SOURCE: AFI
India’s quest for self-reliance in defence technology has long hinged on the development of an indigenous jet engine, a goal epitomized by the Kaveri engine program. Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Retd), a former Indian Air Force (IAF) officer and defence analyst, recently described the Kaveri experience as “a story of a glass more than half full.” Despite its challenges, the program has delivered a functional engine, a wealth of data, and invaluable experience at a relatively low cost.
However, Ahlawat cautions that the Kaveri, now a mature engine, has limited potential for further improvement and cannot meet the thrust requirements of India’s next-generation fighters like the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and Tejas Mk2. To address this critical shortfall, he advocates for a new engine—tentatively dubbed Kaveri 2.0—and a strategic decision to either develop it indigenously or partner with a global original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The clarion call, he emphasizes, is clear: “Fund Indigenous Engine.”
Initiated in 1986 by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), a DRDO laboratory, the Kaveri engine was designed to power the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). Over nearly four decades, the program has overcome significant hurdles, achieving a functional engine with 49 kN dry thrust and 78 kN wet (afterburner) thrust. Ahlawat highlights the program’s successes, noting that India has accrued a “plethora of data points and experience” at a cost far lower than global peers. The Kaveri’s testbed, flown on Russia’s Il-76 aircraft, and its marine variant for naval applications demonstrate its versatility, while advancements in materials, single-crystal blades, and blade-cooling technology reflect significant technological progress.
However, the Kaveri falls short of modern fighter requirements. Even in an optimistic scenario, Ahlawat estimates the engine could achieve 55 kN dry and 85 kN wet thrust, insufficient for the AMCA and Tejas Mk2, which require engines delivering 100–130 kN wet thrust to compete with platforms like China’s J-20 or enable super-cruise capabilities. The current Kaveri’s design, now fully mature, offers limited scope for performance or weight improvements without a complete overhaul. This reality necessitates the development of a new engine, Kaveri 2.0, to power India’s fifth-generation AMCA and the enhanced Tejas Mk2, both critical to maintaining air superiority in a volatile region.
Ahlawat outlines two strategic options for Kaveri 2.0: fully indigenous development or collaboration with an established OEM like Safran, GE, or Rolls-Royce. Each path presents unique advantages and challenges, with the decision hinging on India’s priorities for sovereign control, timelines, and cost.
Indigenous Development: Building Kaveri 2.0 independently would grant India complete ownership of intellectual property (IP), enabling strategic flexibility in exports and ancillary applications, such as marine or industrial gas turbines. This approach aligns with the Aatmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) vision, ensuring long-term autonomy in a critical technology area. However, the challenges are formidable. Developing a 100–130 kN engine from scratch could take 10–15 years and cost over $2 billion, with risks of time and cost overruns, as seen in the original Kaveri program. India’s limited expertise in advanced technologies like single-crystal blades, advanced cooling systems, and digital engine controls further complicates this path.
OEM Partnership: Collaborating with a proven OEM offers a faster, less risky route. Companies like Safran, which has expressed interest in co-developing a 110–130 kN engine for the AMCA, or GE and Rolls-Royce, bring expertise in critical areas like high-temperature materials, compressor design, and digital controls. A partnership could deliver a production-ready engine within 7–10 years, aligning with the AMCA’s production timeline (2035) and Tejas Mk2’s induction schedule. Such a collaboration would also build domestic expertise through technology transfer (ToT), enabling India to develop future engines independently. However, the degree of IP ownership and sovereign control remains a concern, as foreign partners may impose restrictions on exports or upgrades.
Ahlawat emphasizes that any partnership must ensure India retains sufficient control over development, testing, upgrading, and selling the engine. Drawing an analogy to the Tejas program, he notes that while the aircraft relies on imported subsystems like the Elta radar, Martin Baker ejection seats, and Russian/Israeli missiles, India maintains adequate sovereign control through spare depth and indigenous alternatives. An engine partnership must similarly avoid creating a critical dependency that could ground the fleet, as seen with the IAF’s reliance on GE’s F404 engines for the Tejas Mk1A, where supply chain delays have stalled deliveries.
The choice between indigenous development and OEM collaboration hinges on balancing time, cost, and strategic autonomy. An indigenous Kaveri 2.0 would solidify India’s position as a global defence technology player, enabling exports to friendly nations and supporting ancillary applications like naval propulsion. However, the 10–15-year timeline risks delaying the AMCA and Tejas Mk2, both critical to countering China’s advancing air capabilities and Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied platforms, such as the J-10C with PL-15 missiles.
A partnership with an OEM like Safran, which has a history of collaboration with India (e.g., the Shakti engine for helicopters), could bridge critical gaps in materials, testing, and manufacturing. Safran’s proposed 110–130 kN engine aligns with the AMCA’s requirements, offering advanced features like single-crystal blades and digital controls while allowing India to retain significant IP rights. Such a model, similar to the US-India collaboration on GE F414 engines for the Tejas Mk2, could accelerate development while building domestic capabilities. The choice of OEM would depend on factors like cost, ToT extent, and strategic alignment, with France’s Safran emerging as a frontrunner due to its willingness to co-develop and India’s growing defence ties with Paris.
Ahlawat’s call to action—“Fund Indigenous Engine”—underscores the urgency of prioritizing engine development to achieve true self-reliance. The Kaveri program’s lessons, including advancements in compressor design, afterburner technology, and testing protocols, provide a strong foundation for Kaveri 2.0. Whether developed independently or with an OEM, the engine must address the critical shortfall in thrust and incorporate next-generation technologies to power India’s future fighters. The DRDO’s recent approval of the AMCA execution model, allowing private sector participation, signals a broader push for industry collaboration, which could extend to engine development through partnerships with firms like Tata or Reliance.
The stakes are high. Without a domestic engine, India risks prolonged dependency on foreign suppliers, as seen with the Tejas Mk1A’s delays due to GE engine shortages. Social media discussions on X highlight public frustration with these delays, with users emphasizing the need for a robust engine program to support India’s defence ambitions. The IAF’s recent success in Operation Sindoor (May 2025) demonstrated its operational prowess, but Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh’s warnings about procurement delays underscore the engine’s role as a critical bottleneck.
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