SOURCE: AFI
The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas has long been hailed as a success story of India’s aerospace industry, developed indigenously by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under the aegis of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The Tejas Mk1, the first variant of this aircraft, was cleared for production by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2013, after years of testing and development. However, despite the initial clearance and optimism surrounding the aircraft, the IAF’s orders for the Tejas Mk1 were limited.
This limited order volume, combined with various internal and external challenges, resulted in a slower-than-anticipated production pace and a series of strategic missteps that impacted the Tejas program.
One of the key factors behind the slow pace of Tejas Mk1 production was the Indian Air Force’s reluctance to place a large number of orders. Although the Tejas Mk1 was cleared for mass production in 2013, the IAF was not fully committed to procuring the aircraft in substantial numbers. Instead, the IAF initially placed an order for just 40 Tejas Mk1 aircraft, with an option for more. This order was significantly lower than what many had expected for a platform that was developed specifically for India’s defense needs.
The rationale behind the IAF’s cautious approach can be traced back to several factors. Despite the fact that the Tejas Mk1 represented a significant leap in India’s defense capabilities, there were lingering concerns within the IAF about the aircraft’s operational readiness, performance, and its ability to meet the evolving demands of modern warfare. The IAF was especially cautious because the Tejas, at the time of its clearance, was still considered an experimental platform, with certain capabilities that were yet to be fully proven.
The decision to order just 40 aircraft, a relatively small number, also meant that HAL could not scale up production effectively. With limited orders, HAL was unable to optimize its production facilities, reduce manufacturing costs, and ramp up the speed of delivery. The limited order volume created a situation where production was slower than expected, leading to delays in the induction of the Tejas Mk1 into IAF service.
The pace of Tejas Mk1 production was further hindered by the relatively small size of the initial order. In contrast to the procurement strategies employed by other air forces around the world, the IAF’s approach meant that HAL was operating under a constrained order book. While the development of the Tejas Mk1 was a major achievement for India, it was clear that a larger order volume would have allowed HAL to ramp up production capabilities more efficiently.
The slow pace of production was not just about numbers—it also had a financial impact. With fewer aircraft to produce, the unit cost of each Tejas Mk1 remained high, making it more expensive for the IAF to procure additional units. This further discouraged the IAF from placing new orders in significant numbers. The cost per unit became a key concern for the Air Force, especially when other platforms, such as the Russian MiG-29 and French Mirage 2000, were available at competitive prices.
Another key issue contributing to the slow pace of Tejas Mk1 production was the gap between technology development and integration. The aircraft had to undergo several rounds of testing and improvements, which delayed its full-scale induction into the IAF. For example, the Tejas Mk1 initially lacked certain crucial features like the Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) capability, which limited its operational flexibility and attractiveness to the IAF. These delays contributed to the overall hesitation of the IAF to order in bulk.
At the time the Tejas Mk1 was cleared for production, the IAF was focused on modernizing its fleet with a combination of indigenously developed and foreign-sourced aircraft. While the Tejas was seen as an important step toward self-reliance in defense manufacturing, the IAF’s priorities were firmly rooted in procuring advanced aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, and the Rafale, all of which offered a higher degree of combat capability. The IAF’s slow embrace of the Tejas Mk1 was therefore a reflection of a broader, more cautious strategy toward indigenization.
The IAF’s hesitance towards large-scale procurement of the Tejas Mk1 was also compounded by its reliance on the foreign aircraft market, which offered aircraft with proven operational histories and immediate operational capabilities. The absence of a comprehensive and multi-role fighter aircraft like the Tejas Mk1 in the IAF’s arsenal led to skepticism over whether the aircraft could meet all of the Air Force’s evolving needs.
In recent years, the IAF’s outlook has changed as the Tejas Mk1 has proven its capabilities, and the Indian government has committed to expanding indigenous defense manufacturing. The Tejas Mk2, a more advanced version of the original Tejas, is now in development and is expected to address many of the shortcomings of the Mk1. The development of the Tejas Mk2, along with its planned induction into IAF service, may help rectify the earlier mistakes of limited orders and slow production.
The IAF’s slow pace in procuring the Tejas Mk1 has not been without consequence. It has left the Indian defense sector in a position where it has to play catch-up, with the IAF now aiming to build up its fleet of indigenous fighters. With the Tejas Mk1 continuing to serve as a platform for the IAF’s regional defense needs, a more robust commitment from the IAF to procure the Tejas Mk2 and future variants is crucial for India’s defense self-sufficiency.