SOURCE: AFI
The persistent tension between India and Pakistan, reignited by the April 22, 2025, terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, has once again brought the Pakistan Army’s strategic calculus into focus. In a recent discussion, C. Christine Fair, a prominent scholar and expert on South Asian security, offered a compelling analysis of why Pakistan’s military continues to rely on groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to challenge India.
Fair’s central argument is that the Pakistan Army operates not as a conventional military but as an insurgent organization, using terrorist attacks to assert its relevance and prevent India from achieving regional hegemony. This mindset, coupled with the constraints of nuclear deterrence, ensures that groups like LeT remain integral to Pakistan’s strategy, perpetuating a cycle of violence that India struggles to decisively counter.
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal further complicates the equation. While unusable in an offensive capacity, these weapons generate risk, constraining India’s responses to Pakistan-sponsored attacks. Fair argues that this dynamic allows Pakistan to conduct terrorist operations, like those attributed to LeT, with relative impunity, knowing that India’s retaliation will be limited to avoid escalation. The Pakistan Army’s goal is not to defeat India outright but to “land a punch and back away,” a hallmark of insurgent tactics. This approach ensures that Pakistan avoids military defeat while maintaining its narrative of resistance against India’s regional dominance.
LeT, a Punjab-based militant group, serves both external and internal purposes for Pakistan. Externally, it conducts high-profile attacks, such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks or the 2019 Pulwama bombing, to disrupt India’s control over Kashmir and challenge its regional authority. Internally, LeT and its political affiliates bolster the Pakistan Army’s domestic legitimacy by rallying nationalist sentiment and countering political opposition. Fair’s recent book and articles, including a piece co-authored with Iftikhar Khan, highlight how LeT’s activities shore up the military’s objectives at home and abroad.
The 2025 Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 civilians, lacks the “smoking gun” of Pulwama, where Jaish-e-Mohammed’s suicide bomber left clear evidence. The absence of definitive proof linking LeT or other groups to Pahalgam complicates India’s response. Fair notes that even if evidence emerges, targeting LeT’s bases in Pakistan’s Punjab, such as Muridke, is challenging due to their urban locations and Pakistan’s robust air defenses. The international community would likely oppose strikes in densely populated areas, further limiting India’s options.
Fair draws on past India-Pakistan crises to illustrate the Pakistan Army’s insurgent strategy. The 2001-2002 Twin Peaks crisis, triggered by an LeT attack on India’s Parliament, saw India mobilize its forces, only for General Pervez Musharraf to deter escalation with conventional forces and engage in a peace process. The 2016 Uri “surgical strikes” and 2019 Balakot airstrikes, while symbolic, failed to secure lasting deterrence. In Balakot, India’s use of Spice munitions generated buzz but missed key targets, and Pakistan’s retaliatory airstrike, coupled with the capture of an Indian pilot, allowed both sides to claim victories and de-escalate. Fair emphasizes that these episodes reinforce Pakistan’s confidence in its strategy: it avoids defeat, absorbs India’s punches, and resumes hostilities when opportune.
The Pakistan Army’s domestic challenges, particularly the fallout from Imran Khan’s ouster and declining public support, add another layer. Fair recounts encounters with Pakistani military officers who now acknowledge her critiques of the army, a shift driven by Khan’s alienation of ultra-nationalist supporters. Terrorist attacks like Pahalgam serve to rally Pakistanis around the flag, countering internal dissent. India’s saber-rattling, Fair argues, inadvertently aids this by unifying Pakistanis against an external threat, even as global responses—marked by “bothsidesism” from the EU, Russia, and the U.S.—allow Pakistan to interpret neutrality as tacit support.
India’s options to counter Pakistan’s strategy are limited by military, technological, and diplomatic realities. Fair suggests that a game-changing response, such as an armed drone strike, would signal technological escalation but is currently unfeasible given India’s defense modernization stage. Past strategies—skirmishes along the LoC, airstrikes, or full-scale mobilization—have failed to deter Pakistan. The 2001-2002 mobilization, for instance, strained India’s forces without achieving strategic gains, while Balakot highlighted India’s lack of escalation dominance.
Non-military measures, like suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, are unlikely to be effective. Fair warns that India must tread carefully, as China, a staunch Pakistan ally, could retaliate by manipulating water flows on rivers like the Brahmaputra, where it is building massive dams. Diplomatic efforts, led by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, have struggled to secure a unified global condemnation of the Pahalgam attack, with major powers issuing vague calls for de-escalation. The U.S. response, marked by contradictory statements from President Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio, reflects a lack of coherent policy, undermining India’s position.
Fair highlights the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as a rare instance where international pressure—specifically the threat of blacklisting—impacted Pakistan’s military elite by restricting their financial transactions abroad. However, Pakistan’s removal from the FATF grey list came with commitments to curb terrorist financing, which Fair argues have not been honored. Reimposing stringent FATF measures could inconvenience Pakistan’s generals, but Western powers, wary of Pakistan’s economic collapse and potential nuclear proliferation, are reluctant to push for blacklisting. Domestic politics in countries like the UK, with significant Pakistani diaspora populations, further complicate efforts to isolate Pakistan.
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