SOURCE: AFI
In a startling revelation, John Kiriakou, a former CIA counterterrorism operative who served in Pakistan, has claimed that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is effectively under the command of an American general. This statement, which has sparked widespread discussion, suggests a significant shift in the regional security dynamics, particularly in relation to India-Pakistan tensions. Kiriakou further stated that a senior Pakistani army general disclosed this arrangement, which reportedly influenced India to recalibrate its strategic posture, as the agreement was deemed sufficient to assuage Indian concerns.
Kiriakou, known for his controversial tenure with the CIA and his public disclosure of the agency’s use of waterboarding in 2007, made these claims in a recent statement that has circulated widely on social media platforms and media outlets. According to Kiriakou, the command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, estimated to include approximately 170 warheads, is not solely in the hands of Pakistani authorities but is overseen by an American general. This arrangement, he alleges, was confirmed by a senior Pakistani military official.
The claim comes in the wake of India’s Operation Sindoor, a military strike that reportedly caused significant damage to Pakistan’s Nur Khan airbase, a strategic asset located just over a mile from the headquarters of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal. The proximity of the strike to Pakistan’s nuclear nerve center raised concerns about escalation, given the long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed states. Kiriakou’s assertion suggests that the U.S. oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear command may have played a role in preventing further escalation, as it provided India with assurances about the security of Pakistan’s arsenal.
The alleged U.S. command over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has profound implications for the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry, which has been a cornerstone of South Asian security dynamics since both nations conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, characterized by a first-use policy and full-spectrum deterrence, is designed to counter India’s conventional military superiority. The introduction of U.S. oversight, as claimed by Kiriakou, could alter the strategic calculus for both nations.
According to Kiriakou, the senior Pakistani general’s disclosure of this arrangement was significant enough to prompt India to “back off” from further aggressive actions. This suggests that India, wary of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, found the U.S. involvement reassuring, as it potentially reduces the risk of unauthorized or accidental nuclear use by Pakistan. The claim aligns with India’s broader concerns about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, particularly given the country’s history of political instability and the presence of extremist groups.
Indian officials have long expressed unease about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, with former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran noting in 2014 that Pakistan’s expanding nuclear capability is driven by paranoia about U.S. attempts to disable or seize its arsenal. The alleged U.S. command could address these concerns by ensuring stricter oversight, thus reducing the likelihood of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands or being used precipitously in a crisis.
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is officially managed by the National Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the prime minister and including senior civilian and military officials. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD), under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, is responsible for the day-to-day security and management of the arsenal, with a dedicated force of approximately 10,000 troops ensuring the protection of nuclear facilities. Pakistan maintains that its nuclear weapons are stored in a disassembled state during peacetime, with fissile cores separated from warhead packages to enhance safety.
However, Kiriakou’s claim challenges the narrative of centralized Pakistani control. If true, it suggests that the U.S. has a direct role in the command and control mechanisms, potentially through Permissive Action Links (PALs) or other fail-safe systems that prevent unauthorized use. The U.S. has reportedly provided Pakistan with significant assistance, including over $100 million for nuclear security enhancements such as helicopters, night-vision goggles, and detection equipment. Despite this, Pakistan has resisted U.S. audits of its nuclear security measures, raising questions about the extent of foreign involvement.
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