SOURCE: AFI
For decades, the geopolitical rivalry in South Asia has been shaped not only by the direct competition between India and Pakistan but also by the involvement of global powers like the United States and China. Since the 1960s, both nations have, at various points, provided Pakistan with advanced military technology, particularly in the realm of air power, often giving the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) a perceived edge over the Indian Air Force (IAF).
This dynamic has been a source of contention, with India repeatedly expressing concerns over how such support tilts the regional balance. From the U.S. supplying F-104 Starfighters in the 1960s and F-16s in the 1980s to China’s recent moves to potentially supply J-35 stealth fighters in 2025, the pattern of external powers enhancing Pakistan’s aerial capabilities has persisted, complicating India’s strategic calculus.
The roots of this trend can be traced back to the Cold War era, when Pakistan positioned itself as a key ally of the United States in the fight against Soviet influence in Asia. As part of this alliance, the U.S. began supplying Pakistan with advanced military hardware. In 1961, the Pakistan Air Force received its first batch of F-104 Starfighters, a supersonic interceptor that was among the most advanced aircraft of its time. The F-104 gave Pakistan a technological advantage in aerial combat, with its high speed and climb rate outclassing anything India had in its arsenal at the time.
India, aligned more closely with the Soviet Union during this period, responded by acquiring MiG-21 fighters in 1963. The MiG-21, while a capable aircraft, was initially seen as a counterbalance rather than a direct match for the F-104’s capabilities. The 1965 Indo-Pak war showcased these dynamics, with Pakistan leveraging its American-supplied aircraft to challenge India’s air defenses. Although the war ended in a stalemate, the introduction of U.S.-made jets into Pakistan’s fleet set a precedent for foreign powers influencing the regional balance of power. India voiced concerns then, as it would repeatedly in the decades to come, about how such arms transfers destabilized the subcontinent.
Fast forward to the 1980s, and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship deepened further due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S.-led effort to arm Afghan mujahideen against Soviet forces, and in return, the Reagan administration approved significant military aid to Pakistan. A pivotal moment came on March 9, 1984, when India publicly criticized the U.S. for its decision to sell F-16 Fighting Falcon jets to Pakistan. The F-16 was a state-of-the-art multirole fighter, equipped with advanced avionics and precision-guided munitions, giving Pakistan a clear aerial edge at the time.
The first batch of F-16s was delivered to Pakistan in 1983, and by the mid-1980s, the PAF had integrated these jets into its operations. India, which was still relying heavily on Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and MiG-23s, saw the F-16 as a direct threat to its air superiority. The Indian government argued that the sale undermined regional stability, especially given Pakistan’s history of hostility toward India. To counter this, India accelerated its own modernization efforts, eventually acquiring Mirage 2000 fighters from France and later MiG-29s from the Soviet Union. However, the F-16’s introduction marked a significant moment in the PAF’s evolution, giving it a platform that remained a cornerstone of its fleet for decades.
While the U.S. played a dominant role in arming Pakistan during the Cold War, China’s influence began to grow in the latter half of the 20th century and became more pronounced in the 21st century. China and Pakistan have shared a strategic partnership often described as “all-weather,” rooted in their mutual interest in countering India’s influence in the region. This partnership extended to military cooperation, with China supplying Pakistan with a range of aircraft over the years.
In the 1960s and 1970s, China provided Pakistan with Shenyang F-6 fighters (a Chinese-built version of the Soviet MiG-19) and later the Chengdu F-7, a derivative of the MiG-21. These aircraft, while not as advanced as their American counterparts, gave Pakistan a steady supply of combat jets at a time when U.S. military aid occasionally wavered due to diplomatic frictions. The real turning point came in the 2000s with the joint development of the JF-17 Thunder, a lightweight multirole fighter designed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and Pakistan’s Pakistan Aeronautical Complex. The JF-17 became the backbone of the PAF, replacing older aircraft like the Mirage III and F-7, and offering a cost-effective alternative to Western jets.
Now, in 2025, reports have emerged of a potential deal for China to supply Pakistan with J-35 stealth fighters, marking a significant escalation in their military cooperation. The J-35, an advanced fifth-generation stealth jet developed by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, is seen as China’s answer to the American F-35 Lightning II. If this deal materializes, it would give Pakistan access to cutting-edge stealth technology, potentially outpacing India’s current air capabilities, which lack a comparable fifth-generation platform. India’s indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is still in development and not expected to enter service until the early 2030s, leaving a gap that Pakistan could exploit with the J-35.
The recurring pattern of the U.S. and China providing Pakistan with advanced fighter jets has consistently placed India in a reactive position. Each time Pakistan acquires a new capability—whether it was the F-104 in the 1960s, the F-16 in the 1980s, or the potential J-35 in 2025—India has had to scramble to either procure comparable systems or develop indigenous alternatives. This cycle has fueled an arms race in the region, with India often struggling to keep pace due to bureaucratic delays, budget constraints, and reliance on foreign suppliers.
The introduction of the F-16 in the 1980s, for instance, prompted India to diversify its sources, leading to deals with France and the Soviet Union. Similarly, the potential J-35 deal with China has already sparked discussions in India about accelerating the AMCA program or exploring options to acquire fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 from the U.S. However, India’s defense procurement process has historically been slow, and indigenous projects like the Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) have faced significant delays, leaving the IAF with a shrinking number of operational squadrons.
Moreover, the involvement of both the U.S. and China in arming Pakistan underscores the broader geopolitical contest in South Asia. For the U.S., Pakistan’s role as a Cold War ally and later as a partner in counterterrorism efforts justified the supply of advanced jets like the F-16. For China, supporting Pakistan aligns with its strategy of containing India and securing its interests in the Indian Ocean region. Both powers have, at different times, seen Pakistan as a useful counterweight to India, even if their motivations and methods differ.
The history of U.S. and Chinese military support to Pakistan’s air force highlights a persistent challenge for India: how to maintain strategic balance in the face of external interventions. While India has made strides in recent years toward self-reliance in defense—through initiatives like the “Make in India” program and the development of the Tejas and AMCA—the gap between ambition and reality remains wide. Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to benefit from the largesse of its allies, acquiring advanced platforms that keep the pressure on India’s military planners.
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