SOURCE: AFI
In a recent interview with SUNO NEWS HD, Dr. Syed Muhammad Ali, a renowned policy analyst and strategist, raised significant concerns about the potential implications of India acquiring the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet. As discussions around the United States’ offer to sell the advanced fifth-generation aircraft to India gain momentum, Dr. Ali cautioned that such a move could have far-reaching consequences for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the country’s indigenous defense programs. With high procurement costs, infrastructure challenges, and integration hurdles, the F-35 could prove to be a double-edged sword for India’s military aviation ambitions.
Dr. Ali emphasized that one of the most immediate impacts of an F-35 purchase would be the diversion of funds from India’s homegrown fighter jet initiatives. The F-35, with a unit cost ranging from $80 million to over $100 million depending on the variant—excluding lifecycle costs such as maintenance, spares, and upgrades—represents a substantial financial commitment. For a nation already investing heavily in projects like the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas variants, the high procurement cost of the F-35 could strain the defense budget.
“Funds might be diverted to procure the F-35 jets due to their high cost,” Dr. Ali noted. The AMCA, India’s ambitious fifth-generation stealth fighter program, has already seen an allocation of Rs 15,000 crore, with its prototype expected to roll out by 2026–2027 and induction slated for the mid-2030s. Similarly, the LCA Mk-1A and Mk-2 programs, aimed at bolstering the IAF’s fleet with indigenous 4.5-generation fighters, are in critical phases of development and production. A shift in funding toward the F-35 could delay or scale back these projects, undermining India’s long-term goal of self-reliance in defense manufacturing under the “Make in India” initiative.
The policy analyst’s warning echoes sentiments within India’s defense circles, where some fear that an over-reliance on foreign platforms could jeopardize the momentum of domestic programs. With the IAF currently operating at 31 squadrons—well below its sanctioned strength of 42.5—an influx of F-35s might provide a short-term boost, but at the expense of long-term technological sovereignty.
Another critical issue highlighted by Dr. Ali is the IAF’s lack of experience with American combat aircraft. Unlike its extensive history with Russian and French jets—such as the Su-30 MKI, MiG-29, Rafale, and Mirage 2000—the IAF has never operated a U.S.-made fighter jet in its fleet. Introducing the F-35 would necessitate significant investments in training and infrastructure, adding to the overall cost of the acquisition.
“The IAF will need to spend more money on training and infrastructure if they go for the F-35,” Dr. Ali explained. Transitioning to an American platform would require establishing new maintenance facilities, retraining pilots and ground crew, and adapting logistics chains to accommodate the F-35’s unique systems. The aircraft’s advanced stealth features, sensor fusion, and network-centric warfare capabilities demand specialized support ecosystems, which differ markedly from the IAF’s existing setups tailored to Russian and French designs.
For instance, the IAF’s current air-to-air refueling fleet, comprising Russian Il-78 tankers, is incompatible with the F-35’s refueling configuration. Similarly, integrating the jet into India’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), which relies on a mix of Russian and indigenous radar and communication suites, would pose technical challenges. Dr. Ali’s analysis suggests that these additional expenditures could further strain India’s defense budget, diverting resources from other pressing needs, such as modernizing the navy or enhancing air defense systems.
Perhaps the most compelling point raised by Dr. Ali is the potential mismatch between the F-35 and the IAF’s predominantly Russian and French fleet. The IAF’s inventory includes over 250 Su-30 MKI fighters, 36 Rafale jets, and a mix of MiG and Mirage aircraft, all of which operate within a well-established operational framework. Introducing the F-35, a product of Western design philosophy, could disrupt this cohesion.
“The IAF will be a misfit for the F-35 due to the predominance of Russian and French jets in its inventory,” Dr. Ali stated. While he acknowledged that integrating the F-35 with these aircraft is not impossible, he cautioned that it would be far from seamless. The F-35’s advanced communication and data-sharing systems, such as the Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), are optimized for interoperability with other U.S. and NATO platforms, not the Russian Link-16 equivalents or French systems used by the IAF.
This integration challenge extends beyond hardware to operational doctrine. The F-35 is designed for stealth-driven, network-centric missions, often relying on real-time data from satellites and other assets—capabilities that may not fully align with the IAF’s current tactics, which emphasize flexibility across a diverse fleet. Dr. Ali warned that this could “affect” the IAF’s operational effectiveness, potentially creating silos within the force where F-35 squadrons operate independently of their Russian and French counterparts.
Moreover, India’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system adds another layer of complexity. The U.S. has historically opposed allies operating the S-400 alongside the F-35, as seen with Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program in 2019. While the U.S. appears to have softened its stance toward India on this issue, as evidenced by the F-35 offer, integration could still raise concerns about compromising the jet’s stealth technology—a risk Dr. Ali implied could complicate India’s strategic calculus.
Dr. Ali’s critique also hints at broader strategic implications. The F-35 purchase could signal a pivot in India’s defense alignments, potentially straining its decades-long partnership with Russia, which has supplied over 60 percent of its military hardware. Such a shift might invite diplomatic friction with Moscow, especially as Russia has offered its own fifth-generation Su-57 Felon for co-production with India—a proposal that aligns more closely with the IAF’s existing ecosystem.
Conversely, aligning with the U.S. could deepen India’s role in the Indo-Pacific security framework, countering China’s growing air power, including its J-20 stealth fighters. However, Dr. Ali’s analysis suggests that this geopolitical gain must be weighed against the practical and financial costs of integrating a jet that may not fully fit the IAF’s current needs or structure.
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