SOURCE: GIRISH LINGANNA / FOR MY TAKE / IDRW.ORG.
According to a recent RUSI think tank analysis, hundreds of foreign-made microelectronic components, such as processors, were detected in Russian weapons used in its invasion of Ukraine.
The report, titled ‘Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine,’ includes an examination of the components and operation of 27 of Russia’s most modern’ weapons, including cruise missiles, and discovered at least 450 foreign-made components, many of which were manufactured by US companies known for providing microelectronics to the US military.
According to the 8 August study, as many as 80 components were subject to US export prohibitions, which RUSI argued showed Russia’s military-industrial complex had effectively avoided.
RUSI noted that the technical inspection of Russian equipment captured in or fired at Ukraine outlined how Russia’s military modernisation programme has depended on US, Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korean, Swiss, Dutch, British, French, and German-manufactured microelectronics.
According to the article, to be authorised to utilise foreign components in military equipment, Russian enterprises must demonstrate to the Russian Ministry of Defence that there is no local alternative.
Russia has lost massive quantities of equipment and severely reduced its supplies of cruise and ballistic missiles since the beginning of the invasion.
According to RUSI Open Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) research scholar Gary Somerville, one of the report’s authors, given the tonnage of Russian weaponry wasted or lost on Ukraine, Moscow will have to decide how it would replace them.
Since the evidence so far suggests that they are highly reliant on components produced by companies in West and East Asia, it strongly indicates that Russia does not have the domestic microchip manufacturing industry to readily replace the microchips at the volumes and level of sophistication that it requires to rebuild its stockpiles of military equipment, Somerville explains.
This is especially true for vital components seized from many Russian missiles, which rely on sophisticated US-made microchips in their computer and processing units to swiftly interpret data received from the missile’s different sensors.
The paper covers numerous such systems, breaking down the microelectronics contained within them, such as the Tornado-S missile system, which incorporates field programmable gate arrays, static RAM chips, and flash memory modules manufactured in the West.
Western components are also used in a number of systems, including the Orlan-10 UAV, the Akveduk radio station, and the 9M549 Glonass guided missile.
The great bulk of the components mentioned in the reports may be traced back to the United States. Russian Kalibr cruise missiles contain Ethernet transceivers, static RAM, and other Western components. Iskander-K cruise missiles have Western microelectronics as well.
Sanctions and tighter export controls have been imposed to deter Russia’s military-industrial complex and cut off Moscow’s access to dual-use components.
‘Following the imposition of fresh sanctions and tougher export controls, the Russian government has sought to address the severance of access to vital components through import substitution,’ RUSI wrote in its study.
This strategy was later discovered to be unworkable. As a result, Russia must either develop new, less capable weapons or engage in sanctions evasion, which has become a vital priority for its special forces.
According to Somerville, one of the difficulties in cutting off the flow of Western electronics is that many microchips and other components are subject to export regulations.
He also said that many of the identified microchips and components are not subject to export limits, implying that they can be found in common microelectronics. Second, he stated that, according to RUSI research, the Russian military-industrial complex, as well as security and intelligence services, make significant use of front firms to conceal the end user.
Furthermore, the Russians use third-country transhipment hubs such as Hong Kong, where resellers of microelectronics have acted as an intermediary for sending foreign-sourced microelectronics, most likely including those subject to export controls, onto Russian companies, which have then found their way into Russian weapons currently being used against Ukraine.
The RUSI assessment stated that if ‘proper measures are followed,’ Russian military power may be permanently weakened. According to Somerville, governments, exporters, and manufacturers should take a variety of steps to limit the flow of these microelectronics to Russia.
He stated that states should try to uncover and shut down Russia’s “covert procurement networks” abroad, as well as enhance current export controls.
He also stated that microelectronics exporters should exercise increased due diligence to guarantee that components do not end up in the hands of a military end-user or military end-use. Third (party) nations and jurisdictions that are involved in re-exporting commodities to Russia and its military industry should also be given special consideration.
Finally, Somerville stated that while Russia is still likely to buy the microelectronics and associated components that its military requires, these steps will greatly increase their prices in order for them to be even modestly effective in this endeavour.
