SOURCE: AFI
On June 9, 2025, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) made a startling claim, asserting that its military had successfully breached the Secure Data Link (SDR) of India’s Rafale fighter jets, enabling real-time monitoring during Operation Sindoor on May 9–10, 2025. The assertion, widely circulated on X by pro-Pakistan accounts, suggested that Pakistan’s cyber and signals intelligence units intercepted critical data, including flight paths and weapon status, using advanced quantum computing capabilities. However, this claim is not only implausible but also exposes a significant gap between Pakistan’s technological prowess and the sophisticated encryption safeguarding the Rafale’s SDR.
With current Pakistani technology falling far short of the quantum computing threshold required to crack AES-256 encryption—estimated at around 6,681 logical qubits—such a feat remains a fantasy, highlighting the absurdity of the narrative.
The Rafale, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter operated by the Indian Air Force (IAF), relies on its Secure Data Link (SDR) to enable encrypted communication between aircraft, ground stations, and satellites. The SDR, part of the Thales Spectra electronic warfare suite, uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256), a symmetric encryption algorithm considered virtually unbreakable with classical computing methods. AES-256 employs a 256-bit key, requiring an exhaustive search of 2^256 possible combinations—a number so vast (approximately 1.1 x 10^77) that it would take the world’s most powerful supercomputers billions of years to crack.
Quantum computing, however, poses a theoretical threat through algorithms like Grover’s algorithm, which can reduce the search space to the square root of the key size (2^128 combinations for AES-256). Recent research, as cited in a June 2025 X post, suggests that breaking AES-256 would require a quantum computer with approximately 6,681 logical qubits. Logical qubits, corrected for errors, demand significantly more physical qubits—estimates range from 100,000 to 1 million—due to the need for fault-tolerant quantum error correction. Even then, the time to break the encryption depends on the algorithm’s efficiency and the quantum computer’s processing power, a capability far beyond current global technology.
Pakistan’s claim of breaking the Rafale’s SDR hinges on the assumption of possessing advanced quantum computing infrastructure. However, the country’s technological landscape tells a different story. Pakistan’s National Command and Control Centre (NCCC) and Strategic Plans Division (SPD) rely on imported systems, primarily from China, including the Beidou navigation system and Huawei-based communication networks. While China has made strides in quantum research—demonstrating quantum key distribution over 1,200 km in 2021—its operational quantum computers remain experimental, with the Jiuzhang and Zu Chongzhi systems achieving only 76 and 113 qubits, respectively, far below the logical qubit threshold.
Pakistan’s domestic tech sector lacks the expertise and resources to develop or sustain a quantum computer capable of 6,681 logical qubits. The country’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, managed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), are limited to conventional methods like radio frequency interception and basic cryptography, often supported by Chinese equipment like the JY-27A radar. These systems, while effective for jamming or basic data collection, are powerless against AES-256 without quantum-level processing. The idea that Pakistan could deploy such technology during Operation Sindoor, where the IAF’s Rafale jets delivered Scalp missiles with devastating precision, defies technical and logistical feasibility.
During Operation Sindoor, the IAF launched a retaliatory strike against Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bases following the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam terror attack. The Rafale jets, equipped with Spectra and SDR, executed pinpoint strikes, crippling 11 of 13 PAF airbases in 23 minutes. Post-operation analysis by the IAF and independent cyber experts found no evidence of data breaches or SDR compromise. The Rafale’s real-time data, including targeting and navigation, remained secure, as confirmed by Air Marshal AK Bharti in a May 11, 2025, press briefing. The PAF’s claim of monitoring the jets appears to be a fabricated counter-narrative, possibly to salvage morale after the IAF’s overwhelming success.
The ISPR’s assertion likely stems from intercepted open-source communications or radar tracking of Rafale flight paths, which are not indicative of SDR penetration. The Spectra suite’s electronic countermeasures, including frequency hopping and anti-jamming features, further render such a breach improbable with Pakistan’s current SIGINT arsenal.
Pakistan’s claim is more a product of psychological warfare than technological reality. By alleging a breach of the Rafale’s SDR, the ISI aims to undermine the IAF’s confidence in its cutting-edge assets and project an image of technological parity with India.
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