SOURCE: AFI
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has long relied on its fleet of U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter jets as a cornerstone of its aerial combat capabilities. These advanced aircraft, however, come with stringent operational restrictions imposed by the United States, including their confinement to designated airbases. This arrangement, rooted in decades of U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation, has gained renewed attention following recent developments, such as the approval of a $397 million package by U.S. President Donald Trump in February 2025 to sustain and monitor Pakistan’s F-16 fleet. T
his article explores how Pakistani F-16s are operated out of designated operational airbases, the mechanisms ensuring compliance, and the implications for regional security, particularly in the context of India-Pakistan tensions exemplified by the 2019 Balakot airstrike.
Pakistan’s F-16 fleet is primarily stationed at two key operational airbases: Shahbaz Airbase in Jacobabad and Mushaf Airbase in Sargodha. These locations were designated under agreements with the United States to ensure strict oversight and segregation from other aircraft, notably the Chinese-designed JF-17 Thunder, which Pakistan co-produces with China. A smaller contingent of older F-16s, including six Block-15 Air Defence Fighter (ADF) variants acquired from Turkey, is permitted at Bholari Airbase in Thatta. This segregation is a deliberate measure to prevent the transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to third parties, particularly China, which has expressed interest in F-16 avionics since the 1980s.
The U.S. imposes a robust monitoring regime at these bases, enforced by Technical Security Teams (TSTs) comprising U.S. Air Force personnel and civilian contractors. These teams, numbering around 30-60 personnel per base, conduct round-the-clock surveillance to ensure the jets are used solely for their intended purpose—counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations—rather than offensive actions against other nations, such as India. Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), exclusive to the F-16s, are stored in high-security vaults at Mushaf Airbase, with their deployment tightly controlled.
The operation of Pakistani F-16s is governed by a series of end-use agreements that dictate everything from maintenance to deployment. Flights outside Pakistan or participation in joint exercises with third countries require prior U.S. approval, a condition designed to limit the jets’ operational scope. Maintenance is another tightly regulated aspect: mid-life upgrades (MLUs) for Pakistan’s older F-16A/B models, which brought them to Block-52 standards, were conducted in Turkey—a NATO ally—rather than Pakistan, to safeguard U.S. technology. Spare parts and technical support are supplied through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, making Pakistan heavily reliant on American assistance to keep the fleet operational.
The $397 million package approved in 2025 builds on previous efforts, such as the $450 million sustainment program sanctioned by the Biden administration in 2022 and a $125 million monitoring initiative in 2019. This latest funding will support a TST presence in Pakistan for the next five years, enhancing real-time oversight. The U.S. employs programs like Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry to monitor compliance globally, but the F-16 fleet’s strategic importance has led to an unusually intrusive regime in Pakistan, including semi-annual inventories and a “two-man rule” for accessing restricted equipment.
The effectiveness of these controls was called into question during the 2019 Balakot crisis. Following India’s airstrike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist camp in Pakistan on February 26, 2019, the PAF retaliated the next day, deploying F-16s in a dogfight with the Indian Air Force (IAF). India claimed a Pakistani F-16 was shot down by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman’s MiG-21, supported by evidence of AMRAAM debris found on Indian soil—wreckage exclusive to the F-16. Pakistan denied losing an F-16, asserting instead that it used JF-17s, but intercepted PAF radio chatter and satellite data suggested otherwise.
This incident highlighted a critical flaw: despite continuous U.S. monitoring, Pakistan managed to deploy F-16s from forward operating bases not authorized under the original agreements, violating the counterterrorism-only mandate. Leaked U.S. diplomatic correspondence from August 2019 revealed a reprimand from Undersecretary of State Andrea Thompson to Pakistan’s Air Chief, warning that such actions risked compromising sensitive technology and undermining shared security interests. The lack of punitive action at the time fueled skepticism about the U.S.’s ability—or willingness—to enforce its rules during crises.
The renewed U.S. commitment to monitoring Pakistan’s F-16s, as outlined in the 2025 funding package, aims to prevent a repeat of the Balakot incident. The Trump administration has framed this move as a counterterrorism measure, ensuring the jets are not used against India, a key U.S. strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific. Operational restrictions now include explicit bans on co-locating F-16s with JF-17s and limits on missile deployments, reflecting concerns over Pakistan’s growing military ties with China.
For India, the stakes are high. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has repeatedly criticized U.S. support for Pakistan’s F-16 program, arguing that the jets’ deployment history belies claims of counterterrorism intent. The IAF’s proven ability to counter F-16s, as demonstrated in 2019, underscores India’s vigilance, but the presence of these jets near its borders remains a point of contention. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s financial struggles—exemplified by overdue payments to the FMS program—threaten the fleet’s operational readiness, potentially forcing greater reliance on the JF-17.
NOTE: AFI is a proud outsourced content creator partner of IDRW.ORG. All content created by AFI is the sole property of AFI and is protected by copyright. AFI takes copyright infringement seriously and will pursue all legal options available to protect its content.