SOURCE: AFI
On the nights of May 7–8 and 8–9, 2025, Pakistan’s Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) faced a significant setback in their attempts to strike critical Indian targets along the Western front.
Former Indian Air Force (IAF) Mirage-2000 pilot and CEO of NewSpace Research & Technologies Pvt Ltd, Sameer Joshi, took to X to underscore the failure of these drones, stating, “Pakistan’s MALE UAVs flopped on the nights of May 7-8/8-9, failing to hit critical Indian sites on the Western front. Most were neutralised by Indian AD, with survivors too weak to saturate any target. The era of MALE drones in active combat is fading fast.” This bold assessment, rooted in the events of Operation Sindoor, highlights the resilience of India’s air defense systems and signals a potential shift in the role of MALE drones in modern warfare.
The context for Joshi’s statement lies in Operation Sindoor, a retaliatory Indian Air Force operation launched on May 7, 2025, in response to a terror attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, that killed 26 tourists in April 2025. The operation targeted multiple locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, escalating tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. In retaliation, Pakistan deployed a mix of fighter jets, missiles, and over 50 MALE UAVs, including Chinese-origin models like the Wing Loong II and Turkish-supplied Bayraktar TB2, to strike Indian military and civilian sites along the Western front, particularly in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.
According to Indian military sources, Pakistan’s UAV offensive aimed to overwhelm Indian air defenses through swarm tactics, targeting key installations such as airbases, radar stations, and command centers. However, India’s multi-layered air defense network, comprising indigenous systems like the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), Medium-Range SAM (MR-SAM), and the Russian S-400, effectively neutralized the majority of these drones. Joshi’s post on X emphasized that the surviving UAVs lacked the payload capacity or coordination to saturate any single target, rendering the attack ineffective.
As a former IAF pilot with combat experience in the 1999 Kargil War and the CEO of NewSpace Research & Technologies, Sameer Joshi brings a unique perspective to the evolving dynamics of aerial warfare. His company, a Bengaluru-based innovator in unmanned systems, has developed cutting-edge technologies like the High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (HAPS) UAV and the Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) Warrior, positioning him as a thought leader in drone technology.
Joshi’s assertion that “the era of MALE drones in active combat is fading fast” reflects several operational and technological realities exposed during the May 2025 engagements:
- Vulnerability to Advanced Air Defenses: Pakistan’s MALE UAVs, operating at altitudes of 15,000–25,000 feet, were highly susceptible to India’s radar-guided SAM systems. The Akash SAM, with its Rajendra phased-array radar, demonstrated an 88–99% kill probability, intercepting multiple drones in real time. The S-400’s long-range 92N6E radar and 48N6E3 missiles further ensured comprehensive coverage, leaving little room for drones to penetrate defended airspace.
- Failure to Achieve Saturation: MALE drones like the Wing Loong II and Bayraktar TB2 are designed for precision strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) rather than high-volume swarm attacks. Joshi noted that the surviving drones were “too weak to saturate any target,” lacking the numbers or payload capacity to overwhelm India’s layered defenses. This contrasts with emerging swarm technologies, such as NewSpace’s MOSAIC intelligence suite, which enables decentralized, AI-driven UAV coordination for true saturation.
- Technological Obsolescence: The performance of MALE drones in contested environments has been questioned in recent conflicts, including Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, where they struggled against integrated air defenses. Joshi’s comment aligns with this trend, suggesting that MALE drones are being outpaced by next-generation systems like Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) and high-altitude platforms. His company’s HAPS UAV, capable of 90-day endurance at 65,000 feet, exemplifies the shift toward persistent, survivable platforms that operate beyond the reach of most air defenses.
- Counter-Drone Innovations: India’s deployment of counter-drone systems, including soft-kill measures like electronic warfare (EW) jamming and hard-kill options like laser-based defenses, further diminished the effectiveness of Pakistan’s UAVs. The upgraded S-125 Neva/Pechora system, for instance, successfully neutralized Turkish-made drones, highlighting India’s ability to adapt legacy systems to modern threats.
Pakistan’s MALE UAV fleet, primarily composed of Chinese and Turkish platforms, was expected to play a significant role in the May 2025 conflict. The Wing Loong II, with a 20-hour endurance and 480 kg payload, and the Bayraktar TB2, known for its success in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, were deployed in large numbers. Pakistan also reportedly used locally developed drones like the Shahpar-II, though their impact was minimal.
However, these platforms faced several limitations:
- Predictable Flight Profiles: MALE drones typically operate at medium altitudes with predictable trajectories, making them easy targets for radar-guided SAMs. Unlike low-altitude kamikaze drones or high-altitude HAPS, they lack the agility or stealth to evade advanced defenses.
- Limited Swarm Coordination: While Pakistan aimed to employ swarm tactics, the drones lacked the AI-driven autonomy needed for effective saturation. NewSpace’s Joshi has advocated for decentralized swarming systems, like those being developed for India’s CATS Warrior, which Pakistan’s UAVs did not exhibit.
- Payload Constraints: The Wing Loong II and TB2 carry precision-guided munitions but lack the capacity for high-volume attacks. Joshi’s observation that survivors were “too weak to saturate any target” reflects this limitation, as the drones could not deliver sufficient ordnance to overwhelm defended sites.
- Vulnerability to EW: India’s use of electronic warfare, including jamming and spoofing, disrupted the drones’ command-and-control links, rendering many ineffective. This aligns with Joshi’s earlier comments at the 2021 India Today Conclave, where he emphasized the difficulty of countering drones without robust EW measures.
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