SOURCE: AFI
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is grappling with a crisis of unprecedented proportions, one that threatens its ability to safeguard the nation against growing threats from China and Pakistan. In a recent interview on The Wire with host Karan Thapar, Shashank Singh—a leading defense analyst, consultant at Caravan magazine, and lecturer at Yale University—laid bare the gravity of the situation. Drawing from his detailed exposé in Caravan, Singh highlighted a multi-faceted emergency: dwindling squadron strength, outdated aircraft, a lack of critical force multipliers, personnel shortages, and systemic policy failures. His stark warning—“the crisis is very, very serious”—underscores a national security challenge that demands urgent action.
At the heart of the crisis is the IAF’s depleted squadron strength. The IAF is sanctioned for 42 squadrons but currently operates only 31—a 26% shortfall. Singh pointed out that as far back as 2016, defense expert Ashley Tellis assessed that the IAF needs 60 squadrons to effectively counter a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. Yet, the numbers have only dwindled. Two of the 31 squadrons are equipped with MiG-21s, aircraft so outdated that Singh notes they are “just being kept to make up the numbers.” Similarly, the IAF’s Jaguar fleet—long retired by other air forces like the RAF—lacks spare parts, rendering it increasingly obsolete.
The IAF’s modernization efforts have stalled. India hasn’t acquired modern fighter jets since the controversial 2015 Rafale deal for 36 aircraft, a gap of 10 years that Singh calls “pretty unusual.” A 2018 proposal to procure 114 medium fighters has languished, with no trials or progress despite government acknowledgment of the need. Meanwhile, China debuted two sixth-generation stealth jet prototypes in December 2024, while India’s fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) isn’t expected until 2035. This technological lag, compounded by Pakistan’s access to Chinese advancements—80% of its defense imports now come from China—threatens to shift the regional balance of power. Singh warns that within 5–6 years, Pakistan could acquire China’s stealth fighters, leaving India scrambling to catch up.
The crisis isn’t limited to fighter jets. Singh highlighted a “desperate” shortfall in critical force multipliers: airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS), aerial refueling tankers, electronic warfare platforms, drones, and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. These systems are essential for extending operational reach and maintaining air superiority, yet the IAF lags behind. Pakistan, a smaller nation with a defense budget dwarfed by India’s, boasts more AWACS and refuelers—a fact Singh finds alarming. “If you have adequate refuelers, the extent to which your fighter jets can operate goes up manyfold,” he explained, underscoring how this gap handicaps the IAF’s ability to project power.
The IAF also faces a personnel crisis. Between 2015 and 2021, the pilot shortage grew from 486 to nearly 600, with recruitment falling short by 20–70 trainees annually, according to a CAG report. This deficit, Singh noted, may not be felt now due to the lack of aircraft, but it will become critical as the fleet expands. Compounding this is the poor serviceability of existing aircraft—only 50–55% are airworthy at any given time, a statistic gleaned from retired IAF officers.
The Agnipath recruitment scheme, introduced in 2022, adds another layer of concern. The scheme’s four-year tenure, with 75% of recruits exiting thereafter, hampers the development of combat-ready personnel. Singh emphasized that the IAF requires longer training periods to master complex systems, a need unmet by Agnipath’s short cycles. Retired Air Force and Navy chiefs have publicly criticized the scheme, with extracts from General Naravane’s unpublished memoirs revealing the IAF’s strong opposition. Singh predicts that within 5–10 years, the IAF could face a scenario of inadequately trained personnel, further eroding its operational readiness.
The IAF’s pushback against unified theater commands highlights another structural issue. Singh explained that the IAF views India as a single theater, given its ability to redeploy aircraft nationwide within hours. Dividing its already meager 31 squadrons across multiple commands would fragment resources, limiting flexibility and effectiveness. This concern has delayed theater command implementation, with the IAF advocating for centralized control of its assets.
Financially, the crisis is exacerbated by a shrinking defense budget. India’s defense spending, as a percentage of GDP, is at its lowest in independent history—lower even than in 1962 before the Sino-Indian War. Over 52% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions, leaving little for modernization. Singh noted that this economic crunch has slowed acquisitions across all services, with the IAF particularly affected. Fighter jets, among the costliest defense assets, are out of reach without increased funding. A potential deal for F414 engines from the U.S., once hailed as a landmark during PM Modi’s 2023 visit, is now in doubt under a protectionist Trump administration, further dimming modernization hopes.
Singh’s assessment of the crisis’s severity is chilling. The fact that Air Chief Marshal AP Singh has gone public about the shortfall—twice in recent months—signals its gravity. A classified report by a committee under the Defence Secretary, kept secret from the public, further underscores the urgency. Singh warned that without immediate action—adequate funding, diplomatic efforts to procure equipment, and accelerated modernization—the IAF may not be able to perform its expected role in a conflict with Pakistan or China. “We could be facing a situation where, when the balloon goes up, the Indian Air Force may not be in a position to perform,” he told Thapar, describing a potential “catastrophic scenario” within 5–6 years.
The government’s response, Singh argued, has been inadequate. Despite 11 years in power, the Modi administration has failed to prevent the crisis or address it effectively. No modern fighters have been acquired in recent months, and there’s little evidence of urgent action to redress the shortfall. Singh dismissed the government’s ability to blame predecessors after such a long tenure, calling for concrete steps within the coming financial year to avert disaster.
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