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SOURCE: AFI

India’s potential procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II has been a subject of considerable debate among defense analysts. Recently, defense analyst Ranesh Rajan told AFI that India should only consider acquiring the F-35A if it receives full access to the fighter’s mission computer source code and AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar system, similar to what Israel has negotiated for its F-35I Adir variant. This access would allow India to integrate indigenous weaponry and communication systems, ensuring interoperability with Indian and Russian-made fighter jets like the Su-30MKI.

The F-35A, while one of the most advanced stealth fighters in the world, comes with strict operational restrictions imposed by the United States. These restrictions prevent foreign operators from fully customizing the aircraft’s systems to their own operational needs. If India were to acquire the F-35A under standard Foreign Military Sales (FMS) terms, it would face significant limitations in integrating Indian weaponry, upgrading subsystems, and ensuring seamless connectivity with its existing combat aircraft.

Without access to the mission computer’s source code, India would have to rely on U.S. approvals to integrate weapons like the Astra BVRAAM (Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile), BrahMos-NG, and indigenous precision-guided munitions (PGMs). This would not only hinder operational flexibility but also delay future upgrades.

India’s air force operates a mix of Western and Russian-origin aircraft. The F-35A’s inability to communicate via secure datalinks with Su-30MKI, Rafale, and Tejas Mk1A jets would create an operational bottleneck. Access to the source code would allow the IAF to modify the F-35’s communication suite, ensuring compatibility with Indian Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) systems.

The U.S. controls software updates and data management for the F-35 fleet through centralized systems like ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) and ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network). If India does not gain control over these, it would be at the mercy of American decisions on software patches and system upgrades, jeopardizing sovereignty over mission-critical systems.

Israel is the only F-35 operator outside the United States that has been granted extensive customization rights over its F-35 fleet, known as the F-35I Adir. This level of access provides Israel with several advantages. Israel received permission to modify the aircraft’s mission computer, allowing it to integrate Israeli-developed weaponry like the SPICE precision-guided bomb, Python-5 air-to-air missile, and Delilah cruise missile.

The F-35I features an Israeli-developed electronic warfare system, enabling superior situational awareness and the ability to counter regional threats effectively. Unlike other F-35 operators who rely on U.S.-controlled software updates, Israel’s modifications enable seamless connectivity with its F-15 and F-16 fleets.

While most F-35 users depend on the U.S. for sustainment support, Israel has developed its own in-country maintenance infrastructure, reducing dependence on Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon.

If India were to acquire the F-35A without similar concessions, it would be bound by U.S. restrictions, limiting its ability to customize the aircraft to its specific needs. Given India’s focus on indigenization under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, purchasing the F-35A without source code access would be a strategic misstep. India should insist on:

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