SOURCE: AFI
In the volatile aftermath of the May 2025 Indo-Pakistan clashes, sparked by a deadly terror attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, Pakistan’s military made a bold claim that went largely unnoticed by international media: its air force had allegedly neutralized India’s Mach 3-capable BrahMos supersonic cruise missile using “soft kill” measures.
This assertion, attributed to Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Air Vice Marshal Aurangzeb Ahmed, suggests that Pakistan employed non-kinetic, electronic warfare (EW) techniques—such as jamming or spoofing—to disable the missile without firing interceptors. However, a deep dive into the technical capabilities of the BrahMos missile, Pakistan’s air defense systems, and the realities of modern missile defense reveals this claim to be not only implausible but a likely piece of propaganda aimed at salvaging national pride amid a bruising conflict.
The BrahMos: A Formidable Supersonic Weapon
The BrahMos, a joint Indo-Russian venture, is one of the world’s most advanced supersonic cruise missiles, designed to evade even the most sophisticated air defenses. Traveling at speeds up to Mach 2.8–3.0 (approximately 3,600–3,700 km/h), it flies at low altitudes (5–15 meters in its terminal phase) to avoid radar detection. Its key features include:
- Advanced Guidance Systems: The BrahMos employs a combination of inertial navigation, GPS/GLONASS, and an active radar seeker in its terminal phase, making it highly resistant to jamming. Its “fire-and-forget” capability allows it to autonomously track and strike targets with a circular error probable (CEP) of less than 1 meter.
- Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM): The missile is equipped with sophisticated ECCM to counter electronic warfare tactics like jamming or spoofing. Its radar seeker is designed to distinguish genuine targets from decoys and resist interference, a feature derived from its Russian predecessor, the P-800 Oniks.
- High Speed and Low RCS: The BrahMos’s supersonic speed reduces the reaction time for defenders to mere seconds, while its low radar cross-section (RCS) and sea-skimming flight profile make it a challenging target for radar systems.
These characteristics were demonstrated during India’s Operation Sindoor (May 7–10, 2025), where approximately 15 BrahMos missiles struck 11 of 12 key Pakistani Air Force bases, crippling runways, command centers, and air defense systems. The strikes, launched from Su-30MKI jets and ground platforms, exposed the vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s air defenses, forcing the PAF to relocate assets and seek a ceasefire.
Pakistan’s “Soft Kill” Claim: What Does It Mean?
A “soft kill” in missile defense refers to neutralizing a threat using non-kinetic means, such as electronic jamming (disrupting the missile’s radar or navigation), spoofing (misleading the missile with false signals), or laser-based dazzling to blind sensors. Pakistan’s claim, as reported on X, suggests that the PAF used such methods to render the BrahMos ineffective without firing kinetic interceptors like surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
This assertion surfaced during a period of intense disinformation, with Pakistan’s military attempting to counter India’s narrative of a decisive victory in Operation Sindoor. The claim was part of a broader misinformation campaign, including fabricated reports of Pakistan destroying BrahMos storage sites, S-400 systems, and Indian airfields—assertions debunked by India with time-stamped visual evidence.
Why Pakistan’s Claim Is Implausible
1. BrahMos’s Resistance to Electronic Warfare
The BrahMos’s design prioritizes resilience against soft-kill measures. Its active radar seeker operates in the X-band, with frequency agility and advanced signal processing to filter out jamming attempts. The missile’s ECCM capabilities, inherited from the P-800 Oniks, allow it to maintain lock on targets even in contested electromagnetic environments. X posts note that even the baseline Oniks is “extremely resilient to jamming,” and the BrahMos, with Indian enhancements, is likely more so.
Spoofing, another soft-kill tactic, requires precise knowledge of the missile’s guidance algorithms and real-time signal manipulation—capabilities that Pakistan’s EW systems, primarily Chinese-origin, are unlikely to possess against a missile as advanced as the BrahMos. The missile’s multi-mode guidance (inertial, satellite, and radar) further reduces its vulnerability to single-point disruptions.
