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SOURCE: AFI

A prominent Pakistani defence analyst, Air Commodore (Retd) Zia Ul Haque Shamsi, has stirred debate by claiming that the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, if procured by India, would become a “white elephant” for the Indian Air Force (IAF) due to its exorbitant operational costs and persistent availability challenges. Speaking to regional media, Shamsi argued that the fifth-generation stealth fighter’s price tag—both in procurement and sustainment—exceeds even that of the IAF’s existing Dassault Rafale fleet, posing a logistical and financial burden that could undermine India’s air power ambitions. His critique draws parallels with the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) own struggles to maintain its F-16 fleet, highlighting a cautionary tale for India amid escalating regional rivalries.

Shamsi’s assertion hinges on the F-35’s well-documented operational expenses, which dwarf those of the Rafale, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter already in IAF service. The F-35A, the conventional takeoff variant most relevant to India, carries a flyaway cost of approximately $80 million per unit (as of FY 2024), with export prices often inflating to $100-110 million due to training, spares, and support. However, the real sting lies in its sustainment costs—estimated at $36,000 per flight hour by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), compared to the Rafale’s $16,500 per flight hour, as derived from French Air Force data and India’s 36-jet fleet experience.

The analyst further warned that the F-35’s reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) issues, plaguing even the U.S. fleet, would hobble the IAF unless procured in large numbers. Citing the U.S. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 2023 report, Shamsi noted that the F-35 fleet averaged just 51% availability—well below the Pentagon’s 65% goal. This translates to stark realities: of 628 U.S. F-35s, only half were mission-capable at any given time, with combat-coded jets faring slightly better at 61%, and full mission capability (FMC) rates as low as 30% for the broader fleet.

For India, Shamsi posits a hypothetical procurement scenario: “If the IAF buys 60 F-35s, only 30 might be available at any moment, given the 51% rate. To get 50 jets combat-ready, they’d need at least 100 units—a massive investment.” This calculus, he argues, stems from the F-35’s frequent breakdowns—Air Force F-35As suffer critical failures twice as often as anticipated—and a strained supply chain, with depot repairs lagging at 60+ days against a 60-day goal. The IAF, accustomed to intensive training like Operation Gaganshakti (2018), would struggle to maintain even half its F-35 fleet airborne, especially in India’s diverse climates, from Rajasthan’s heat to the Northeast’s humidity—conditions the F-35 has yet to prove itself in.

Shamsi draws a parallel with the PAF’s experience maintaining its 76 Lockheed Martin F-16s, a backbone of its fleet since the 1980s. U.S. sanctions, imposed intermittently over Pakistan’s nuclear program and geopolitical shifts (e.g., 1990s Pressler Amendment), have crippled spares availability, reducing operational readiness to an estimated 50-60%—mirroring the IAF’s own Su-30MKI woes (60% availability vs. a Western norm of 75%). The PAF’s inability to secure the advanced AIM-120D AMRAAM (range: 180 km), stuck instead with the AIM-120C-5 (105 km) acquired in 2006, further limits its beyond-visual-range (BVR) edge, despite the missile’s success in downing an IAF MiG-21 in 2019.

Over a 40-year lifecycle, the F-35’s total cost for a modest fleet of 110 units could balloon to $80-100 billion, factoring in maintenance (60-70% of operating costs), upgrades, and spares. In contrast, the Rafale F4’s lifecycle cost for the same number is estimated at $48-50 billion—a savings of nearly 40%. Shamsi contends that for a resource-constrained IAF, already stretched across a diverse fleet of Su-30MKIs, MiG-29s, and Tejas variants, the F-35’s “Rolls-Royce-like upkeep” would drain budgets better spent on indigenous programs like the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

This stagnation contrasts sharply with the IAF’s Rafale jets, armed with the Meteor BVR missile (200+ km range), which outclasses the C-5 and even the Chinese PL-15 (150-200 km) on Pakistan’s JF-17s. Shamsi suggests that India risks replicating the PAF’s logistical quagmire with the F-35, especially given its reliance on a U.S. supply chain vulnerable to CAATSA sanctions—already a concern after India’s S-400 purchase from Russia.

While Shamsi’s “white elephant” label resonates with critiques from U.S. oversight bodies—GAO’s $1.7 trillion lifecycle cost estimate for 2,470 F-35s equates to $44 million annually per jet—his argument invites scrutiny. The F-35’s stealth, sensor fusion (AN/APG-81 AESA radar, Distributed Aperture System), and network-centric warfare capabilities offer a generational leap over the Rafale, potentially justifying its cost against threats like China’s J-20 (200+ units) and Pakistan’s looming J-35 acquisition. Availability could improve with scale, as seen with combat-coded U.S. jets, and India’s growing defence-industrial ties with the U.S. might mitigate spares issues over time.

Conversely, the Rafale’s proven reliability (French Air Force: 75%+ availability) and synergy with India’s 36-jet fleet make it a safer bet. The IAF’s current squadron strength (30 vs. a sanctioned 42) demands numbers, not niche platforms—a point Shamsi overlooks. A smaller F-35 fleet (e.g., 40 jets for “door-kicking” strikes) paired with Rafales and Tejas could balance capability and cost, but integrating a seventh fighter type risks the logistical chaos Shamsi predicts, echoing the IAF’s historical 50-60% fleet availability struggles (CAG, 2017).

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