The RUSI assessment stated that “the moment to act is now,” as Russia scrambles to acquire in bulk before the net of western microelectronic supply shuts.Sanctioned Western chips and electronics may still find a way to Russia, says think tank
According to a recent RUSI think tank analysis, hundreds of foreign-made microelectronic components, such as processors, were detected in Russian weapons used in its invasion of Ukraine.
The report, titled ‘Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine,’ includes an examination of the components and operation of 27 of Russia’s’most modern’ weapons, including cruise missiles, and discovered at least 450 foreign-made components, many of which were manufactured by US companies known for providing microelectronics to the US military.
According to the 8 August study, as many as 80 components were subject to US export prohibitions, which RUSI argued showed Russia’s military-industrial complex had effectively avoided.
RUSI noted that the technical inspection of Russian equipment captured in or fired at Ukraine outlined how Russia’s military modernisation programme has depended on US, Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korean, Swiss, Dutch, British, French, and German-manufactured microelectronics.
According to the article, to be authorised to utilise foreign components in military equipment, Russian enterprises must demonstrate to the Russian Ministry of Defence that there is no local alternative.
Russia has lost massive quantities of equipment and severely reduced its supplies of cruise and ballistic missiles since the beginning of the invasion.
According to RUSI Open Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) research scholar Gary Somerville, one of the report’s authors, given the tonnage of Russian weaponry wasted or lost on Ukraine, Moscow will have to decide how it would replace them.
Since the evidence so far suggests that they are highly reliant on components produced by companies in West and East Asia, it strongly indicates that Russia does not have the domestic microchip manufacturing industry to readily replace the microchips at the volumes and level of sophistication that it requires to rebuild its stockpiles of military equipment, Somerville explains.
This is especially true for vital components seized from many Russian missiles, which rely on sophisticated US-made microchips in their computer and processing units to swiftly interpret data received from the missile’s different sensors.
The paper covers numerous such systems, breaking down the microelectronics contained within them, such as the Tornado-S missile system, which incorporates field programmable gate arrays, static RAM chips, and flash memory modules manufactured in the West.
Western components are also used in a number of systems, including the Orlan-10 UAV, the Akveduk radio station, and the 9M549 Glonass guided missile.
The great bulk of the components mentioned in the reports may be traced back to the United States. Russian Kalibr cruise missiles contain Ethernet transceivers, static RAM, and other Western components. Iskander-K cruise missiles have Western microelectronics as well.
Sanctions and tighter export controls have been imposed to deter Russia’s military-industrial complex and cut off Moscow’s access to dual-use components.
‘Following the imposition of fresh sanctions and tougher export controls, the Russian government has sought to address the severance of access to vital components through import substitution,’ RUSI wrote in its study.
This strategy was later discovered to be unworkable. As a result, Russia must either develop new, less capable weapons or engage in sanctions evasion, which has become a vital priority for its special forces.
According to Somerville, one of the difficulties in cutting off the flow of Western electronics is that many microchips and other components are subject to export regulations.
He also said that many of the identified microchips and components are not subject to export limits, implying that they can be found in common microelectronics. Second, he stated that, according to RUSI research, the Russian military-industrial complex, as well as security and intelligence services, make significant use of front firms to conceal the end user.
Furthermore, the Russians use third-country transhipment hubs such as Hong Kong, where resellers of microelectronics have acted as an intermediary for sending foreign-sourced microelectronics, most likely including those subject to export controls, onto Russian companies, which have then found their way into Russian weapons currently being used against Ukraine.
The RUSI assessment stated that if ‘proper measures are followed,’ Russian military power may be permanently weakened. According to Somerville, governments, exporters, and manufacturers should take a variety of steps to limit the flow of these microelectronics to Russia.
He stated that states should try to uncover and shut down Russia’s “covert procurement networks” abroad, as well as enhance current export controls.
He also stated that microelectronics exporters should exercise increased due diligence to guarantee that components do not end up in the hands of a military end-user or military end-use. Third (party) nations and jurisdictions that are involved in re-exporting commodities to Russia and its military industry should also be given special consideration.
Finally, Somerville stated that while Russia is still likely to buy the microelectronics and associated components that its military requires, these steps will greatly increase their prices in order for them to be even modestly effective in this endeavour.
The RUSI assessment stated that “the moment to act is now,” as Russia scrambles to acquire in bulk before the net of western microelectronic supply shuts.
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