SOURCE: AFI
Bangladesh stands at a pivotal juncture in its political and security landscape, warns U.S. security expert Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a seasoned observer of South Asian geopolitics. In a stark assessment, Rubin posits that the country faces two stark paths to avert descending into a “Pakistan- and China-backed Taliban nightmare”: either emulate Egypt’s model of a military coup to restore order or require a Grenada-style Indian military intervention to preempt external manipulation. The stakes, he argues, are nothing less than the nation’s sovereignty and stability in an increasingly volatile region.
Egypt’s modern history offers a blueprint that Rubin suggests Bangladesh could follow. In 2013, Egypt’s military, led by then-General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, ousted the democratically elected but increasingly authoritarian President Mohamed Morsi amid mass protests and fears of Islamist overreach by the Muslim Brotherhood. The coup, while controversial, was framed as a necessary intervention to prevent chaos and secure the state against radicalization. El-Sisi’s subsequent consolidation of power brought stability, albeit at the cost of democratic freedoms, and positioned the military as the ultimate arbiter of Egypt’s destiny.
For Bangladesh, this path would see its military stepping in to neutralize what Rubin describes as a growing threat of Pakistan- and China-backed destabilization. Recent unrest—culminating in the August 2024 ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina after violent protests—has exposed deep fissures. Hasina’s flight to India and allegations of U.S. involvement in her downfall have fueled speculation of external meddling, while the interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus struggles to assert control. Reports of a thwarted coup attempt by pro-Pakistani or Islamist generals in early March 2025, allegedly countered with Indian assistance, only heighten the sense of fragility. A military takeover, Rubin argues, could decisively quash such factions and reassert national unity, mirroring Egypt’s approach to stifling internal threats.
Alternatively, Rubin invokes the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada as a model for Indian intervention in Bangladesh. In that Caribbean crisis, the U.S. intervened militarily to topple a Marxist regime following a coup, citing regional stability and the safety of American citizens. For Bangladesh, India—its powerful neighbor with a vested interest in preventing a hostile or radicalized state on its eastern flank—could play a similar role. Rubin warns that without decisive action, Bangladesh risks becoming a proxy for Pakistan and China, potentially hosting a Taliban-like insurgency that could destabilize the region.
India’s strategic concerns are palpable. Pakistan’s historical ties to Bangladesh, rooted in the pre-1971 era, and its alleged support for Islamist groups could find fertile ground in a weakened Dhaka. Meanwhile, China’s expanding influence—via infrastructure investments and military cooperation—threatens to pull Bangladesh into Beijing’s orbit, challenging India’s regional dominance. An Indian intervention, Rubin suggests, could swiftly restore a pro-India government, neutralize Pakistan-China proxies, and prevent the emergence of a radicalized state akin to Afghanistan under Taliban rule. The precedent of India’s 1971 military role in Bangladesh’s liberation lends historical weight to this option.
Rubin’s most alarming scenario envisions Bangladesh transforming into a “Taliban nightmare” under Pakistan and China’s aegis. He points to Pakistan’s past support for Islamist militancy—most notably the Taliban in Afghanistan—as a playbook that could be replicated in Bangladesh. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other jihadist groups, emboldened by the Afghan Taliban’s 2021 resurgence, have already strained Pakistan’s own borders. Rubin warns that Islamabad could export this model, leveraging Bangladesh’s political instability and porous borders to foster a similar insurgency.
China’s role, meanwhile, would be more strategic than ideological. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has already deepened economic ties with Bangladesh, and a pliant or chaotic Dhaka could serve as a counterweight to India in the Indo-Pacific. Rubin suggests that China might tacitly back Pakistan’s efforts, providing resources or diplomatic cover to ensure Bangladesh remains a thorn in India’s side. The result: a radicalized state that mirrors Afghanistan’s descent into militancy, threatening not just India but the broader Bay of Bengal region.
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