SOURCE: AFI
The Indian Air Force (IAF) stands at a critical juncture as it seeks to modernize its fleet and bolster its strategic capabilities amid evolving regional threats. While the IAF has made strides in acquiring advanced fighter jets and missile systems, its pace of securing approvals for large-scale strategic programs from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) often lags behind the urgency demanded by the geopolitical landscape.
In contrast, the Indian Navy has demonstrated remarkable agility in navigating bureaucratic hurdles and achieving rapid progress in its strategic initiatives—most notably with its Nuclear Attack Submarine (SSN) program and the K-series Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) program. The IAF could significantly benefit from adopting the Navy’s playbook to expedite its own high-priority projects.
The Indian Navy’s success with its SSN program is a case study in strategic foresight and effective coordination. In October 2024, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), chaired by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), greenlit the construction of two nuclear-powered attack submarines, a decision that underscores the Navy’s ability to align its objectives with national security priorities. This approval came on the heels of the commissioning of INS Arighaat, India’s second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), in August 2024, and the launch of the fourth SSBN, codenamed S4*, in October 2024. These milestones reflect a seamless integration of planning, advocacy, and execution, with the Navy leveraging direct oversight from the PMO to bypass traditional delays.
Similarly, the K-series SLBM program—encompassing missiles like the K-15 (750 km range) and the K-4 (3,500 km range)—has seen incredible results under the Navy’s stewardship. Operating under the classified Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project, the program benefits from a streamlined chain of command that reports directly to the PMO. This structure has enabled rapid development and testing, with the K-4 missile successfully integrated into the Arihant-class submarines, enhancing India’s nuclear triad. The Navy’s ability to secure funding, technical expertise, and political backing has ensured that its submarine-launched ballistic missile capabilities have progressed from concept to operational reality in a relatively short span.
What sets the Navy apart is its strategic approach to MoD approvals. By framing its programs as indispensable to India’s nuclear deterrence and maritime dominance—especially in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s naval presence is growing—the Navy has consistently garnered high-level support. The direct involvement of the PMO has further insulated these projects from bureaucratic inertia, allowing for swift decision-making and resource allocation. For instance, the SSN program’s approval was fast-tracked due to its alignment with India’s broader deterrence strategy against adversarial navies, while the K-series SLBMs have been prioritized as a critical component of second-strike capability.
The IAF, by comparison, has faced protracted delays in its strategic programs. The Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) tender for 114 jets remains mired in evaluations, while the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project, despite its potential to revolutionize India’s air combat capabilities, has struggled to secure the same level of urgency and funding. The IAF’s challenges stem partly from a less cohesive advocacy strategy and a reliance on conventional MoD processes, which are often bogged down by inter-service rivalries and financial constraints. Unlike the Navy, the IAF has not fully capitalized on direct PMO oversight to push its case, leaving critical programs vulnerable to indecision.
To bridge this gap, the IAF could adopt several lessons from the Navy. First, it should emphasize the strategic necessity of its programs by linking them explicitly to national security imperatives—such as countering China’s air superiority along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Second, it should seek a more direct line to the PMO, positioning projects like the AMCA as flagship initiatives akin to the Navy’s SSN and SLBM efforts. Third, the IAF could benefit from integrating its plans with tri-service objectives, presenting a unified front with the Navy and Army to secure MoD buy-in. Finally, cultivating a narrative of self-reliance and technological advancement, as the Navy has done with its indigenous submarine designs, could rally political and public support.
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