SOURCE: AFI
A recent war simulation conducted by a Pakistani think tank, reportedly backed by the country’s military, has sparked intense debate over its provocative findings. The simulation posits that Pakistan could use low-yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) on its own soil against advancing Indian troops in a future conflict, compelling world powers to intervene and enforce a ceasefire. By limiting the strike to Pakistani territory, the think tank argues, India would be deterred from escalating to a full-scale nuclear response, as the attack would not directly target Indian soil.
The simulation further suggests that minimal Indian casualties would prevent a disproportionate Indian retaliation, allowing Pakistan to claim a strategic victory akin to its perceived success in the 1965 war. However, this high-stakes strategy raises serious questions about its assumptions, risks, and implications for regional stability.
The think tank’s scenario envisions a conventional conflict where Indian forces, leveraging their numerical and technological superiority, penetrate Pakistani territory. To halt this advance, Pakistan deploys TNWs—such as the Nasr missile, a 60-kilometer-range system designed for battlefield use—against Indian troops on Pakistani soil. The simulation assumes these low-yield weapons, with yields as small as 0.5-5 kilotons, would disrupt Indian operations without causing massive casualties, thereby avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe that could trigger global outrage.
By confining the strike to its own territory, Pakistan aims to exploit a perceived loophole in escalation dynamics. The think tank argues that India, bound by its No First Use (NFU) nuclear policy and wary of international condemnation, would hesitate to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons against Pakistani cities or military targets. Instead, the simulation predicts that world powers—particularly the United States, China, and Russia—would swiftly intervene to broker a ceasefire, fearing a broader nuclear exchange. This diplomatic pressure, the think tank claims, would freeze the conflict, allowing Pakistan to negotiate from a position of strength and claim a political victory, much like it did after the 1965 war, where a ceasefire brokered by the Soviet Union ended hostilities without a decisive military outcome.
The simulation’s optimism hinges on several critical assumptions. First, it presumes that Pakistan can precisely calibrate the strike to minimize Indian casualties—potentially in the hundreds rather than thousands—to avoid provoking a massive Indian response. The Nasr missile, equipped with a “shoot-and-scoot” capability, is touted for its accuracy, but battlefield conditions, including troop dispersion and weather, could undermine such precision. A miscalculation leading to significant Indian losses could prompt India to abandon restraint, especially given its doctrine of “massive retaliation” to any nuclear first use, as reiterated by defense officials in recent years.
Second, the think tank assumes that world powers would act swiftly and uniformly to impose a ceasefire. While the U.S. and other nations have historically mediated India-Pakistan crises—such as during the 1999 Kargil conflict or the 2019 Balakot standoff—their ability to enforce de-escalation in a nuclear scenario is uncertain. The simulation overlooks the possibility that China, Pakistan’s closest ally, might adopt a more ambiguous stance, while Russia’s alignment with India could complicate neutral mediation. Moreover, the global community’s response might prioritize punitive measures, such as sanctions, over diplomatic solutions, further isolating Pakistan economically.
Third, the strategy banks on India’s restraint, assuming New Delhi would prioritize international optics over decisive action. Yet, India’s evolving nuclear posture, including hints of reconsidering NFU in 2019, suggests a willingness to respond forcefully to any nuclear use, regardless of location. A tactical strike on Indian troops could be perceived as crossing a red line, prompting retaliation against Pakistani military assets or even population centers, escalating the conflict beyond the think tank’s projections.
The think tank’s reference to the 1965 war as a model for victory is contentious. In that conflict, Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar aimed to spark an insurgency in Kashmir but failed to achieve its objectives, leading to a broader war. Despite fierce battles, including the largest tank engagement since World War II, the conflict ended in a stalemate with the Tashkent Declaration, brokered by the Soviet Union. Pakistan’s narrative of “victory” stems from its ability to resist India’s advance and secure a ceasefire, but India’s capture of key territories, like the Haji Pir Pass, and higher Pakistani losses—estimated at 5,800 killed compared to India’s 2,862—paint a less triumphant picture.
The 1965 analogy falters in the nuclear context. Unlike conventional warfare, where losses can be absorbed and territories regained, a nuclear strike introduces irreversible consequences. Even a limited TNW strike risks catastrophic escalation, as India’s doctrine does not distinguish between tactical and strategic nuclear use. The think tank’s belief that Pakistan could replicate a 1965-style diplomatic win ignores the unprecedented stakes of nuclear conflict, where global powers might prioritize containment over rewarding Pakistan’s gambit.
The simulation’s reliance on TNWs reflects Pakistan’s broader nuclear posture, which emphasizes “full-spectrum deterrence” to counter India’s conventional advantage. The Nasr missile, introduced in 2011, was explicitly designed to deter India’s “Cold Start” doctrine, a strategy for rapid, limited incursions into Pakistani territory. However, the deployment of TNWs lowers the nuclear threshold, increasing the risk of miscalculation. Unlike strategic weapons stored centrally, TNWs require battlefield dispersal, raising concerns about command-and-control vulnerabilities and the potential for unauthorized use.
For India, the simulation’s findings reinforce the need for a robust counter-strategy. The IAF’s acquisition of Rafale jets, equipped with long-range missiles, and the Army’s Integrated Battle Groups suggest a focus on preemptive and retaliatory capabilities. India’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program, though nascent, could further complicate Pakistan’s calculations, potentially neutralizing low-yield strikes. Beyond military measures, India’s diplomatic clout, bolstered by partnerships with the U.S., France, and Russia, could ensure that any Pakistani nuclear use invites severe international repercussions, undermining the think tank’s ceasefire scenario.
Globally, the simulation highlights the fragility of nuclear stability in South Asia. The region’s history of four conventional wars (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999) and numerous skirmishes underscores the ever-present risk of conflict. A nuclear strike, even on Pakistani soil, would send shockwaves through international markets, disrupt global supply chains, and strain diplomatic relations. The think tank’s assumption that world powers would prioritize Pakistan’s narrative over India’s response overlooks the broader geopolitical context, where India’s economic and strategic weight increasingly shapes global perceptions.
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