SOURCE: AFI

In a rare admission, several Russian military analysts have pointed to the Indian Air Force (IAF) as a case study in effective airpower deployment, particularly in executing swift and decisive strikes to neutralize enemy airbases. The commentary, which has gained traction in Russian defense circles, comes amid growing frustration over the Russian Air Force’s inability to decisively degrade the Ukrainian Air Force’s infrastructure, even after more than three years of high-intensity conflict.
Despite sustained missile and drone strikes, Ukraine continues to operate fighter jets, maintain functioning airbases, and launch sorties from relatively intact infrastructure—an outcome that many in Russia’s defense community see as a failure to establish full air dominance.
According to Russian military commentators, the IAF’s operational doctrine, exemplified by its rapid-response capabilities and deep-strike precision, offers valuable lessons. Indian air planners have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to paralyze adversary airbases and infrastructure in a matter of hours, thanks to well-coordinated strikes, surveillance, and superior target selection—most notably displayed during exercises and operational scenarios along the western and northern fronts.
In particular, India’s emphasis on Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) missions has led to the integration of advanced weaponry such as precision-guided munitions, anti-radiation missiles, and standoff weapons like the SCALP, Spice-2000, and BrahMos. The IAF’s Mirage-2000, Su-30MKI, and Rafale fighters are all configured for deep-penetration strikes, backed by real-time ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) assets and satellite-based target acquisition.
A Stark Contrast to Russian Strategy in Ukraine
Russian analysts argue that unlike the IAF’s precise and coordinated strike doctrine, the Russian Air Force’s campaign in Ukraine has suffered from several limitations:
- Lack of sustained targeting of Ukrainian airbases and runways.
- Underuse of precision-guided munitions, especially early in the war.
- Insufficient integration of ISR assets to track and target mobile air operations.
- Inability to conduct follow-on strikes to keep repaired infrastructure inoperable.
Even after repeated missile salvos and tactical air operations, Ukraine continues to generate sorties from dispersed airbases, road runways, and hardened shelters, forcing Russia into a prolonged war of attrition—something it had hoped to avoid.
What stands out to Russian observers is the IAF’s emphasis on combined arms planning, real-time adaptability, and indigenous innovation. India has also focused heavily on modernizing its fleet with advanced electronic warfare capabilities and network-centric warfare doctrines that allow pilots to make independent decisions based on real-time data fusion.
Additionally, India’s growing integration of domestically developed stand-off weapons and sensor-fusion technologies—ranging from DRDO’s Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW) to long-range glide bombs and loitering munitions—gives the IAF a toolkit that is agile, cost-effective, and strategically potent.
For Russian defense planners, this comparison serves as both a criticism and a roadmap. The ongoing war in Ukraine has revealed gaps in Russia’s ability to impose air supremacy, despite having one of the world’s largest air forces. The IAF’s doctrine, with its emphasis on quick, high-impact, precision-driven operations, may hold the key to breaking the stalemate in future conflicts.
As Russia recalibrates its strategy, there is a growing acknowledgment that modern air warfare is not just about numbers or firepower—but about coordination, precision, speed, and the ability to disable critical infrastructure in the opening hours of a campaign.
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