SOURCE: AFI
The strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been significantly altered with India’s launch of its third SSBN (Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear) earlier this year, prompting Pakistan to escalate its naval ambitions. In a strategic countermove, Pakistan has been actively lobbying China to procure an SSBN, not just at a friendly price but with the stipulation that it be operated by a Pakistani crew and with operational costs financed by China.
Pakistan’s desire for an SSBN is driven by the need to establish a credible second-strike nuclear capability, mirroring India’s strategic posture. However, China faces a dilemma as transferring or leasing such nuclear platforms violates its own and international non-proliferation commitments.
China has offered Pakistan eight Hangor-class conventional submarines, which can be equipped with tactical nuclear warheads on sub-sonic cruise missiles. Yet, this has not satisfied the Pakistani Navy, which is eyeing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for a more robust deterrence strategy.
The current Hangor-class submarines lack the VLS necessary for launching SLBMs, leading Pakistan to demand either modifications to include VLS or the transfer of older Chinese SSBNs like the Type 092, the predecessor to the more advanced Type 094.
While China aims to expand its influence in the IOR, supporting Pakistan’s nuclear submarine program could jeopardize its relations with other global powers and complicate its international standing regarding nuclear proliferation.
Pakistan’s interest in North Korean SLBM technology hints at a broader strategy to diversify its sources of military technology, potentially circumventing strict Chinese or international controls. China remains cautious, balancing its strategic partnership with Pakistan against the risks of international backlash and the precedent such a transfer would set in global nuclear politics.