SOURCE: AFI
In a significant move to strengthen dormant defense ties with the United States, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Chief Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu arrived in Washington on July 2, 2025, for high-level engagements with U.S. military and political leadership. The visit, the first by a serving PAF chief in over a decade, has sparked speculation that Sidhu is lobbying for the procurement of the AIM-120D, the latest and most advanced variant of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), for Pakistan’s fleet of approximately 18 F-16 Block 52 fighter jets.
This push comes in the wake of reported failures of the Chinese-made PL-15E Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles (BVRAAMs) during the recent India-Pakistan conflict, Operation Sindoor, in May 2025. However, U.S. concerns about potential Chinese access to the advanced missile system may pose a significant hurdle to Pakistan’s ambitions.
Sidhu’s visit to Washington, following Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir’s meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in June 2025, signals a broader effort to reset military ties between Islamabad and Washington. The PAF chief held meetings at the Pentagon, State Department, and Capitol Hill, engaging with key figures such as U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General David W. Allvin, Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs Kelly L. Seybolt, and prominent U.S. Congress members, including Mike Turner and Rich McCormick. According to the Pakistan Air Force, the visit aimed to “further enhance bilateral defence cooperation and mutual interests,” addressing regional security and technological collaboration.
The timing of the visit is notable, coming weeks after Operation Sindoor, a brief but intense conflict triggered by a Pakistan-backed terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 22, 2025, which killed 26 civilians. During the conflict, the Indian Air Force (IAF) conducted precision strikes on 11 PAF airbases, including Nur Khan, Bholari, and Sargodha, using BrahMos cruise missiles, SCALP missiles, and Harop loitering munitions. The IAF’s success in evading and destroying Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied HQ-9B and HQ-16 air defense systems exposed vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s air defense capabilities, prompting a reevaluation of its reliance on Chinese weaponry.
A key focus of Sidhu’s visit is believed to be the procurement of the AIM-120D AMRAAM, a state-of-the-art air-to-air missile with a range exceeding 180 kilometers, advanced active radar homing, and improved resistance to electronic countermeasures. The missile is intended to equip Pakistan’s fleet of approximately 18 F-16 Block 52 jets, which were acquired in 2006 along with older AIM-120C-5 AMRAAMs. These older missiles, now nearly 20 years old, are nearing the end of their service life and are slated forreplacement with Turkish-made BVRAAMs, such as the GÖKTU? series developed by TÜB?TAK SAGE. However, the PAF’s interest in the AIM-120D reflects a desire to upgrade its air-to-air combat capabilities with a proven, cutting-edge system.
The push for the AIM-120D is driven by the underwhelming performance of the Chinese PL-15E BVRAAM during Operation Sindoor. Pakistani claims of downing five IAF aircraft—three Rafales, one Su-30 MKI, and one MiG-29—using J-10CE fighters equipped with PL-15E missiles were met with skepticism, as India has not officially confirmed these losses. Reports indicate that the PL-15E, an export variant of China’s PL-15 missile, failed to effectively counter IAF aircraft, which were equipped with advanced electronic warfare systems and Meteor missiles. An unexploded PL-15E missile recovered by India during the conflict further highlighted its limitations, prompting Pakistan to seek more reliable alternatives.
Despite Pakistan’s interest, the U.S. is reportedly hesitant to supply the AIM-120D due to concerns that China could gain access to the missile’s sensitive technology. Pakistan’s deepening defense ties with China, including the planned acquisition of 40 J-35 stealth jets and the continued use of Chinese systems like the J-10CE and HQ-9B, raise fears that Beijing could study the AIM-120D’s advanced guidance systems, radar technology, and countermeasures. Such access could compromise the missile’s effectiveness and provide China with insights into countering U.S. and allied air forces.
The U.S. has historically imposed strict export controls on advanced weaponry to prevent technology leaks, particularly to strategic competitors like China. During the 2006 F-16 deal, Pakistan received a limited number of AIM-120C-5 missiles under stringent end-use monitoring agreements. The reluctance to supply the AIM-120D reflects ongoing U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s reliability as a partner, especially given its strategic alignment with China and past instances of technology sharing.
NOTE: AFI is a proud outsourced content creator partner of IDRW.ORG. All content created by AFI is the sole property of AFI and is protected by copyright. AFI takes copyright infringement seriously and will pursue all legal options available to protect its content.