for foreign aircraft. We were not making our engines. The HF-24 engine was not there, and even when we tried to get it, outside powers made sure we didn’t develop our aircraft industry.” He recounted a particularly bitter episode where three newly built HF-24 squadrons, with aircraft that had flown just 5–6 hours, were grounded on the orders of the Soviet Union, India’s primary arms supplier at the time. “Russia twisted our arms, saying, ‘Why are you flying these three HF-24 squadrons? Fly our MiG-23 instead,’” Bakshi said. The aircraft were left on the grass, still wrapped in polythene with fresh paint, a stark symbol of India’s lost opportunity to build a self-reliant aerospace industry.

This dependency on foreign suppliers has had long-lasting consequences. Bakshi noted that the process of buying and selecting foreign aircraft is “cumbersome” and time-consuming, involving lengthy negotiations, trials, and approvals. “When you are weak, when your industry is weak, your defense is weak, and when your defense is weak, your policy is weak,” he stated, highlighting the vicious cycle that has plagued India’s defense preparedness. The reliance on imports has not only delayed the induction of new aircraft but also left India vulnerable to external pressures, as foreign powers have historically “twisted our arms” to prioritize their own interests.

The IAF’s current situation with the Jaguars underscores the urgent need for indigenization, a goal that India has pursued with renewed vigor under the “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” initiative. The Tejas program, despite its challenges, represents a significant step toward self-reliance. The Tejas Mk1A, with its advanced avionics, AESA radar, and electronic warfare suite, is poised to replace the MiG-21 and eventually the Jaguar, with the IAF ordering 180 units to form up to ten squadrons. However, production delays—HAL has struggled to meet its target of delivering 16 aircraft annually, with only three Tejas Mk1A jets ready as of February 2025—have slowed the IAF’s modernization efforts.

The Jaguar’s eventual replacement will likely involve a combination of indigenous and foreign platforms. The Tejas Mk2, a medium-weight fighter with a larger airframe and GE F414 engine, is expected to enter service by 2028–2029, offering a more capable option for deep-strike roles. The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), India’s fifth-generation stealth fighter, is projected for induction by 2035, providing a long-term solution to the IAF’s squadron shortage. In the interim, the IAF has inducted 36 Rafale jets from France, with deliveries completed by 2022, and is considering additional foreign acquisitions, such as the 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program, to bridge the gap.

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