SOURCE: AFI
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has faced a troubling year in 2025, with a series of jet crashes casting a harsh spotlight on its ageing fleet and maintenance practices. The latest incident, a Jaguar twin-seater crash near Jamnagar, Gujarat, on April 2, claimed the life of Flight Lieutenant Siddharth Yadav, marking the second Jaguar loss this year after a similar accident in Haryana in March.
These back-to-back crashes, alongside others involving MiG-21s and Mirage 2000s reported earlier in 2025, have raised alarm bells about the IAF’s ability to sustain its operational readiness. While many air forces worldwide continue to operate older aircraft, their crash rates remain notably lower, prompting questions about the IAF’s maintenance department and its oversight mechanisms. Past Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) reports on Indian crashes offer critical insights into systemic issues that may still persist, urging a thorough relook at how the IAF maintains its fleet.
The Jamnagar crash, attributed to a “critical technical malfunction,” saw one pilot eject safely while Yadav stayed with the aircraft to steer it away from populated areas, a heroic act that cost him his life. Earlier, a Jaguar went down near Panchkula due to a systems failure, with the pilot ejecting unharmed. Reports from idrw.org also note at least two MiG-21 incidents and a Mirage 2000 crash in Madhya Pradesh in 2025, though official tallies remain pending. With over 50% of the IAF’s fleet—MiG-21s (50+ years), Jaguars (40-45 years), Mirage 2000s (35-40 years), MiG-29s (35-40 years), and older Su-30MKIs (25+ years)—exceeding 25 years of service, the strain on airframes and systems is evident. Yet, the frequency of these crashes in 2025 suggests that age alone isn’t the full story.
Other air forces operate vintage aircraft with far fewer incidents, highlighting potential gaps in IAF maintenance. The U.S. Air Force (USAF), for instance, flies A-10 Thunderbolt IIs (introduced in 1977) and F-15 Eagles (1976), both over 40 years old. In FY23, the USAF logged a Class A mishap rate of 1.18 per 100,000 flying hours—higher than its historical average but still manageable given its fleet size and operational tempo. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) operates F/A-18A/B Hornets (introduced in 1985), averaging 0.5-1 crash per year despite their age. Israel’s Air Force (IAF) continues to fly upgraded F-16s and F-15s from the 1970s and 1980s, with a crash rate below 0.2 per 10,000 hours in recent years, thanks to rigorous maintenance and life-extension programs.
These forces share a common thread: proactive maintenance, robust training, and timely upgrades. The USAF’s Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) for F-16s and A-10s, coupled with real-time diagnostics, keep older jets airworthy. Israel’s focus on in-house overhaul facilities ensures rapid turnaround and high serviceability. In contrast, the IAF’s reliance on foreign spares—often delayed due to supply chain issues—and an overstretched maintenance corps may be undermining its efforts, especially as it juggles a diverse fleet of Russian, French, and British-origin aircraft.
Past CAG reports have repeatedly flagged deficiencies in IAF maintenance and training, many of which resonate with 2025’s crashes. The 2017 CAG Report (No. 24) on the IAF highlighted “inadequate serviceability and maintenance” of IL-series aircraft and delays in installing autopilots on Jaguars, compromising safety. It also noted non-functional under-vehicle scanning systems at airbases, hinting at broader logistical lapses. The 2019 CAG audit on the 2014 C-130J Super Hercules crash, which killed five crew members, blamed “inadequate training” due to an unused simulator—available since 2012 but operational only in 2016 because of contractual delays with Lockheed Martin. A 2024 parliamentary report, referencing CAG data, showed human error rising from 41% of crashes in 1991-97 to 51% in 2010-13, with technical defects often compounding the issue.
These findings suggest a pattern: ageing aircraft, overstretched maintenance teams, and training gaps create a perfect storm. The IAF’s current accident rate of 0.20-0.27 per 10,000 flying hours (2020-2024) is a marked improvement from 0.93 in 2000-2005, reflecting better safety protocols. Yet, the spate of 2025 crashes—potentially pushing the rate higher—indicates that unresolved issues, like those flagged by CAG, may persist.
Unlike the USAF or Israeli Air Force, the IAF operates under unique constraints. Its fleet diversity—MiG-21s, Jaguars, Su-30s, and Mirage 2000s—complicates maintenance, requiring distinct expertise and spares. Foreign dependency, especially on Russia, has led to supply bottlenecks, a problem less acute for nations like the U.S., which produce most components domestically. India’s high-altitude and tropical conditions also accelerate wear, unlike the temperate climates where many Western jets operate. Moreover, the IAF’s 31 squadrons (against a sanctioned 42) stretch pilots and maintainers thin, with training hours sometimes sacrificed for operational demands—a contrast to the RAAF’s smaller, focused fleet.
The IAF’s maintenance department must confront these realities head-on. First, it needs a comprehensive audit of its ageing fleet, prioritizing life-extension upgrades or accelerated retirement for high-risk platforms like the Jaguar and MiG-21. The Tejas Mk1A, with 97 additional units slated to replace Jaguar squadrons by 2028-29, offers hope, but production delays at HAL must be addressed. Second, enhancing in-house repair capabilities—mirroring Israel’s model—could reduce reliance on foreign spares, especially as Rolls-Royce supports Jaguar engines only until 2035. Third, training must be overhauled, leveraging simulators and addressing the CAG-noted pilot deficits (486 short in 2015, with uneven recovery since).
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