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SOURCE: AFI

Turkish defense analysts have sharply criticized the United States for what they perceive as blatant hypocrisy in its defense policies, particularly following reports that the U.S. has offered India its F-35A Lightning II stealth fighter despite India’s operation of the Russian S-400 air defense system.

This offer comes in stark contrast to Turkey’s experience, where its purchase of the S-400 led to its expulsion from the F-35 program and the imposition of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions. Turkish analysts argue that this disparity exposes U.S. double standards, raising questions about fairness and consistency in Washington’s approach to its allies and partners. This article explores the analysts’ claims and explains why India is not Turkey in this geopolitical context.

The S-400 Triumf, a Russian-made air defense system, has been a contentious issue in U.S. foreign policy due to its potential to undermine NATO security and gather intelligence on Western military technologies, particularly the F-35. Turkey, a NATO member, signed a deal with Russia in 2017 to acquire the S-400, with deliveries beginning in July 2019. The U.S. responded decisively, expelling Turkey from the F-35 program—where it was set to purchase 100 jets and contribute to manufacturing—and imposing CAATSA sanctions in December 2020. The U.S. cited concerns that the S-400’s radar could collect data on the F-35’s stealth capabilities, compromising NATO’s technological advantage.

India, meanwhile, signed a $5.43 billion deal with Russia in October 2018 for five S-400 systems, with deliveries starting in December 2021. Despite initial threats of CAATSA sanctions, India has faced no punitive measures from the U.S. Moreover, recent reports indicate that the U.S. is now considering offering India the F-35A, a fifth-generation stealth fighter, potentially through a government-to-government (G2G) deal similar to India’s Rafale procurement from France. Turkish analysts have seized on this development, arguing that it highlights U.S. hypocrisy: while Turkey was penalized for its S-400 purchase, India is being courted with the same aircraft it was denied.

Turkish defense analysts have expressed outrage over this perceived inconsistency. “The U.S. expelled Turkey from the F-35 program and imposed sanctions for acquiring the S-400, claiming it posed a threat to NATO security,” one analyst remarked. “Yet, India, which also operates the S-400, is now being offered the F-35A. This exposes the U.S.’s double standards and selective application of its own rules.” Another analyst added, “If the S-400 is a security risk, why is it acceptable for India but not for Turkey? This is not about principles—it’s about geopolitics and favoritism.”

Why India is Not Turkey: Key Distinctions

While Turkish analysts’ grievances are rooted in real disparities, several strategic, geopolitical, and contextual factors explain why India and Turkey are treated differently by the U.S. These distinctions highlight the unique positions of each country in relation to U.S. interests and global security dynamics.

  1. NATO Membership and Alliance Commitments
    Turkey’s status as a NATO member since 1952 places it under stricter scrutiny regarding defense procurement. As a NATO ally, Turkey is expected to align its military systems with alliance standards, ensuring interoperability and security. The integration of the S-400, a Russian system, into Turkey’s defense architecture raised concerns about compatibility with NATO assets, particularly the F-35, and the risk of Russian intelligence-gathering. This breach of alliance norms triggered a strong U.S. response to protect NATO’s collective security.
    India, conversely, is not a NATO member and operates as a non-aligned nation with a tradition of strategic autonomy. Its defense decisions do not directly impact NATO’s operational framework, reducing the perceived threat to U.S. and allied security. India’s S-400 purchase is seen as a sovereign choice rather than a violation of alliance obligations, allowing the U.S. to adopt a more lenient stance.
  2. Geopolitical Priorities and the Indo-Pacific Strategy
    The U.S. views India as a critical partner in the Indo-Pacific region, where it serves as a counterbalance to China’s growing military and economic influence. This partnership is reinforced through initiatives like the Quad and bilateral agreements such as BECA and COMCASA. Offering the F-35A to India, despite its S-400 ownership, reflects a strategic calculation to strengthen ties with a key ally in a region of heightened geopolitical competition.
    Turkey, while an important NATO member, operates in a different strategic context, primarily focused on the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Its relations with the U.S. have been strained by disagreements over Syria, its purchase of Russian systems, and domestic policies, reducing its leverage compared to India. The U.S. prioritizes India’s role in the Indo-Pacific over Turkey’s regional influence, influencing its willingness to accommodate India’s S-400 purchase and extend the F-35 offer.
  3. Historical Defense Relationships with Russia
    India has a decades-long defense relationship with Russia, which supplies approximately 60% of its military hardware, including aircraft, tanks, and air defense systems. The S-400 purchase is a continuation of this partnership, driven by India’s need to counter threats from China and Pakistan. The U.S. recognizes India’s historical reliance on Russian systems and has sought to diversify its defense procurement through offers of platforms like the F-35 and F-21, rather than imposing sanctions that could push India closer to Russia.
    Turkey’s S-400 acquisition, however, marked a significant shift from its reliance on Western systems within NATO. This move was perceived as a strategic alignment with Russia, a NATO adversary, heightening U.S. concerns and justifying a punitive response. India’s consistent defense ties with Russia contrast with Turkey’s pivot, influencing U.S. policy decisions.
  4. Timing and CAATSA Application
    The timing of the S-400 deals relative to CAATSA’s enactment provides additional context. CAATSA, signed into law on August 2, 2017, targets nations engaging in significant transactions with Russia’s defense sector. India’s S-400 negotiations began before CAATSA, with a preliminary agreement in 2016, and the final deal was signed in 2018. This pre-CAATSA timeline allowed India to argue that its purchase predated the law’s full enforcement, mitigating the risk of sanctions.
    Turkey’s S-400 contract was signed in April 2017 and finalized in December 2017, after CAATSA’s enactment. As a NATO member, Turkey’s decision to proceed despite U.S. warnings was seen as a deliberate violation, prompting sanctions. The differing timelines and contexts of these deals influenced the U.S.’s application of CAATSA.
  5. Economic and Strategic Leverage
    India’s economic and military weight as the world’s third-largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP) and a nuclear power with a growing defense budget gives it significant leverage. The Indian market is a lucrative opportunity for U.S. defense firms, and imposing CAATSA sanctions could jeopardize potential contracts, such as the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) tender or F-35 sales.
    Turkey, while a valuable NATO ally, has less economic and strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region, making it a less critical partner for the U.S. in economic terms. This disparity influences the U.S.’s willingness to accommodate India’s S-400 ownership and extend the F-35 offer.

Turkish analysts’ accusations of U.S. hypocrisy are grounded in the tangible consequences Turkey faced—exclusion from the F-35 program and sanctions—while India appears to be rewarded with an F-35 offer. However, the differences outlined above demonstrate that India and Turkey operate in distinct geopolitical contexts, and U.S. policy reflects pragmatic considerations rather than arbitrary favoritism. The U.S.’s strategic imperatives in the Indo-Pacific, India’s non-NATO status, and its historical ties with Russia justify its differential treatment.

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