You dont have javascript enabled! Please enable it!
Archives

SOURCE: AFI

In an insightful discussion with TaiwanPlus, Don McLain Gill, a lecturer at De La Salle University in Manila, shed light on Vietnam’s strategic intentions behind potentially acquiring the BrahMos missile system from India. Gill highlighted the increasing tensions in the Gulf of Tonkin, where Chinese maritime forces have reportedly attacked Vietnamese fishermen with iron clubs and detained others, underscoring the urgency for Vietnam to bolster its defense capabilities.

“China, for instance, has been pushing the envelope in its claim over the Gulf of Tonkin. In the past few weeks, we’ve seen Chinese maritime forces beat Vietnamese fisherfolk with iron clubs, and of course, there’s the imprisonment or detainment of Vietnamese fishermen,” Gill stated. These incidents form part of Vietnam’s strategic calculations in seeking deterrents like the BrahMos missile, which could serve as a significant counterbalance to China’s aggressive maritime posturing.

However, Gill points out Vietnam’s strategic culture, emphasizing its pursuit of strategic autonomy rather than engaging in bloc politics against China. “Vietnam is unlikely to engage in bloc politics against China driven by its strategic autonomy,” he notes, indicating that Vietnam’s defense acquisitions are more about self-preservation and deterrence rather than alignment with any particular power bloc.

The acquisition of BrahMos by Vietnam follows a pattern seen with the Philippines, which has already integrated similar missile systems into its defense strategy in the South China Sea, where it has competing territorial claims with China. “The Philippines has already acquired a similar missile system to use in the South China Sea where it has competing claims with China. Is that why Vietnam wants to buy these missiles?” Gill was asked. His response ties the move to Vietnam’s long-standing negotiations with India for various defense systems, including the Akash missile in 2017, which also stirred controversy with China.

The strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific, characterized by intense geopolitical competition and security polarization, has naturally led Vietnam to this decision. “Given the highly competitive nature of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, the highly polarized dimension of Southeast Asian security, this was a natural step for Vietnam,” Gill explains. He also mentions the increasing cooperation between Vietnam and the Philippines through bilateral patrols for non-traditional security issues, suggesting a regional trend towards bolstering defense capabilities amidst the US-China power dynamics and China’s expansionist policies.

Regarding China’s potential reaction to Vietnam’s acquisition of BrahMos missiles, Gill observes, “China has also been a major supplier of arms and defense equipment to India’s immediate neighbors, and of course, the first offshore base of China is in Djibouti in the Western Indian Ocean.” He posits that China should not be overly apprehensive about Vietnam’s move, given its own strategic maneuvers in different contexts. Instead, he sees India’s engagement in Southeast Asia as part of a broader strategy to enhance capacity building among friendly nations rather than solely countering China.