SOURCE: AFI
According to Pakistani defense analyst Bilal Khan, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had banked on a repeat of the 2019 Balakot scenario during India’s Operation Sindoor, launched on May 7, 2025, targeting Pakistani terror infrastructure. The PAF anticipated that alleged IAF losses on the first night of the strikes would deter India from further operations, as seen in 2019 when India refrained from escalation after losing a MiG-21. However, as Khan notes in his June 5, 2025, analysis, India’s perception of “cost” versus “benefit” diverged significantly from Pakistan’s projections, leading to a strategic pivot that caught the PAF off guard and nearly halted its operations.
On the night of May 7, 2025, the PAF demonstrated its ability to engage Indian aircraft while they were still within Indian airspace, marking an apparent setback for the IAF. This engagement, likely involving PAF’s JF-17 Thunder jets equipped with PL-12 missiles, was intended to signal Pakistan’s defensive resolve and deter further Indian action. Khan suggests that the PAF expected India to back off, as it did post-Balakot in 2019, when perspective, fearing the cost of escalation would outweigh the benefits of sustained operations. However, India quickly regrouped, reassessing its strategy and redefining its approach to imposing its national security interests on Pakistan.
India’s response was far more aggressive and technologically sophisticated than the PAF had anticipated. The IAF leveraged advanced weaponry, including loitering munitions like the Israeli-made Harop and Alpha Design’s SkyStriker, as well as the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (SSCM), to devastating effect. Loitering munitions were used to create a persistent presence over Pakistan’s urban areas, disrupting PAF operations and sowing chaos, while BrahMos missiles struck key PAF installations with precision. Major airbases, including Nur Khan, Bholari, and Sukkur, were hit, destroying critical infrastructure such as UCAV hangars, a Saab 2000 AWACS hangar, a TPS-43J radar, and Next Gen Mobile Mission Control Centres (NG-MMCCs). The IAF also reportedly destroyed 4-5 PAF jets on the ground, a loss far exceeding Pakistan’s expectations.
This multi-pronged assault not only crippled PAF infrastructure but also halted its Combat Air Patrols (CAPs), as the risk of further losses grounded much of its fighter fleet. The PAF, expecting India to shy away from escalation, was unprepared for the scale and intensity of the IAF’s operations, which effectively dismantled its operational capacity in the initial days of the conflict.
Khan highlights that the PAF’s strategy hinged on the assumption that India would prioritize minimizing losses over achieving its objectives, a calculation rooted in the 2019 experience. However, India’s leadership in 2025 perceived the “cost” of inaction as far greater than the risks of escalation, especially given the strategic need to neutralize Pakistan’s support for terrorism following the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack.
The unexpected scale of India’s strikes left the PAF reeling. The destruction of 4-5 jets on the ground, combined with the loss of critical infrastructure, forced the PAF to suspend CAP patrols, severely limiting its ability to respond to Indian incursions. The psychological impact was equally significant, as the IAF’s ability to strike deep into Pakistan with impunity shattered the PAF’s confidence in its defensive posture. Khan notes that the PAF’s over-reliance on static defenses and underestimation of India’s willingness to escalate were key factors in its operational paralysis during the initial phase of Operation Sindoor.
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