SOURCE: AFI
In a recent Medium article titled The Rise of the PAF: Asia’s Third Air Power, published on May 4, 2025, Amir Husain claims that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is poised to become Asia’s third most powerful air force, trailing only Russia and China, based on nine analytical pillars. Husain cites the PAF’s modernization, including fifth-generation fighters like the J-35, Turkish KAAN, and indigenous PFX, alongside a robust drone fleet, cyber capabilities, and infrastructure redundancy.
However, a critical examination reveals that these claims are overstated, rooted in speculative projections rather than current realities. In 2025, the PAF ranks fourth in Asia, behind China, India, and South Korea, with significant gaps in fleet size, technological sophistication, and operational readiness that undermine Husain’s assertions. This article counters Husain’s narrative, highlighting the PAF’s limitations and why the Indian Air Force (IAF) and others maintain a clear edge.
Husain’s central argument rests on the PAF’s acquisition of advanced platforms, particularly fifth-generation fighters. He predicts that by 2026, the PAF will operate the Chinese J-35, Turkish KAAN (re-designated “Iqbal”), and the indigenous PFX stealth fighter, positioning it as a regional leader. However, these projections are speculative and face significant hurdles:
J-35 and KAAN: The J-35, a Chinese stealth fighter, remains in development, with no confirmed delivery timeline to Pakistan. The Turkish KAAN, still in prototype stages, is not expected to enter service before 2030, and Pakistan’s adoption is unconfirmed beyond memoranda of understanding. These timelines contradict Husain’s 2026 claim, as neither platform is operational in 2025.
PFX Stealth Fighter: Pakistan’s indigenous PFX, under Project Azm, is at an early conceptual stage, with no prototypes or confirmed specifications. Developing a fifth-generation fighter requires decades and billions in investment, which Pakistan’s constrained defense budget—$7.3 billion in 2024 compared to India’s $78 billion—cannot sustain.
JF-17 Block III: Husain praises the JF-17 Block III, equipped with PL-15 missiles and AESA radar, as a cost-effective 4.5-generation platform. While the JF-17 (149 in service) is a backbone of the PAF, its reliance on Chinese technology, limited electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and smaller payload compared to India’s Rafale or Su-30 MKI limit its effectiveness. Posts on X note the JF-17’s “marginal EW/kinetic survivability,” highlighting vulnerabilities against advanced adversaries.
Husain estimates the PAF operates ~300 medium and high-altitude long-endurance drones, including CH-4s, Shahpar-IIs, Bayraktar TB2s, and Wing Loongs, claiming superiority over India’s unmanned capabilities. This figure is exaggerated and lacks verification. Independent assessments, like those from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), suggest Pakistan’s drone fleet is closer to 100–150 units, primarily Chinese and Turkish models with limited combat experience.
Moreover, Husain’s claim that India lacks operational unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) is outdated. The IAF has integrated 31 MQ-9B Sky Guardian drones, acquired from the U.S. for $3.99 billion in 2024, with 35-hour endurance and precision strike capabilities. India’s DRDO is also developing the Ghatak stealth UCAV and TAPAS-BH drones, expected by 2027. South Korea and Japan, with indigenous drone programs and U.S.-supplied Reapers, further outpace Pakistan’s capabilities. Pakistan’s drones, while numerous, lack the sensor fusion and network-centric warfare integration of Western systems, limiting their strategic impact.
Husain highlights the PAF’s cyber wing, supported by the National Aerospace Science and Technology Park (NASTP), and its hardened infrastructure, including dozens of airbases and motorway landing capabilities. While these are notable, they do not elevate the PAF above its peers:
- Cyber Capabilities: Pakistan’s cyber infrastructure, including quantum-resistant algorithms, is nascent and primarily defensive. In contrast, India’s Cyber Command, backed by the Defence Cyber Agency, has conducted offensive operations, such as disrupting Pakistan’s communication networks during the 2019 Balakot airstrike. South Korea’s advanced cyber ecosystem, integrated with U.S. systems, also surpasses Pakistan’s.
- Infrastructure Redundancy: The PAF’s dispersed airbases and motorway exercises are strategic but not unique. India operates 60 airbases, many hardened with underground facilities, and conducts highway landings with C-130J and Su-30 MKI aircraft. The IAF’s S-400 systems, with a 400 km engagement range, neutralize Pakistan’s electronic warfare platforms like the DA-20, as noted on X: “PAF’s EW architecture rests on vulnerable DA-20s, a textbook Achilles’ heel.”
Husain’s narrative omits the PAF’s historical underperformance against the IAF. In the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the IAF, with 625 combat aircraft, decimated Pakistan’s 275-plane fleet, destroying 36 PAF aircraft on the ground and dominating air operations. The PAF’s defensive posture, as admitted by retired PAF Chief Noor Khan, failed to counter the IAF’s 4,000+ sorties.
More recently, the 2019 Balakot airstrike exposed the PAF’s limitations. Despite intercepting IAF jets, the PAF lost an F-16 to an Indian MiG-21, with India’s superior situational awareness and electronic countermeasures prevailing. The PAF’s counter-terrorism operations, such as the 2009 Swat Valley campaign, relied on improvised doctrines and U.S.-supplied sensors, highlighting training and equipment gaps.
Objective metrics contradict Husain’s claim. In 2025, the PAF operates 1,399 aircraft, including 149 JF-17s, 25 J-10CEs, and 69 F-16s, with a TruVal Rating of 46.3, ranking fourth in Asia behind China (3,304 aircraft, TruVal 78.9), India (2,296 aircraft, TruVal 62.7), and South Korea (1,595 aircraft, TruVal 58.4). Japan, with 1,381 aircraft and advanced F-35s, is a close contender.
The IAF’s technological edge is evident in its Rafale jets, equipped with SPECTRA suites that outmatch the PAF’s KG600 jammers, and the S-400 systems, which neutralize Pakistan’s air threats from long ranges. South Korea’s F-35As and Japan’s F-2 fighters, integrated with U.S. networks, further outclass the PAF’s Chinese-dependent platforms. Posts on X highlight the PAF’s “fleet crisis,” noting obsolete Mirages, F-7s, and slow J-10C inductions, with only 23 JF-17 Block IIIs operational, risking attrition in prolonged engagements.
Husain’s claim of “geopolitical redundancy” through diverse fifth-generation platforms ignores Pakistan’s economic realities. With a GDP of $340 billion and a defense budget dwarfed by India’s, Pakistan relies heavily on Chinese subsidies and loans, limiting its ability to sustain advanced acquisitions. The PAF’s ZDK-03 AWACS, retired after 11 years due to a 25% serviceability rate, exemplify the risks of Chinese technology, as noted on X.
India, with a $3.7 trillion GDP and diversified arms imports (36% Russian, 33% French, 13% U.S. in 2019–2023), enjoys greater strategic flexibility. South Korea and Japan, backed by U.S. alliances, further outpace Pakistan in technological and financial resilience. Pakistan’s alignment with China, supplying 82% of its arms, risks over-dependence, especially as India counters with Western partnerships like the Quad.
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