SOURCE: AFI
Pakistan has long boasted of possessing South Asia’s largest fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), primarily sourced from Turkey and China, positioning itself as a regional leader in drone warfare. With an inventory exceeding 1,000 drones, including advanced platforms like the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci, Chinese CH-4 and Wing Loong II, and indigenous models like the Burraq and Shahpar-II, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has heavily invested in unmanned systems for surveillance, precision strikes, and cross-border operations.
However, the four-day conflict with India in May 2025, known as Operation Sindoor, exposed critical limitations in Pakistan’s UAV strategy. Despite deploying 300–400 Turkish-made Asisguard Songar and Baykar YIHA-III drones, Pakistan’s UAVs were largely neutralized by India’s multi-layered air defense systems, highlighting their ineffectiveness in high-intensity conflicts against a well-equipped adversary. This article examines why Pakistan’s vaunted drone fleet failed to deliver and why Turkish and Chinese UAVs may have a limited role in conflicts where the opposing side possesses advanced air defenses, as seen in the recent India-Pakistan clash.
Pakistan’s drone program, developed since the late 1990s, has grown into one of the most extensive in South Asia. According to Lahore-based defense analyst Ejaz Haider, the PAF’s inventory includes “over a thousand drones,” featuring a mix of imported and indigenous platforms. Key systems include:
- Turkish Drones: The Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci, known for their success in conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh, offer precision strike and reconnaissance capabilities. The Asisguard Songar, a smaller armed drone, is designed for tactical operations.
- Chinese Drones: The CH-4B and Wing Loong II are medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) equipped with missiles and advanced sensors, complementing Pakistan’s domestic Burraq and Shahpar-II.
- Indigenous Efforts: The Burraq, first deployed in 2015, and the Shahpar-II, produced by Global Industrial & Defence Solutions, reflect Pakistan’s push for self-reliance, though production capacity remains limited.
Pakistan’s collaboration with Turkey’s Baykar, through the National Aerospace Science and Technology Park, enables local assembly of YIHA-III drones, with production times as low as two to three days. China, accounting for 81–82% of Pakistan’s arms imports from 2019–2024, has supplied advanced UCAVs like the Wing Loong II, enhancing Pakistan’s strike capabilities. Posts on X have amplified Pakistan’s claims of “armed drone supremacy,” with users like @wartrophy_414 touting the PAF’s fleet as “the most extensive UCAV fleet in South Asia.” Yet, the May 2025 conflict revealed a stark gap between this rhetoric and battlefield reality.
The May 2025 conflict, triggered by the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 civilians, saw India launch Operation Sindoor, targeting PAF airbases and terrorist infrastructure with BrahMos and SCALP missiles, as well as Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions. Pakistan responded with a large-scale drone offensive, deploying 300–400 Turkish Songar and YIHA-III drones, alongside Chinese CH-4 and Wing Loong II UCAVs, targeting Indian bases in Jammu, Udhampur, Pathankot, and Punjab. However, India’s advanced air defense systems—comprising the Russian S-400 Triumph, indigenous Akash missiles, and Cold War-era L70 anti-aircraft guns upgraded with Bharat Electronics’ radar networks—neutralized these drones with remarkable efficiency.
According to Indian sources cited by India Today, over 10 Pakistani UCAVs were shot down, and a hangar at Bholari Air Base containing Wing Loong drones was destroyed by Rafale and Su-30 MKI strikes. Reuters reported that India’s retrofitted anti-aircraft guns, originally not designed for anti-drone warfare, proved “surprisingly effective” against Pakistan’s UAVs. Posts on X, such as one by@suryakane
on May 31, 2025, noted that “Chinese air defense systems were comprehensively overcome by Indian and Israeli missiles and drones,” while Pakistan’s drones “failed to hit targets.” The debris of intercepted drones, described as “orange dots” in Indian skies by international correspondents, littered multiple states, underscoring the scale of Pakistan’s failed offensive.
Limited Role of Turkish and Chinese UAVs in High-Intensity Conflicts
The May 2025 conflict underscores that Turkish and Chinese UAVs, while cost-effective and versatile in asymmetric warfare, have limited utility in high-intensity conflicts against adversaries with robust air defenses. Their effectiveness is evident in scenarios like Nagorno-Karabakh or Syria, where opponents lacked advanced systems, but against India’s integrated air defense grid, they faltered. Key reasons include:
- Lack of Stealth and Survivability: Unlike India’s Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions, which combine stealth and autonomous capabilities, Turkish and Chinese drones are detectable by modern radars. The Harop’s 200km range and six-hour loiter time allowed it to bypass Pakistani defenses, as claimed by Pakistan’s military spokesperson on May 8, 2025.
- Dependence on Foreign Supply Chains: Pakistan’s reliance on Chinese and Turkish imports, with limited domestic production capacity, creates vulnerabilities. Zohaib Altaf of the Center for International Strategic Studies noted that “Pakistan’s weak domestic drone industry” could hinder sustained operations in a protracted conflict, especially if supply chains are disrupted.
- Counter-Drone Measures: India’s investment in counter-drone technologies, such as the D4 system and handheld jammers, neutralized Pakistan’s UAVs. A Foreign Policy report emphasized that drones are “extremely effective” for probing defenses but are often shot down by robust systems, as seen in India’s response.
NOTE: AFI is a proud outsourced content creator partner of IDRW.ORG. All content created by AFI is the sole property of AFI and is protected by copyright. AFI takes copyright infringement seriously and will pursue all legal options available to protect its content.