You dont have javascript enabled! Please enable it!
Archives

SOURCE: AFI

A tragic incident on December 18, 2024, off the Mumbai coast, where a naval speedboat collided with the passenger ferry Neel Kamal, killing 15 people, has taken a new turn. An investigation by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL), has found no mechanical or design faults in the speedboat, shifting the focus to human error as the primary cause.

Mumbai Police, aligning with this finding, have pointed to operational negligence by the speedboat’s crew, prompting a deeper probe into accountability and safety protocols. This article delves into the investigation’s findings, the police’s stance, and the broader implications for naval and maritime safety in India.

On December 18, 2024, a naval speedboat, during a routine engine trial near the Gateway of India, collided with the Neel Kamal, a ferry en route from the Gateway to Elephanta Island. The speedboat, traveling at over 40 knots, struck the ferry, causing it to capsize. Of the 113 passengers on board the ferry, 15 perished, including a naval sailor and two speedboat crew members. The incident, captured on video and widely shared on X, sparked outrage and raised questions about maritime safety in one of India’s busiest coastal zones. A survivor, speaking to NDTV, recounted the chaos: “The boat came out of nowhere… we had no time to react” .

The Indian Navy immediately launched a Board of Inquiry (BoI), while Mumbai Police registered a case under sections 304(2) (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code against the speedboat’s crew. The OEM, Cochin Shipyard Limited, was tasked with a technical assessment of the vessel to determine if mechanical failure contributed to the tragedy.

Cochin Shipyard Limited’s report, submitted to the Navy and Mumbai Police in early April 2025, concluded that the speedboat was mechanically sound at the time of the collision. The vessel, a rigid inflatable boat (RIB) designed for high-speed operations, underwent rigorous trials post-incident, including engine performance, steering, and stability tests. The OEM found no evidence of throttle malfunction, steering failure, or structural defects that could have caused the speedboat to veer uncontrollably into the ferry’s path .

CSL’s findings corroborated the Navy’s preliminary BoI report, which noted that the speedboat’s engines were being tested at peak capacity but within design limits. The boat, built under a ?500 crore contract for 20 such vessels, met all safety and operational standards, including those mandated by the Indian Register of Shipping (IRS). A CSL official, speaking anonymously to Hindustan Times, emphasized, “The boat performed as expected during trials. The issue lies elsewhere” .

With mechanical failure ruled out, Mumbai Police have zeroed in on human error as the likely cause. Deputy Commissioner of Police (Port Zone), Rajesh Deo, stated on April 14, 2025, that the speedboat’s crew failed to adhere to standard operating procedures (SOPs) during the trial. Preliminary findings suggest the crew did not maintain a safe distance from civilian vessels, a critical oversight in the congested waters near the Gateway of India, where ferries, yachts, and fishing boats operate in close proximity .

Police investigations revealed that the speedboat’s coxswain, a junior sailor, may have misjudged the ferry’s trajectory, leading to the collision. Eyewitness accounts, including those from surviving ferry passengers, indicate the speedboat was traveling at full throttle with little time to maneuver. A senior police official told Hindustan Times, “The coxswain and the trial supervisor should have anticipated the ferry’s path and slowed down or altered course. This was a preventable tragedy” .

The police are also examining whether the trial was conducted in an appropriate zone. Maritime regulations designate specific areas for high-speed trials to avoid civilian traffic, but sources suggest the speedboat may have strayed into a busy corridor. The Navy’s BoI, expected to conclude by May 2025, will further clarify these operational lapses, potentially leading to disciplinary action against the crew and oversight officers.

NOTE: AFI is a proud outsourced content creator partner of IDRW.ORG. All content created by AFI is the sole property of AFI and is protected by copyright. AFI takes copyright infringement seriously and will pursue all legal options available to protect its content.