SOURCE: AFI
In the wake of the April 22, 2025, terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, which claimed 26 lives, Bharat Karnad, Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, has proposed bold and decisive military objectives for India’s retaliation against Pakistan. In a blog post published on April 30, 2025, Karnad argues that capturing the Haji Pir Salient and Skardu, both strategically critical locations in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), is “eminently doable” and should be the Indian military’s primary goals to deliver a lasting blow to Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare tactics.
Karnad’s proposal comes amid heightened India-Pakistan tensions following the Pahalgam attack, attributed to The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). India has already suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, closed its airspace to Pakistani aircraft, and revoked visas for Pakistani nationals, signaling a shift from strategic restraint. However, Karnad criticizes the Indian government’s initial response, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s efforts to seek international support, which failed to secure even a mention of “Pahalgam” in a UN Security Council resolution. He urges India to act unilaterally, emphasizing that “India does not need anybody’s permission or support to retaliate harshly against Pakistan for its asymmetric terrorist warfare undermining national security.”
The Haji Pir Salient, a thumb-shaped protrusion into Indian territory at an altitude of 2,637 meters in the Pir Panjal range, is a critical infiltration route for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Historically, it has facilitated the movement of jihadists, such as LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) cadres, into the Kashmir Valley, as seen in the Pahalgam attack. Karnad proposes a multi-pronged assault to capture the salient, engaging Pakistani forces from three sides while Special Forces pinch off the Uri-Poonch line, cutting off escape routes. This operation, he argues, would trap Pakistani troops in a “cauldron, a killing field,” forcing them to fight, flee, or face destruction.
Capturing Haji Pir would rationalize the Line of Control (LoC), sever the south-of-Pir Panjal infiltration route, and shorten the Uri-Poonch road link from 282 kilometers to 56 kilometers, enhancing India’s logistical and security posture. The salient’s loss would be permanent under international norms, as territory across a ceasefire line, once captured, remains with the victor. Karnad asserts that this operation would not trigger Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, as it involves disputed territory and Pakistan’s survival would not be at stake in a limited conventional conflict.
Karnad’s second objective, capturing Skardu, the headquarters of Pakistan’s Forces Command, Northern Areas, located 40 kilometers across the LoC, aims to disrupt the Sino-Pakistani nexus in the region. Skardu’s proximity to the Shaksgam Valley, ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, and its role as a logistical hub make it a high-value target. In Indian hands, Skardu would secure the LoC up to the Saltoro Muztagh and Siachen Glacier, weakening Pakistan’s hold over Gilgit-Baltistan and complicating China’s strategic ambitions in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
A lightning foray to seize Skardu, Karnad argues, would exploit Pakistan’s limited defensive capabilities in the rugged northern terrain, where India’s high-altitude warfare expertise, honed in Siachen, provides a tactical edge. Like Haji Pir, capturing Skardu would not cross Pakistan’s nuclear red line, as it remains within the contested Kashmir theater, far from Pakistan’s heartland.
Karnad lambasts India’s historical reluctance to capitalize on military gains, citing the 1965 Tashkent Agreement, where India returned the Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan despite its capture in a daring operation led by Major Ranjit Singh Dayal. He argues that this “strategic blunder” allowed Pakistan to resume infiltration, a pattern repeated in India’s failure to retake Haji Pir in 1971. Karnad also critiques the Modi government’s reactive approach, noting the absence of pre-planned retaliatory options or target lists, a deficiency evident in India’s muted responses to the 2000 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
He dismisses calls for broad-front advances across the LoC, as suggested by some retired generals, as lacking strategic focus. Instead, Karnad advocates for “hard geographic-geostrategic objectives” like Haji Pir and Skardu, which offer tangible, lasting benefits. He warns that India’s “lack of spine” in standing up for its interests risks squandering the current opportunity to reshape the regional security landscape.
While Karnad’s plan is ambitious, it faces significant hurdles. Capturing Haji Pir and Skardu requires rapid, coordinated operations in challenging mountainous terrain, demanding elite forces, precise intelligence, and robust logistics. Pakistan’s deployment of SH-15 howitzers and air defense systems along the LoC, as reported recently, could complicate Indian maneuvers. Moreover, China’s potential reaction to an Indian offensive near Skardu, close to its CPEC investments, could escalate tensions, though Karnad believes the risk of nuclear escalation remains low.
Diplomatically, India’s unilateral action could invite criticism, though Karnad argues that global powers, including the U.S., may tacitly support a limited strike, as suggested by Vice President JD Vance’s reported openness to India targeting LeT’s Muridke headquarters. Pakistan’s claim of “credible intelligence” about an imminent Indian strike within 24-36 hours, reported on April 30, 2025, indicates heightened alertness, potentially reducing the element of surprise.
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