SOURCE: AFI
Pakistan’s air defense strategy is undergoing a significant shift as the country explores the acquisition of Turkey’s advanced S?PER 1 and S?PER 2 long-range air and missile defense systems. This pivot comes in the wake of the underwhelming performance of Chinese-supplied HQ-16 and HQ-9 systems during recent conflicts with India, where they failed to detect or intercept Indian strikes and were crippled by Indian electronic warfare (EW) tactics. The move signals Pakistan’s growing frustration with its current air defense architecture and a strategic effort to diversify its defense partnerships amid evolving regional threats.
During Operation Sindoor, launched by India on May 7, 2025, in response to a terror attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 civilians, Indian forces conducted precision strikes on terrorist sites and key Pakistani airbases, including Noor Khan and Rahimyar Khan. Indian Air Force (IAF) Rafale jets, armed with French-origin SCALP cruise missiles, bypassed Pakistan’s HQ-16 and HQ-9 systems, which failed to intercept a single missile. Reports indicate that Indian EW capabilities, including radar jamming and signal suppression, effectively blinded Pakistan’s air defense network, leaving critical installations vulnerable. The strikes not only destroyed terrorist infrastructure but also damaged HQ-9 launchers in Lahore and Sialkot, exposing the limitations of Chinese technology in a real combat scenario.
The HQ-16, with a range of 40-70 km, and the HQ-9, capable of engaging targets up to 200-300 km, were marketed as robust solutions against aerial threats, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. However, their inability to counter India’s low-altitude, stealthy SCALP missiles—combined with the successful jamming of their radars—has led to a crisis of confidence in Pakistan’s air defense capabilities. The failure of these systems to protect key airbases has been a particular point of concern, as India’s loitering munitions and drones struck high-value targets with surgical precision, unchallenged by Pakistan’s defenses.
In response, Pakistan has turned its attention to Turkey’s S?PER air defense systems, which are gaining a reputation for advanced technology and reliability. The S?PER Block 1 guided missile, already operational, can engage aerial targets at a range of 70 km, offering a comparable capability to the HQ-16 but with improved radar and guidance systems designed to resist electronic countermeasures. More promising is the S?PER Block 2, currently in testing and expected to be operational with the Turkish Air Force by 2026. Tested in 2024, the Block 2 variant extends its engagement range to 150 km, positioning it as a direct competitor to the HQ-9 while incorporating modern features to counter stealth and jamming threats. The Turkish Air Force has also been evaluating the system’s resilience against radar jamming and electronic warfare, a critical factor for Pakistan given its recent experiences.
Pakistan’s interest in the S?PER systems reflects a broader trend of diversifying its defense acquisitions beyond China, which has been its primary supplier for decades. The poor performance of the HQ-16 and HQ-9 has not only embarrassed Pakistan but also strained its defense relationship with Beijing, with Chinese netizens openly criticizing Pakistan’s operational handling of the systems. This has pushed Pakistan to seek alternatives that can better address the sophisticated threats posed by India, whose air defense and EW capabilities—bolstered by systems like the S-400, Akash, and indigenous jammers—have proven superior in recent engagements.
The S?PER systems offer several advantages that could address Pakistan’s current vulnerabilities. Their advanced radar technology, designed to counter electronic warfare, could mitigate the jamming tactics employed by India. Additionally, the Block 2’s 150 km range would provide Pakistan with a credible long-range defense option, potentially filling the gap left by the HQ-9’s failures. Turkey’s growing defense industry, which has seen success with systems like the Bayraktar TB2 drone, also makes it an attractive partner for Pakistan, which is looking to modernize its forces while reducing reliance on Chinese equipment that has underperformed in combat.
However, integrating the S?PER systems into Pakistan’s air defense architecture will not be without challenges. The country’s existing Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence (CLIAD) framework, which relies heavily on Chinese systems like the HQ-16, HQ-9, and LY-80, may face compatibility issues with Turkish technology. Moreover, Pakistan’s economic constraints—compounded by a defense budget stretched thin by previous procurements—could complicate the acquisition process. The cost of the S?PER systems, while not publicly disclosed, is likely to be significant, especially for a country already grappling with the high maintenance costs of its Chinese equipment.
The failure of the HQ-16 and HQ-9 systems has also highlighted deeper systemic issues within Pakistan’s air defense strategy, including inadequate operator training and overreliance on foreign technology without sufficient domestic expertise. While the S?PER systems may offer a technological upgrade, addressing these underlying issues will be crucial for Pakistan to effectively counter India’s aerial dominance. The IAF’s ability to conduct stand-off strikes, as demonstrated in Operation Sindoor, underscores the need for Pakistan to not only acquire new systems but also enhance its EW capabilities and training protocols.
NOTE: AFI is a proud outsourced content creator partner of IDRW.ORG. All content created by AFI is the sole property of AFI and is protected by copyright. AFI takes copyright infringement seriously and will pursue all legal options available to protect its content.