2. Pakistan’s Limited Air Defense Capabilities
Pakistan’s air defense network relies heavily on Chinese-supplied systems like the HQ-9 (a derivative of the Russian S-300) and HQ-16FE, supplemented by older French and American SAMs. These systems struggled significantly during Operation Sindoor:
- HQ-9 Limitations: The HQ-9, Pakistan’s most advanced SAM, has a maximum engagement speed of Mach 4.2 and a reaction time of 12–15 seconds. While theoretically capable of intercepting supersonic targets, its radar and command systems are ill-equipped to track and engage low-flying, high-speed targets like the BrahMos, which reduces detection windows to seconds. X posts highlight that the HQ-9 “completely struggled” against the BrahMos’s speed and low-altitude flight.
- Electronic Warfare Gaps: Pakistan’s EW capabilities, such as the Chinese YLC-18 radar and associated jammers, lack the sophistication to disrupt a missile with the BrahMos’s ECCM. Even advanced militaries like the U.S. and China struggle to reliably counter supersonic cruise missiles, as noted by X users.
- Operational Evidence: During Operation Sindoor, India’s BrahMos strikes penetrated Pakistani defenses, destroying critical infrastructure. The PAF’s failure to intercept these missiles, even with prior warning, is evidenced by debris (e.g., a BrahMos booster and nose cap) found in Rajasthan, indicating successful launches. Pakistan’s subsequent request for a DGMO-level ceasefire suggests its defenses were overwhelmed.
3. Soft Kill Feasibility in Combat
Soft-kill measures are most effective against slower, less sophisticated threats, such as drones or subsonic missiles, where there is sufficient time to deploy countermeasures. The BrahMos’s Mach 3 speed and low-altitude trajectory leave defenders with a reaction window of less than 10 seconds, making real-time EW intervention nearly impossible. Even if Pakistan possessed advanced jammers, the BrahMos’s autonomous guidance and high kinetic energy mean that disrupting its course would require precise, continuous interference—far beyond the capabilities of Pakistan’s current systems.
4. Historical Precedent: The 2022 BrahMos Incident
A 2022 incident, where an unarmed BrahMos missile accidentally landed in Pakistan’s Punjab province, underscores the PAF’s inability to counter this weapon. Despite Pakistan’s claim of tracking the missile from Sirsa, it failed to intercept or engage it, raising questions about its air defense efficacy. The missile evaded Pakistani radars, likely due to its speed and low RCS, and caused no damage only because it was unarmed. This event, coupled with Pakistan’s forensic interest in the missile’s wreckage, suggests a lack of technical understanding of the BrahMos, further undermining the 2025 soft-kill claim.
Pakistan’s soft-kill claim aligns with a pattern of misinformation during the 2025 clashes. Facing a devastating Indian counteroffensive, Pakistan launched a coordinated disinformation campaign, falsely claiming strikes on Indian airfields, religious sites, and even Afghan territory. These assertions were systematically debunked by India’s Ministry of External Affairs and the Press Information Bureau, which presented photographic and video evidence of intact Indian assets.
The BrahMos soft-kill narrative likely served multiple purposes:
- Domestic Morale: With Pakistani airbases crippled and assets relocated, the claim aimed to project military competence to a domestic audience.
- International Posturing: By suggesting technological parity with India, Pakistan sought to mitigate diplomatic embarrassment, especially after India’s strikes exposed its vulnerabilities.
- Deflection: The claim distracted from Pakistan’s failure to counter India’s BrahMos-led offensive, which forced a US-brokered ceasefire to avert further escalation.
The international media’s lack of attention to this claim can be attributed to its technical implausibility and Pakistan’s broader loss of credibility due to debunked misinformation. Outlets like The Washington Post noted that the “war of misinformation” continued even after a ceasefire, with Pakistan’s narrative collapsing under scrutiny.
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