SOURCE: IDRW.ORG
In the wake of India’s Operation Sindoor, a four-day military engagement from May 7 to May 10, 2025, Chinese defense analysts and social media commentators have sharply criticized Pakistan’s handling of the Chinese-supplied HQ-9 air defense system, labeling its personnel as “mute spectators” due to operational inefficiencies and inadequate training. The operation, launched in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 22, 2025, which killed 26 civilians, saw Indian forces penetrate Pakistan’s air defenses with ease, leveraging superior missile technology, satellite intelligence, and electronic warfare (EW).
The destruction of several HQ-9 batteries by Indian loitering munitions, alongside losses of fighter jets, surveillance aircraft, drones, and radar sites, has not only embarrassed Pakistan’s military but also cast significant doubts on the reliability of Chinese defense exports, particularly the HQ-9 system. This article examines the reasons behind the HQ-9’s failure, its implications for China’s global arms market ambitions, and the broader strategic fallout for the China-Pakistan defense partnership.
The HQ-9, developed by China’s Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), is a long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system designed to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and tactical ballistic missiles. Marketed as an analog to the U.S. Patriot and Russian S-300 systems, the HQ-9P and HQ-9B variants, with ranges of 125 km and 250–300 km respectively, form the backbone of Pakistan’s Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence (CLIAD) architecture. The system integrates advanced radars like the HT-233 passive electronically scanned array and employs semi-active radar homing (SARH) with mid-course data-link updates and terminal active radar homing for precision targeting. Each battery includes 192 missiles, 48 launch vehicles, and multiple radar and control vehicles, designed to provide robust area and point defense.
Pakistan, which acquired the HQ-9P in 2021 and the enhanced HQ-9BE in subsequent years, has heavily relied on these systems to counter India’s air power, particularly its Rafale jets and BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. Chinese media and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have touted the HQ-9’s high interception rates in simulated exercises, claiming it can engage low-flying targets, hypersonic threats, and saturation attacks. However, Operation Sindoor revealed critical shortcomings, as the system failed to detect or intercept Indian precision strikes involving BrahMos missiles, French-origin SCALP cruise missiles, and Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions.
India’s success was amplified by its use of satellite intelligence, likely from ISRO’s network of 10 satellites providing round-the-clock surveillance, and advanced EW tactics, including radar jamming and signal suppression. These capabilities neutralized Pakistan’s CLIAD, rendering the HQ-9 and medium-range HQ-16 (LY-80) systems ineffective. A notable strike on an HQ-9 battery in Lahore, confirmed by Indian media and social media videos, highlighted the system’s inability to counter low-observable munitions and loitering drones.
Despite these critiques, the HQ-9’s design, heavily influenced by the Russian S-300 and incorporating elements of U.S. and Israeli technology, has raised concerns about its suitability against modern, high-speed missiles like the BrahMos, which combines speed, low-altitude flight, and unpredictable trajectories. The system’s reliance on semi-active radar homing and separate guidance radar vehicles may also limit its mobility and effectiveness in dynamic combat scenarios, particularly in Pakistan’s mountainous border regions.
The HQ-9’s dismal performance in Operation Sindoor has sparked a crisis of confidence in Chinese defense exports, which account for nearly two-thirds of Pakistan’s arms imports and position China as the fourth-largest global arms exporter. The system’s failure to intercept a single Indian missile, as reported by OpIndia, has been described as a “technological indictment” of Beijing’s export-grade hardware. This echoes previous incidents, such as the 2019 Balakot airstrike and a 2022 accidental BrahMos launch, where Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied defenses failed to respond effectively.